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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to analyse the modern trends among the Muslims
concerning the problem of sovereignty. The question of sovereignty, which basically
deals with political power, has become a matter of great concern to the Muslims since
the nineteenth century especially those who are interested in the real principles of
Islamic statehood as opposed to the western political concepts. There have been
remarkable attempts by modern Muslim scholars to reconstruct early Islamic theories
of rulership in cirumstances which have been entirely different to those in which the
theories were born, chiefly due to the encounter between Islam and the West. These
scholars have attempted to express these theories in modern terms amongst which the
word sovereignty is in common use. Owing to the great impact of the Western notions
of sovereignty, we shall also consider to what extent they have influenced the
emergence of the new Muslim attitudes.
It is advisable, therefore, to start the study with an examination of the origins of
the Western theories in order to understand the Islamic concept of sovereignty as
conceived by the modern Muslims. In Europe, sovereignty emerged as an important
political concept after the religious wars of the sixteenth century and as a result of the
creation of the territorial nation state. Though, it is generally an accepted working
assumption up to the present time, yet it is an ambiguous term and lends itself to
different interpretaions. In fact, it has been given a variety of forms in a number of
theories which are all surrounded with much controversy. Nonetheless, all states of the
modern world, including the Muslim countries, have been founded on the basis of
these Western theories.
After the Western sources the study looks into the early Islamic ideas of
rulership from which the Muslims derive their inspirations. The survey of the modem
Muslim views that follows covers the political thought of the Ottomans, the Arabs and
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Foreword
The purpose of this study is to analyse the modern trends among the Muslims
concerning the problem of sovereignty. The question of sovereignty, which basically
deals with political power, has become a matter of great concern to the Muslims since
the nineteenth century especially those who are interested in the real principles of
Islamic statehood as opposed to the western political concepts. There have been
remarkable attempts by modern Muslim scholars to reconstruct early Islamic theories
of rulership in cirumstances which have been entirely different to those in which the
theories were born, chiefly due to the encounter between Islam and the West. These
scholars have attempted to express these theories in modern terms amongst which the
word sovereignty is in common use. Owing to the great impact of the Western notions
of sovereignty, we shall also consider to what extent they have influenced the
emergence of the new Muslim attitudes.
It is advisable, therefore, to start the study with an examination of the origins of
the Western theories in order to understand the Islamic concept of sovereignty as
conceived by the modern Muslims. In Europe, sovereignty emerged as an important
political concept after the religious wars of the sixteenth century and as a result of the
creation of the territorial nation state. Though, it is generally an accepted working
assumption up to the present time, yet it is an ambiguous term and lends itself to
different interpretaions. In fact, it has been given a variety of forms in a number of
theories which are all surrounded with much controversy. Nonetheless, all states of the
modern world, including the Muslim countries, have been founded on the basis of
these Western theories.
After the Western sources the study looks into the early Islamic ideas of
rulership from which the Muslims derive their inspirations. The survey of the modem
Muslim views that follows covers the political thought of the Ottomans, the Arabs and
the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent since the ninteenth century.
Chapter 1
ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT IN THE WEST
I. The Evolution of the Concept of Sovereignty
i. Influences of Formation
The concept of sovereignty is best understood if it is associated with the
circumstances in which it appeared. In Europe the modem use of the notion emerged at
the close of the sixteenth century. Several factors at that time were in the process of
bringing about radical transformations in Western society. The long struggle between
the Pope and the Emperor, the gradual concentration of power in the hands of regional
monarchs, the revival of the ideas of Greece and Rome, and similar interlinked forces
had helped in the formulation of the new outlooks. However, the emergence of the
modem concept of sovereignty is closely linked with the birth of the national secular
state and the development of positive law. In fact the modern theory of sovereignty
owed much of its existence to these two changes. Without the evolution of the
territorial state as a creator of law, sovereignty in its modern European formula could
not have appeared.1 A historian of sovereignty observes:
"Without the revolutionary idea that valid law might be created
by an act of will, and not simply discovered by an act of understanding ,
the modern theory of the state could scarcely have emerged. For once it
is admitted that law can be made , and made specifically by the political
authority, the political order no longer stands on an equal footing with
other associations. If these derive their powers from law, the political
authority as law-creator must be, in some sense, above the law, and
superior to other associations. Thus the theory of sovereignty as
developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ... involved the
logical divorce of law and custom, and the preeminence of the
community's political organization. The law-making state became the
source of legitimacy for all other forms of social organizations".2
Those influences which have shaped the Western concept of sovereignty will
briefly be looked into in the following discussion.
1 See F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd. ed.(Cambridge, 1986), ch. 3; A. P. D'Entreves, The
Notion of the State (Oxford, 1967), pp. 89-95.
2 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, Social principles and the Democratic State (London, 1963),
p. 275.
The Positive Concept of Law
The new ideas in the field of law, initially, were not so much direct outcomes
of political changes in Europe as importations from and rediscoveries of other different
civilizations.1 The renewed study of Roman law led Western legal thinking to draw a
distinction between divine or natural law and positive law; between the law of God and
the law of the community. The medieval legal conception was that law was part of a
universal and eternal order. It was 'given' and 'found' and not 'made'. As a set of
universal truths it might be given through revelation or might be discovered by reason
and study of local customs. The community with all its associations and political
authorities was under the law. This primacy of law was checked by the important
change brought about by the idea inherited from Rome that law could be man-made. It
began to be accepted that the community was free to legislate what it required in order
to meet its needs and to adopt any necessary rules seen to be suitable to its changing
conditions. Divine law, natural law and customary law lost their primacy and
gradually began to be viewed as moral obligations and rules of ethics rather than
statutory rules of law.2
As law began to be conceived as positive law, that is to say, law posited or
made by man, the stress shifted to focus on the source of law. Then it was natural to
make a basic assumption that the source of law was there somewhere in the
community. Henceforth, it would be a question of finding that supreme will which
would command and was not commanded by others, and whose command was the
law.3 That would one day come to be termed sovereignty.
Birth of the nation state
The other substantial change which was paving the way for the appearance of
the modem European formulae of sovereignty, was the growing preeminence of the
1 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 72.
2Ibid., pp. 67-72; D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 89; Benn and Peters, op. cit., pp. 255 - 7.
3 D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 93.
political association, the state, and the steady decline and subordination of other
associations, particularly the church, kinship, and local groups. Regional kings were
gradually concentrating more power in their hands, while the external universal
authority of the Pope and the Emperor, and the internal power of the feudal lords, were
both weakening and failing.1 National Kings were gaining superiority internally and
independence externally, and at that time the theory of sovereignty was invented to
support their claims. It is worthy of note that both attributes of superiority and
independence, which were assigned to national Kings, formed an important element in
the theory. In short, the theory of sovereignty was formulated at the same time as the
modern notion of statehood was emerging. Therefore, it was shaded by the same
colours and it became closely linked with nationalism and secularism.
Absolutism
Moreover, the concept of sovereignty was to come to maturity in a period when
absolute monarchy was budding in Europe.2 One of the pressures which necessitated
the demand for royal absolutism was the occasional outbreak of civil and religious
wars. To face the bitter consequences of these conflicts and the confusion of divided
loyalties, there was a need for a solid and continuing solution. The only solution seen
was the establishment of an effective, strong, and definite centralized government with
unlimited authority. Hence, the developing centralized system of regional monarchy
was supported by a theory of royal absolutism which was given the name sovereignty.
Absolute monopoly of both force and law was vested in the King.3 The maintenance of
order was seen to be the preeminent value to be secured. Eventually, the idea of
absolutism penetrated deeply into the logic of the theory of sovereignty.
1 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 100.
2 Jacques Maritain, "The Concept of Sovereignty", in W. J. Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of
Sovereignty (New York, 1969) p. 49.
3 D'Entreves, op. cit., pp. 108 - 9; Hinsley, op. cit. , p. 120.
The General Culture
In the light of the historical circumstances which have been briefly sketched
above, a possible explanation could be sought for the basic notions that are associated
with sovereignty in its Western context. Sovereignty has become territorial rather than
universal because it is conceived as an attribute of the national state. Sovereignty has
emerged as secular and not as divine because it is considered to be the source of man-
made legislation and the creator of positive law. Sovereignty is linked with absolutism
because it originated at a moment when the need for unlimited, unique, centralized
authority was stressed. Those notions, inherent in the concept of sovereignty, carried
the influences of its formative period, and due to the changing political conditions, they
have eventually created many difficulties and have become the object of substantial
criticism.
Undoubtedly, the political conditions were not the only forces that shaped the
form which the theory of sovereignty took in Europe, but there were other factors as
well. Politics is nothing but one aspect of the ideologies, outlooks and way of life of
any society. Hymen Cohen in Recent Theories of Sovereignty writes:
"Not the political alone, however, influences theory. Social facts
and political institutions are an important element, a very important
element, in shaping the general patterns of an ideology. But not the sole
factors. They furnish the basic groundwork, perhaps. The techniques
of elaborations, the nature of the justification, and the types of
interpretation will depend as well, however, upon the philosophy, the
outlook, the intellectual background - in short, on the general culture of
the theorizer".1
Hence, it may be concluded that the modem theory of sovereignty is in fact the
outcome of Western general culture, and in the light of this reality, its universal validity
seems to be very questionable.
! H. E. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty (Chicago, 1937) pp. 3 - 4.
ii. Great Theorists of Sovereignty
There are many political theorists who have made significant contribution to the
study of sovereignty in the West and the literature on the subject is vast. The basic
questions raised are at least three: what is the nature of political rule in any system, who
is the real ruler and who ought to rule? Probably the most important thinkers since the
sixteenth century who have puzzled out theories dealing with these questions have
been Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Austin. It is
proposed to outline below a broad summary of their theses.
Bodin
The father of the modern theory of sovereignty is rightly regarded to be Jean
Bodin, a French lawyer and politician, who lived in the second half of the sixteenth
century. In two key chapters of his work The Republic, which appeared in 1567,
Bodin gives a systematic discussion of sovereignty, its definition, characteristics, limits
and general functions.1 Bodin was not entirely wrong in claiming that he had
discovered sovereignty.2 Credit is commonly given to him for presenting the first
definition of it, and furnishing logical arguments concerning its essential existence in
any political community. Though those arguments contained serious confusions, his
statement of sovereignty was the first clear one given.
Perhaps, the confusion in Bodin's thought was mainly because he attempted the
reconcilation of two rival principles. On the one hand he was an advocate of the
separation of religion from politics as the only cure for the disorder of the religious
wars in France in his time. In order to maintain peace, he required the establishment of
a powerful central authority which placed the interests of the French nation over the
religious considerations. In fact, he belonged to a nationalist party known as the
Politiques, and his book to a large extent reflected their ideas. The Politiques were
1 See J. Bodin, Les Six Livres de la Republique (1576). Trans. Richard Knolles as The Six
Books of Commonweal, edited by Kenneth D. McRae (Cambridge, Mass., 1962) Book 1, chapters 8
and 10.
2 D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 99.
described by one of their contemporaries as those who preferred "that the Kingdom
remained at peace without God than at war with Him".1 Thus, to strengthen the
authority of the King, Bodin assigned various rights to him, amongst which the most
fundamental of those was the authority to make laws. In his view , the human ruler
possessed absolute power to legislate.
On the other hand, Bodin, who was bound by his medieval tradition which was
religious in nature, could not follow the consequences of the absoluteness of human
legislation to its logical conclusions. His apparent contradiction discloses itself when,
in his ultimate analysis, he laid restrictions on the ruler. The decisions of his absolute
ruler were not final. One of the most important limitations to his power was that he
was subject to divine law.
Bodin's human ruler could be seen to be above the law as his single will is the
sole unlimited source of it, and at the same time the subject of fundamental laws which
he has not made and cannot change. He wanted to place the ruler above moral and
religious matters and at the same time exclude them from his control.2 "Hence he does
not effect a harmonious reconcilation of his two principles, failing to see their
antithetical character with sufficient clarity".3
Hobbes
The enquiry of Thomas Hobbes, the English philosopher of the seventeenth
century, into the problem of sovereignty, in his thesis Leviathan published in 1651, is
an outstanding landmark in the development of Western political thought. It was a
major step forward towards the full secularization of the state and its institutions to
which Europe had been gradually moving to but had hesitated to adopt. It was a death¬
blow to the traditional dualism of church and state that had lasted for centuries.
1 George H. Sabine, A History of Political Thought, ed. Thomas L. Thoroson (Hinsdale,
Illinios, 1973 ), p. 373; F. J. C. Hearnshow, "Bodin and the Genesis of the Doctrine of Sovereignty",
in R. W. Seton-Watson (ed.),Tudor Studies (London, 1924), p. 119.
2 W. T. Jones, Masters of Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1960), pp. 59 - 63; Sabine, op.
cit., pp. 379 - 82.
3 Jones, op. cit., p. 62.
Hobbes presented a solution to the problem which had eluded Jean Bodin and
all the previous theorists because of their dual approach. He took the logic of the early
theories of sovereignty and worked it out to its ultimate conclusions. In his scheme,
the state absorbs and represents the members of all the community. The 'multitude'
becomes 'united in one person', as he says, an artificial person who is a mortal god,
symbolized by him in the Leviathan, the powerful monster described in the Bible" as
there is no power above the earth which may be compared to him".1 Hobbes says that
to "the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather to that mortal god... wee owe... our
peace and defence, for ... he hath the use of so much Power and Strength".2 Hobbes
made the state above all individuals and above all associations, even above the church.
In his proposition, power is concentrated in one single centre and is the source of
unlimited legislative authority. Law is solely the command of the ruler and there is no
limit to the extent of his orders. He expanded the absoluteness of the human
legislature to the extreme. That absoluteness is applicable to both the political and
moral spheres. In the moral sense, what is meant is not only that there is no higher
moral law above the state according to which it could be criticized, but that the laws of
the state create the distinction of right and wrong, and of good and evil.3 The function
of the state is to establish moral values and legal rules out of a moral and a legal
vacuum.4
The influence of Hobbes is enormous. Despite the fact that he has been
criticized for his one sided outlook of human nature on which he had based his political
theory, and for inconsistency in his premises,5 his ideas in general founded the basis of
the modem secular state. His outstanding position may be best described in the words
of a modem political writer, who said:
1 Cf. F. L. Cross, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (London, 1974), sv.
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Middlesex, 1986), p. 227.
3 Ibid., pp. 234, 312.
4 Hinsley , op. cit., p. 149.
5 Jones, op. cit., pp. 126 - 134.
"His enquiry into sovereignty stands as a milestone in modern
political thought. Indeed , it is only comparatively recently that this
special value of Hobbes's teaching has been fully realized. When once
old enmities had subsided, and the question of the 'atheism' and
'immorality' of the philosopher of Malmesbury had ceased to be an
issue, Hobbes's political theory appeared in a totally different light, and
could be hailed as what it certainly is, 'the first modern theory of the
modern state'."1
Rousseau
In the eighteenth century the theory of sovereignty found a new formulation and
justification in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on whose ideas, in large
measure, depended the French Revolution. During the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the great problem had been to secure a powerful centralized national authority
against external and internal forces. But after the battle for regional monarchies had
been won, a new problem emerged which political theorists had to face. It was that the
monarchies had become too powerful.2 The result was a trend towards a rediscovery
and an assertion of the rights of the subjects. It was felt that it had become of crucial
importance to base the authority of the state on the consent of the governed people.
Rousseau developed these democratic notions to the utmost extreme.3 He took
over the conception of Hobbes of an absolute single centre of power4 and combined it
with the idea of the people's rights and the requirement of their agreement to establish
their ruling authority.5 The combination of the two ideas generated his thesis which he
expressed in his main political work, the Social Contract (1756). He put forward the
hypothesis that the people possessed the absolute highest authority as a right embodied
in their so called 'General will'. The governing body in the society is subjected to the
general will of the people and authorized by it. In his opinion, the main function of the
1 D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 105.
2 Jones, op. cit., p. 253.
3 C. E. Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau (New York, 1900),
p. 33.
4 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 153.
5 J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. Tran. G. D. H. Cole, ed. J.
Brumfitt and J. Hall (London, 1983), introduction p. XXVI.
government is to carry out the instructions, or acts of will of the people.1 Hence, he
reduced the rulership to which the early theorists had attached great power to a mere
commission.2 Rousseau did not state precisely and clearly what he meant by his
concept of the General Will. However, what can be understood is that it is the will of
the collective body composed of all the individuals of the community aiming to maintain
the common interests of the whole.3
Rousseau attributes to the people all the rights. They are the unlimited source of
power and law. He holds that the 'general will' of the people is infallible, it is always
right and always just. Moreover, he asserts that their authority is inalienable and
indivisible.4 He says:
"The body politic, therefore, is also a corporate being possessed
of a will; and this general will, which tends to the preservation and
welfare of the whole and every part, and is the source of law,
constitutes for all the members of the state, in their relation to one
another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust... The most general
will is the most just also, and ... the voice of the people is in fact the
voice of God."5
In the final analysis, Hobbes and Rousseau appear to stand on the same
footing. While the former allowed the state to absorb the community which originally
created it, the latter allowed the community to swallow up the state.6 In both cases, the
bearer of sovereignty possessed absolute unlimited power. Despite these differences,
the ideas of both of them did influence the modern states, though with some
adjustments to their premises. This took the form of a synthesis of their doctrines
which was expressed in the tendency towards constitutionalism.
1 Ibid., p. XXVI.
2 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 153.
3 Rousseau, op. cit., book I ch. VI, p. 175 - 7.
4 Ibid., pp. 182 - 93.
5 Ibid., p. 120 - 2.
6 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 155 ; Merriam, op. cit., p. 35.
Austin
The next stage in the history of sovereignty which needs to be considered is the
contribution made by the jurists of the nineteenth century, notably by John Austin's
Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832). To his outstanding credit is the
presentation of " a sharply defined theory of sovereignty, stating its nature and
character in the most precise terms."1 His main concern was legislation, which was
viewed by him to be the most important function of the state. With a crystal clear view
and simplicity, he asserts positiveness in jurisprudence. He defines law as being solely
an effective command of a superior to an inferior which is binding because of the
sanction that the superior is able to inflict whenever it is violated. It is essentially a
precise and a definite command of a superior which obliges certain acts or
forbearances, and not a general and vague notion that something must be observed.
Therefore, moral rules or customs are not considered by Austin to be law proper,
because they fail his test. In the first place, they are not issued by a superior, nor stated
in the form of a command. And secondly, there is no effective sanction attached to
them.2
Regarding sovereignty, Austin's doctrine is closely connected with his
conception of law. His sovereign is the human superior who is the source of law.
Most essential in the nature of that superior is that it is a 'determinate' body. By that
Austin means a definite body which is capable of corporate conduct. That is to say a
definite person or body of persons who are indicated with concise characteristics, such
as the Parliament of England, for example. Such a body must be distinct and clear; it
must possess "a local habitation and a name" and there must be no doubt about its
identity. This clear definiteness is the most striking emphasis laid down by Austin's
theory of sovereignty.3 As regards the other features, Austin attributed to his
1 Merriam, op. cit., p. 131.
2 Ibid., p. 138.
3 Ibid., pp. 141- 2.
sovereignty whole absoluteness. Whether it is located in a person or a body of
persons, its power to legislate is unlimited. As a source of law, it cannot be limited
even by its own law. Supreme power limited by law, he holds, is a flat contradiction in
words.1
II. Nature of Absolute Sovereignty
Apparently, the conclusion that could be derived from the above analysis is that
the nature of sovereignty discussed by earlier scholars, namely Bodin, Hobbes,
Rousseau, and Austin, is generally identical. All of them have conceived sovereignty as
wholly absolute. In order to throw more light on the concept of absolute sovereignty,
the discussion now turns to pursue further its nature, considering questions such as its
definition, attributes and location.
i. Preliminary Definition
Sovereignty is an ambiguous term,2 and it is almost impossible to define it
precisely and clearly. The etymology of the word in English shows that it is derived,
through old French soverainete, from medieval Latin supremtas, or suprema
potestas, which is taken to mean "supreme power".3 In The Oxford English
Dictionary the word sovereign indicates "one who has supremacy or rank above, or
authority over, others; a ruler, governor, lord or master (of persons, etc. )." It is
frequently applied to the Deity in relation to created things, but the usage permits even
its application to a husband in relation to his wife,4 and till very recent times it was
used to describe the head of a municipality in several Irish boroughs.5 However, the
1 Ibid., pp. 143- 4.
2 Benn and Peters, op. cit., p. 257.
3 Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary to the English Language (Oxford, 1882), p.
576; W. J. Stankiewicz, "Sovereignty", Encyclopaedia Britannica (1981), 17, p. 309. The years
1290 and 1297 are suggested for the first usage of the term in English. In other European languages it
emerged also from the same origin, and at first other equivalents were used to denote the same meaning
of sovereignty. Cf. D' Entreves, op. cit., p. 102.
4 The Oxford English Dictionary, ed. James Murray (Oxford, 1933), 10, p.489.
5 James Bryes, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1901) II, p. 51 n.l.
origin of the modern usage of the word may be traced to the feudal system of the
Middle Ages in Central and Western Europe. Feudalism was basically a system of land-
tenure in which the various social classes organized themselves in a hierarchical order.
Land was granted according to a contract, vassalage, in which the lord was obliged to
give aid and protection in return for loyalty and other specific services rendered by the
tenant, among which were military duties, judgement at the lord's court, and various
payments upon fixed occasions. At the apex of the system was the king who granted
lands to members of the high nobility, who in turn gave parts of it to various vassals
from the lower class of nobles, and that was filtered down to the bottom where there
were the serfs on whose labour the whole system rested. Consequently, political
power in the feudal system was essentially a personal relation and a property relation
and was also highly decentralized. The king was weak, as he was only able to deal
with his subjects at second or third hand. The loyalty of the people was to their
immediate lord.1 In other words, each member of the nobility, like the barons, the
dukes and the counts, possessed full authority in his domain. The terms used to
describe the lordships of the nobles were sovereignty and suzerainty, though the
distinction between the two was not explicit. Generally, a suzerain was a lord who had
another over him, while sovereignty referred to overlordship and signified finality of
authority.2
Therefore, in its feudal origins sovereignty was only a specific quality
associated with special lordships and particularly with royal lordships. The Latin root
of the word, "superans or "supremitas", indicates the owner of a lordship who is
independent of any other lordship or, as phrased by medieval thinkers, whose lordship
depends only on God.3 In this sense, a medieval writer used the word sovereignty to
describe the feudal lordship of a baron. The baron, it is stated, in the internal affairs of
1 Sabine, op. cit., pp. 204 - 8.
2 Paul W. Ward, Sovereignty (London, 1928), pp. 3-4.
3 Leon Duguit, Law in Modern State. Trans. Frida and Harold Laski (London, 1921), p. 8.
his barony recognizes no suzerain, as " each baron is sovereign in his barony", but
above all " the king is sovereign and has the right of general control over the
kingdom".1 Later, the term was applied exclusively to the king. In the sixteenth
century Bodin took the word, which was originally attached to a single quality of the
royal person, and coined it to mean royal power itself.2 Undoubtedly, Bodin used it in
a new sense, yet it had wide appeal since the people had already familiarized themselves
with it.
Moreover, sovereignty, like most modern European political and legal terms,
goes back in its origin to Roman law. To form the modern concept of sovereignty the
lawyers intertwined the feudal notion of sovereignty with the Roman ideas of public
power. Public lordship is called in Latin "imperium". In the course of the
development of the Roman Empire, the Emperor came to possess the "imperium"
which meant a right to command inherent in his character and his will was equated with
law.3 This idea also found its expression in the famous sentence: "the will of the
Prince has the force of law, since the people have transferred to him all their right and
power".4 Those conceptions of Roman "imperium" or "suprema potestas", which
were originally universal, were narrowed to a territorial scope, and fused with the
denotations of the feudal lordship, especially in its implied relations of power and
property. The power to command, the "imperium" , was regarded as a right similar
to that of property. The fusion of those elements resulted in the modern doctrine of
sovereignty,5 which was made in its first stages of development to belong exclusively
to the secular king.6 To this modern sense of sovereignty we now turn our concern.
1 La Coutume de Beauvoisis, quoted in Duguit, op. cit., pp. 8 - 9.
2 Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.
3 Ibid., pp. 3 - 4.
4 Merriam, op. cit., p. 11.
5 The beginnings of the theory may also be traced to Aristotle in his Politics.He does not
appear to have discussed the nature of sovereignty but rather to have questioned who should be
sovereign. He arrives to his famous classification that sovereignty must be in the hands of one, or a
few, or of many. Cf. Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 27- 30.
6 Duguit,op. cit., pp. 5- 9; Ward, op. cit., p. 23- 6.
In the fields of theology, law or political science the term sovereignty is
eventually employed to signify two inseparable senses: supremacy over others
(omnipotence) and/or freedom from control by others (independence).1 That is to say
that the phenomenon of sovereignty comprises two aspects. One is a positive side
implying the possession of infinite power which overrides all other forces and compels
them to complete subjection. The other is a negative feature which denotes the denial of
any superior authority and the claim for full autonomy unrestricted by any other being.2
Following this analysis, sovereignty in its broadest sense could be defined as the power
to do everything without accountability.3 However, as sovereignty is used as a political
and a legal concept, the notion that it is "the power to do everything " must be related
to a lesser sphere. This "lesser sovereignty" is a circumscribed type perceived to
operate and prevail in the "state".4 Even at this preliminary stage in our discussion it
appears to be important to emphasize this shift of application. The point may look
trivial and obvious, but in fact it is often overlooked and important consequences
follow. Perhaps, ignoring it is the cause of the puzzling difficulties found in the
concept in Europe since its formulation. Sovereignty which is the supreme infinite
absolute power is attached to a human organization, the state, which is by its nature
finite and limited. From the beginning contradictory elements seem to be inherent in
the Western concept of sovereignty.
With reference to the state, sovereignty is defined as "the supreme power by
which any state is governed".5 Applying the former broad sense of the term to the
state, the idea of sovereignty would be the idea of "the power to do everything in a
state without accountability".6 This idea seems to be the core of the definitions given by
1 George Schwarzenberger, "The Forms of Sovereignty", in Stankiewicz ed. , In Defence of
Sovereignty, p. 162.
2 Ibid., pp. 165- 7.
3 Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty (Washington, 1921), p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 6th. ed. (Boston, 1855), p. 29, quoted in
Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty, p. 7.
6 Lansing, op. cit., p. 6.
accepted authorities in the West in the past and the present time, though they have been
phrased differently, each emphasizing one or another of the implications of the concept,
ii. Constituents of Sovereignty
It may suffice for the present discussion about the nature of sovereignty to
quote and analyse two famous key definitions. One is given by Bodin who was the
first in the modem age to attempt to define sovereignty. The other is offered by Austin
and much credit is given to it for its clearness and preciseness.
Bodin's definition is as follows:
"Sovereignty is the most high, absolute and perpetual power
over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweal, ... that is to say, the
greatest power to command."1
Austin expresses the notion of sovereignty thus:
"If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a
like superior, receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given
society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the
society (including the superior) is a society political and independent."2
Apparently, both definitions need further analysis and closer examination. This
will be shown in the following discussion.
1. Before progressing further it is necessary to obtain an essential
understanding of the notion of the state, in order to grasp the basic assumption that
sovereignty exists in every state. A satisfactory meaning of the state may be is that it"
is a particular portion of mankind viewed as an organized unit".3 Apparently, the main
characteristic of the state is that it is an organized association . In general terms, by
that is meant that, within it, there is some person or body of persons who is in some
sense representing the whole, speaking or acting on behalf of them, and who makes
decisions which are regarded as binding on the whole. That characteristic is also a
feature of any other organized group like a church, a trade union, a political party or
1 Bodin, op. cit., book 1 ch. 8, p. 84.
2 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London, 1832), p. 200.
3 Lansing, op. cit., p. 4.
any other similar organizations; but there are of course other qualities which
distinguish the state from other organized associations. Among these distinctive
qualifications the most common may be is that a state must have a fixed territory.
Broadly speaking, the individuals habitually resident in a certain tract of land compose
a state. However, it is not needed for the present discussion to deal with all the
qualifications of a state. The important consideration, with regard to sovereignty, is
that the state is an organized group of individuals.1
Now, the basic assumption introduced as a main attribute of the state is that
there exists somewhere in the state, as an organized association, a power which
controls the actions of the members of the society. That central authority in the state
is above all the individuals and all their associations. It has the first claim on their
obedience and it is controlled by none outside it. This greatest and highest power is
given the term sovereignty. In Bodin's definition sovereignty is referred to as the
highest power over the citizens and subjects in a state.
2. It seems that the focal point in the idea of sovereignty is that it is " an
ultimate right" of command in the society,2 or, as Bodin phrased it in his definition
quoted above, it is "the greatest power of command". It is the centre of decision making
in the state, which is entitled to issue orders binding the members of the society to
certain courses of action. Sovereignty acts as an ultimate agent of arbitration conferring
the right to settle disputes among members of the community on how a community
shall act.3
3. Some of the "commands" of the sovereign authority are in the form of
instructions related to particular cases or settlements of certain issues, but mainly its
orders are in the form of general rules and laws. Hence, one of the chief elements of
sovereignty is that it is the sole source of law. Indeed, laws are defined simply as the
1 Ibid., p. 6; G.C. Field, Political Theory (Strang, 1963), pp. 55 -7.
2 Bertrand De Jouvenel, On Power (Boston, 1962), p. 26.
3 Preston King, "Sovereignty" in David Miller, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of
Political Thought (Oxford, 1987), p. 493.
general commands of sovereignty. Any rule which cannot be traced to a direct or an
indirect order of the sovereign body will not be regarded as a law. Sovereignty in this
sense is the supreme legislative authority in society. Bodin writes:
"I say that the first mark of a sovereign prince is the power of
giving laws to all the people ... without consent of any beside himself
...This power of being the source of law is incommunicable. The
sovereign may, of course, give to certain persons the right to make the
laws, which will then have the same authority as if made by the
sovereign himself. Under this power of giving and abrogating laws are
included all the other rights and marks of sovereignty. Indeed, if one is
to speak precisely, there is but this one mark of sovereignty, All the
various specific rights of a sovereign prince are only aspects of , or
derivatives from this primary right of giving laws."1
Similarly, the theory of Hobbes has annexed to the sovereign "the whole power
of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy and
what actions he may do".2 Likewise, the essential element in the existence of laws, in
the Austinian sense, is the command of a superior which binds and obliges an inferior
person or persons. It is a definite, precise order necessitating certain "acts or
forbearances".3
4. Hence, a fundamental aspect of sovereignty is the habit of issuing orders and
commands in legal or other forms, but it is not the only one. Actually, the
phenomenon of sovereignty has two inseparable faces: commands which proceed from
the centre of power, and "habitual obedience" by the "bulk" of the people. Perhaps, the
latter is the most fundamental side of it.4 Unless there is a habit of obedience from the
side of the majority of the subjects without the possibility of resistance, sovereignty
does not exist. The central fact here is that sovereignty is constituted by being obeyed,
and by nothing else.5 "Habitual" obedience is meant to be a general and regular
submission to a recognized authority. Continuity and regularity are essential to form a
'Bodin, op. cit., pp. 159 -62.
2 Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit. p. 234.
3 Austin,op. cit., p. 18 ; Merriam, op. cit., p. 138.
4 Field, op. cit., p. 62.
5 Ibid.., p. 78.
habit of obedience and a sovereignty in the Austinian sense.1 If the obedience is rare
or transient, and not permanent or habitual, the relation of sovereignty and subjection
is not created in that given society.2
Moreover, the reference to the fact of obedience is characterized affirmatively
and negatively. Positively a superior to be sovereign must receive obedience from
other people, but negatively he must not obey anyone. As Austin expresses it in his
definition, the sovereign superior must not be in a habit of obedience to a like superior,
and should receive habitual obedience from the bulk of the people.
5. However, the question of political obligation, that is why people obey their
political authority, is not a simple question and cannot be answered in simple terms.
The motives behind obedience vary considerably as between individuals and might be
very mixed in the same individual. Sometimes, obedience is based on active approval.
Yet, it is probably safe to say that obedience is a habit influenced by many motives.3
Undoubtedly, fear of punishment is a main motive behind the obedience of
many people. Therefore, it is essential for an effective sovereignty to possess and
control the necessary force which would compel people to obey. Sovereignty, besides
making the law, must be competent to enforce the law. Force should always be there in
the background in order to support the commands of sovereignty and bring about the
people's obedience, either as a threat or to be physically applied when necessary.
Sovereignty appears from this point of view to be the holder of the supreme coercive
power in society. In fact the idea that sovereignty rests on force has been advanced by
many writers.4 For example, this is clearly stated in the following two quotations:
"Without force a State can neither come into existence nor
continue."5
1 Merriam, op. cit., p. 140.
2 Austin, op. cit., p. 202.
3 Field, op. cit., p. 63.
4 But cf. Field, op. cit., pp. 65- 9.
5 Bluntschli, quoted in Lansing, op. cit., p. 9.
"The essence of the state is in its monopoly of coercive power,
declared and enforced as the only legitimate monopoly; in its very
existence, which is an imminent threat; or in its active use in the naked
form of force when the members of the society... threaten the main
values and are about to disrupt the society by exercising force against
each other. This then, is the state; and its supreme power and monopoly
of coercion (which it can devolve in many ways on its own terms) is
sovereignty."1
6. In relation to the above analysis of the basic elements which constitute
sovereignty, it is important to remember that sovereignty in the European formula is
conceived primarily as a human quality. In the above quoted definition of Austin, he
speaks of it as an attribute of "a human superior". It is understood to be the force
constantly working within the framework of human society, regulating personal
conduct and shaping social institutions. It is the power originating from human society
and functioning in its sphere,
iii. Attributes
The theorists of sovereignty, in their attempt to express a basic exposition of its
nature, described it in general terms, at one time or another, with a variety of
characteristics.2 With reference to position, sovereignty is regarded as the highest
power in the pyramid of the ruling hierarchy. Quantitatively, it is the greatest power in
society possessing the major 'amount' of control. In sequence it is the final power in
the chain of the process of politico-legal decision making. With reference to effect,
sovereignty is the most general power, in the sense that it serves the public interest of
the whole community. In respect of its extent, it is identified as the total power or
unlimited power without any restraint in its scope of action. Moreover, unity is
maintained as an essential feature of sovereignty,. It is indivisible and cannot be
shared among many bodies. Another fundamental attribute refers to autonomy. By
nature, sovereignty is independent from any control, and is not subjected to any agent.
1 Herman Finer, quoted in Benn and Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State,
op. cit., p. 267.
2 Cf. Preston King, The Ideology of Order (London, 1974), pp. 140- 57; idem.,
"Sovereignty", The Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, pp. 492- 4.
In some contexts, sovereignty is characterized as being perpetual,1 inalienable,2 and
infallible.3
Seemingly, all these attributes are distinct notions., though some of them
overlap with each other. However, most of them could stem as implications of the
basic idea that sovereignty is an absolute power. The term "absolute" is vague and
could be understood to mean different, and not necessarily compatible, notions. Ideas
such as "highest", "greatest", "final", "indivisible", and "unlimited" can all be
categorized as absolute.4 However, further examination of these meanings is desirable.
The Highest Power
The first fundamental attribute of sovereignty is superiority. In status this
means it is the uppermost power in society. In any politico-legal system many
decisions are taken within it at a lower level. When moving up a point is reached where
there is no competence beyond it. That power at the peak is sovereignty. The entire
elements in the society are subordinate and inferior to it.5
The Final Power
Sovereignty is considered to be the authority of the last word. It is the final
centre of adjustment and arbitration in the politico-legal association. The attribute of
being the highest authority may overlap with the quality of being final. But a
distinction can be made if the former is viewed as refering to position, while finality is
assumed to suggest sequence. The finality of sovereignty is not a limitation to its
power to amend or alter earlier laws or decisions. Finality is not identical with
irreversibility. It simply means that no body, other than the sovereign, can or has the
right to reverse a sovereign decision. In most cases, finality is imposed by time in the
1 Bodin, op. cit., p. 84.
2 Rousseau, op. cit., p. 182.
3 Ibid., pp. 120, 122.
4 King, The Ideology of Order, pp. 140 -1.
5 King, "Sovereignty", Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, p. 493.
sense that once a decision is taken, it might already be implemented before being
revised and reversed.1
The Greatest Power
This means superiority in "quantity" of power. No body could be called
sovereign if it does not exercise a considerable control over other bodies and persons
in the society. In order to determine their actions in certain ways the "amount" of
power in the hands of the sovereign must be greater than that possessed by any other
person or group of persons. The difference between the ideas of being greatest and
being highest could easily be seen when a body has the highest status in the society, in
any possible sense, but may not necessarily be competent to impose the greatest
influence.2
The Total Power
Some may tend to think of the quantitative power of sovereignty, not only as a
major quantity of control contained in the idea of being greatest, but as being complete
and total. This could mean that the ruling agent exercises a total range of control over
every sphere of governmental affairs. The reference here is to the horizontal breadth of
control. The description of such a power as being complete may mean that all final
decisions on all ruling problems, arising at any level or time, are in the hands of the
sovereign. However, total power could also mean a total degree or depth of control
and not only total range of control. The intensity or degree of control is complete if all
orders and instructions issued by a ruling agent are obeyed by all the subjects. It could
be argued that all the commands of a sovereign are compulsory; nevertheless, no ruler
appears to possess the power to exercise a total degree or depth of control over the
whole society.3
1 Ibid., . 493; Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford, 1952), p.
60.
2 King, The Ideology of Order, p. 151.
3 Ibid., pp. 147- 51.
The Unlimited Power
The absoluteness of sovereignty is best reflected in the thesis that its power is
unlimited. The theory simply argues that there could be no other power limiting the
sovereign, otherwise by definition that power is itself the sovereign. In other words
the doctrine asserts that the unlimited power of the sovereign is his by definition.1
Though that argument appears to be simple and straightforward, the interpretations of
being unlimited are varied, confused and open to attack. In a weaker sense, the word
"unlimited" is often used to mean "exceedingly great" or "superior to any other". But
this is rather a pointless tautology, as it is like saying that supreme authority must be
supreme.2 In extreme cases, the idea that the competence of sovereignty is illimitable,
is understood to mean that "everything whatsoever lies within its competence".3 The
difficulty and exaggeration involved in such a statement are avoided in other
explanations. It is said that there could be various restrictions on the sovereign, such
as moral obligations and the agreed values of the society in which it exercises its
power. It may be argued that no decision-making procedure can exist except against a
background of some agreement on values; and therefore there must be some decisions
the decision procedure has no authority to make, namely those which run counter to
the shared values of the members of the community.4 There are other considerations as
well, such as that the sovereign may in fact be influenced by public opinion and other
political factors. But it is generally admitted that such obligations cannot be regarded as
political or legal limitations. Hence, the thesis that there is no political or legal power
capable of formally limiting the sovereign appears to be unchecked.5 Legally the
supreme power is absolutely despotic; practically, its power may depend on many
considerations. It is asserted that the theory does not insist that there are no limits
1 Merriam, op. cit., p. 223.
2 W. J. Rees, "The Theory of Sovereignty Restated", in Stankiewicz, ed., In Defence of
sovereignty, p. 220.
3 J. R.Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford, 1966), p. 33.
4 Ibid.., p. 33.
5Merriam, op. cit., pp. 150, 223.
whatsoever on the sovereign. Simply, the limits it denies are only legal limits.1
Austin says: "supreme power limited by positive law, is a flat contradiction in terms",2
meaning that the legislative power of the sovereign cannot be legally restrained. Upon
this it follows that sovereignty is seen to be a part and an organ of the legal association.
It is defined and limited by its own nature. As it is confined to and moves within the
legal circle, it does not enter the areas of social action which cannot be brought under
legal control. Sovereignty is not a capricious power of doing anything in any way.
Only in one sense sovereignty is unlimited and illimitable, that is, it must be competent
to adjust every issue arising in the legal association without exception.3
The Indivisible Power
Hobbes writes: "
"There is a doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a
commonwealth; and it is this : that the sovereign power may be
divided. For what is to divide the Power of a commonwealth, but to
DISSOLVE it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other."4
His statement is a distinguished account of the principle of indivisibility of
sovereignty held by most political theorists. Sovereignty, it is believed, is one or not
at all. This means, as Austin, for instance, explains: "in every society political and
independent, the sovereign is one individual, or one body of individuals".5 However,
the indivisibility doctrine may indicate two distinct notions. It may be understood to
denote that sovereignty is both unique and united.6 Sovereignty is unique in the sense
that there is one and only one supreme power, and it is united if it is in the hands of
one person or one body of persons. Clearly, it would be self-contradicting to say of
any two powers that they were both at one and the same time the highest and the
greatest; nevertheless, if in a state there were more than non-subordinate powers,
1 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), p. 65.
2 Austin, op. cit., p. 268.
3 Barker,op. cit., pp. 60-1.
4 Hobbes, op. cit., p. 368.
5 Province of Jurisprudence, p. 285.
6 Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford, 1980), pp. 8, 35; Rees, op. cit., p.
219.
sovereignty would not be unique. On the other hand, if there is only one sovereign
power but it is shared between several bodies, each separately holding part of the
sovereign power, it is not united. Such an interpretation assumes that sovereignty can
be divided and yet remains unique.1 As will be shown later, fierce criticism has been
levelled against the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty. It is argued that it is not
necessary that only one and the same body should possess all authority on all matters
all the time. One authority could be obeyed in some matters, and another in others.2
The Independent Power
Independence is another important characteristic of sovereignty . In fact it is a
natural consequence of it. Austin, for example, in his definition of sovereignty asserts
that the determinate human superior, called sovereign, must not be "in a habit of
obedience to a like superior".3 He further stressed:
"To that determinate superior, the other members of the society
are subject: or on that determinate superior, the other members of the
society are dependent. The position of its other members towards that
determinate superior is a state of subjection, or a state of dependence.
The mutual relation which exists between that superior and them may be
styled the relation of sovereign and subject or the relation of sovereignty
and subjection."4
In other words, independence meant absolute non-subjection to any interior or
external power. With regard to non-subjection to outside powers, the notion of
independence of the national sovereign state has gained significant importance in the
field of international relations. It has become an established rule in international law to
respect the independence of any state , its freedom to adopt any policies according to its
own will, and the prohibition of the intervention of any external powers in its affairs.5
Yet, no state or political entity seems to be absolutely independent of every other.
Interactions and influences are always present. Absolute independence is assumed
1 Raz, op. cit., p. 8.
2 Cf. Raz, op. cit., p. 35; Field, op. cit., p. 79.
3 Province of Jurisprudence, p. 200.
4 Ibid., p. 200.
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York, 1976), p. 302.
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formally, but there has always been found intermediate stages between absolute
independence and absolute subjection.1 Preston King in the Encyclopaedia of
Political Thought observes:
"No social or political entity is entirely or absolutely independent
of every other. As individuals, we may be slaves to passion, to
fashion, to ideologies, and more. Some nations may regularly imitate
others, and in diverse ways betray reciprocal influences. Some,
certainly, have far greater power than others, and over others.
Autonomy in matters political does not indicate an absence of
interaction.... There will be powerful groups within any state seeking
influence, preference or control. Many external groups (not least among
these being other states) will betray the same purpose. The point is that
for a sovereign (meaning independent) state to be subject to non-
sovereign influences does not mean that, in this, it loses its sovereignty
and independence, any more than it follows that an individual,
persuaded in some matter or matters by another, becomes, by virtue of
this, subject to that other. Nevertheless, it remains open as to how
regularly one sovereign entity may sway another before it becomes
inappropriate to speak of the latter as 'sovereign'.2
The Perpetual Power
One of the characteristics to which Bodin attached particular attention was the
unlimited duration of sovereign power.3 To him, "sovereignty is unlimited in power,
competence, and time".4 It seems that Bodin's basic intention was that the monarch
should be granted office for life, and should be allowed to appoint his successor
according to the hereditary rule. However, instead of formulating a direct argument to
support that view he adopted a different approach. He used the same logic which he
has applied to prove the unlimited power of the sovereign taking time as one dimension
of the quality of being illimitable. As no power could put limits on the sovereign or else
he would cease to be sovereign, he also argued that if it were possible that he might
cease to be sovereign at any moment he would have never been a sovereign. Hence, he
concluded that, for a sovereign to be sovereign he must exercise perpetual power.
However, Bodin himself appears to be aware of the difficulty of his argument, since
1 Field, op. cit., pp. 80 - 4.
2 King, "Sovereinty" inThe Encyclopaedia of Political Thought , p. 494.
3 Idem.,The Ideology of Order, pp. 141 - 145.
4 Bodin, The Six Books, p. 85.
kings die and no sovereign power exists in perpetuity. He admits that "wherefore we
must understand by the word perpetual, for the time of the life of him who hath the
power".1 Yet, scholars took seriously his argument that sovereignty implies an infinite
duration and spent considerable effort in refuting him.
The Inalienable Right
Rousseau describes the sovereign power, which he believes to belong to the
general will of the people, as being inalienable. He writes:
"I hold then that sovereignty, being nothing less than the
exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the
Sovereign, who is no less than a collective being, cannot be represented
except by himself: the power indeed may be transmitted, but not the
will.2
His concept of the inalienable right may be clearer when a closer examination
is made of his distinction between power and will. In his opinion, the government
holds only executive function and it merely executes the acts of will of the people. Just
as the human will transfers its commands to be carried out by the parts of the body, in
the same way the general will of the people transmits power to the government to
execute its acts. The people are always supreme, the government exists only at their
pleasure and can always be revoked by their will. Rousseau denies that representative
institutions have any claims to sovereignty. The bearer of sovereignty is the people
only. To exercise legislation every individual has to participate direcdy and not through
delegation.3 In his words: "every law the people has not ratified in person is null and
void - is in fact not a law".4 Hence, he concludes that he cannot see how the people
can preserve their right as sovereign unless the state be very small.5
1 Ibid., p. 87.
2 The Social Contract, p. 182.
3 John C. Hall, in his introduction to The Social Contract, pp. xxvii - ix.
4 Ibid., p. 240.
5 Ibid., p. 242.
The Infallible Power
Rousseau's sovereignty is characterized by a further attribute. He describes the
sovereign will as infallible. He asserts: "the general will is always upright and always
tends to the public advantage".1 "It is always constant, unalterable and pure".2
Sometimes, the general will might be mistaken, because it is misled by private interests
and "is subordinated to other wills",3 but in general it is not corrupted.
However, Rousseau's assumption faced frequent objections. One of his recent
critics writes:
"Certainly the facts of history seem to contradict this claim only
too frequently. There is no doubt that on many occasions men consent
to, and actively participate in, acts which are extremely unjust... To
assume that all men always act from good motives and that they do
wrong only when they are misled or deceived, is more Utopian
idealism.4
III. Who is Sovereign?
Undoubtedly, the question of where sovereignty is located is fundamental, as
obviously it would be pointless to investigate the nature of sovereignty without
determining who can is the holder of it. Yet, it seems to be more puzzling than the
other inquiries and perhaps no unambiguous answer can be given to it.5 Many
theorists, especially the early makers of the concept of sovereignty, Bodin, Hobbes,
Rousseau and Austin, seem to be in agreement generally on the nature and attributes of
sovereignty but differ considerably on who ought to possess the sovereign power. An
overview of the suggested answers reveals a remarkable contrast between ideas. The
theories of sovereignty have varied from locating it in one person, an individual ruler at
1 Ibid., p. 184.
2 Ibid., p. 248.
3 Ibid., p. 274- 8.
4 Jones, Masters of Political Thought, pp. 271, 274.
5 Very early on in human history Aristotle wrote in his Politics saying: "Another question is
where ought the sovereign power of the state reside? With the people? With the propertied classes?
With one man the best of all the good? With one man the tyrant? There are objections to all these".
Cf. Stankiewicz, In Defence of Sovereignty, p. xiii
the top of a hierarchy, to considering the people, who are in reality the ruled, to be the
only source of it. The residence of sovereignty may be a personal body, for instance a
monarch, or an impersonal organization, the state. Most theories have conceived
sovereignty as a human quality, but some have asserted its divine nature and assigned
it to God. Instead of situating supremacy in a physical entity, some have assigned it to
an abstract norm such as the law.1 However, these patterns of thought about the seat
of sovereignty may fall into three main categories, namely sovereignty of the ruler,




The sovereignty of the ruler was the first theory to appear. In fact, the
emergence of the concept of sovereignty itself was mainly an attempt to justify the rule
of a single person as the only possible solution to the crisis of the conflicting interests
in the community. According to this theory, the state will be inadequate to achieve true
stability, unity and peace if it is not a specific individual. The state, in other words,
becomes incarnate in a single ruler. All powers are centred in his person and he
becomes the focus of all social functions. What he wills is right because it is his will.
By his predominating unity and decisiveness he gives unity and strength to the whole
community. These are the elements of the theory formulated by Bodin.2 As a sixteenth
century Frenchman, he was strongly in favour of monarchy assuming that any other
form of government was seriously inoperative. His theory of sovereignty was an
assertion of the supremacy of the royal will, and it placed sovereignty as a personal
attribute of the king. It was a great support to the French monarchy of his day. Yet,
1 Aristotle argued that it is 'a poor sort of policy to vest sovereignty in any person or body of
persons, subject as persons are to the passions that beset men's souls, and that it is better to vest it in
law'. Cf. Wilson, op. tit., p. 781. For the idea of the sovereignty of reason or justice see Merriam,
op. tit., pp. 73- 83; Barker, op. tit., pp. 212- 5.
2 Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 100- 25; King, "Sovereignty" in Encyclopaedia of Political
Thought, p. 494; Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925), p. 45.
Bodin did not rule out the possibility that sovereignty may also reside in other forms of
state organization such as democracy, where the holder of it will be the whole
community, or aristocracy, where it is vested in the hands of a limited number of
individuals.1
Similarly, Hobbes allows theoretically that sovereignty may be placed in one
man or an assembly of men, into which either every one has the right to enter, or only
certain distinguished men.2 But his admission is only nominal. He makes it perfectly
clear that he took monarchy to be the best form of rule to produce peace and unity.3
His view is based on a number of factors. First, he argues that a collective sovereignty
in democracies is actually dominated by the will of one man and must prove in the end
to be like monarchy. Second, the representatives of an assembly may not be able to
give good advice, either because their choice is the effect of wealth rather than of
knowledge, or because their decision is commonly the outcome of long fruitless
discussions filled with strong passion which may excite men but not govern them.
Third, the disagreements in the assembly may reach such a dangerous height as to bring
the state to the edge of civil war.4
The State
Significantly, Hobbes' arguments disclose another important theoretical
implication. He compares the commonwealth to an artificial man, even of greater
stature and strength than the natural, in his language a Leviathan, the mythical monster.
He then advances the idea that the state itself as an artificial man is the holder of the
supreme power. That is to say, Hobbes attempts to transform the sovereignty of the
ruler by substituting for the Prince the abstract notion of the state. He assumes a mortal
god as the holder of sovereign power which absorbs the personality and rights of his
1 Merriam, op. cit., p. 16; Ward, op. cit., p. 23; D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 102.
2 Hobbes, op. cit., pp. 293 - 41.
3 Ibid., p. 241.
4 Ibid., pp. 241- 5.
subjects.1 But, even he himself might speak of the state as an artificial man, might
attribute to it absolute sovereignty and might consider it as a matter of choice or
circumstances whether it is formed of one physical ruler or of a few or of many. Yet
the only practical interpretation of his theory is that the old ruler personality possesses
sovereignty.2 The king is tangible and visible, the state is a mere fiction.
However, the idea that the state itself is the holder of sovereignty has continued
to find recognition among later theorists,3 especially when personal loyalty to royal
families gave way to loyalty to the state as an impersonal entity. The first step in the
development of the idea is an attack on the theory of the artificial nature of the state
which views it as a product of the will of the community through a contract. The state
is regarded as an organism created by social growth, either in the idealistic sense
introduced by Hegel,4 or in the natural sense influenced by the development of natural
sciences.5 Further there appeared the notion that the state is a real juristic personality,
that is, it has the capacity to bear legal rights and duties.6 With these two conceptions
about the nature of the state, some supporting one of them, others holding both, the
idea of the sovereignty of the state has become widespread.
ii.The People
At first sight, the doctrine that the people are sovereign, if seen to signify the
ruled in contrast to their ruler, may be judged as an inversion of the natural political
order.7 Moreover, it may be assumed to involve a contradiction in terms in indicating
that the people are superior to the people. Yet, the idea that power primarily belongs to
the people, that the authority of the ruler is in fact transformed to him from the
1 Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 142- 3.
2 Ibid., p. 145.
3 See Merriam, op. cit., pp. 85 - 129.
4 Ibid., pp. 91- 5; cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right.. Trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1952).
5 Cf. H. J. McCloskey, "The State as an Organism", The Philosophical Review, LXXXII
(1963), pp. 306- 26.
6 Merriam, op. cit., pp. 108 - 20; cf. Kenneth C. Cole, "The Theory of the State as a
Sovereign Juristic Person", in Stankiewicz, In Defence of Sovereignty, pp. 86 - 103.
7 Merriam, op. cit., p. 128.
community, and that he is only a delegate of the whole is an old belief. It is found in
ancient Greece, among the Romans and in medieval thought, as well as in its revival by
modem thinkers.1 The striking fact is that such notions are not believed to hold only in
democracy. They appear to be the underlying assumption in any form of government,
whether it is in the hands of one, few or many. The historic expression ' government
by the consent of the governed' has never, and will never fall out of use.2 An example
of its use to justify monarchy in the ancient world appears in the Roman idea that' the
will of the Prince has the force of law, since the people have transferred to him all their
rights and power'.3 Another modern example is Hobbes who though he assigned
absolute power to the ruler who is preferably a monarch, still held that initially the ruler
is invested with sovereignty by an agreement between him and the people who submit
to his authority wholly and for ever.4 That is to say that Hobbes admits the notion of
the supremacy of the people in theory, only to destroy it in reality. On the other hand,
Rousseau has probably done more than any one else to renew the notion of the
supremacy of the people and to bring it back to its original sense in democracy.
Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau assumes that the people are the holders of
sovereignty and they have never alienated it or transmitted it.5 In his theory the role of
the ruler is reduced to that of a leader who is completely under the control of those
whom he leads. The governor seems in appearance to exercise authority, but in truth
authority remains in the hands of the governed. The governing person is delegated by
the people, is instructed to fulfil a certain mission, and while carrying out his duties he
remains strictly subordinated to the people who have delegated him. Real authority
belongs not to the governor but to the governed.6 To bring forth this essential element
1 Cf. Yves R. Simon, "Sovereignty in Democracy", in Stankiewicz, In Defence of
Sovereignty, pp. 241-72.
2 Simon, op. cit., p. 268.
3 Merriam, op. cit., p. 11.
4 Hobbes, op. cit., pp. 227 - 8.
5 Rousseau, op. cit., p. 182.
6 Simon, op. cit., p. 243.
of the theory, one writer suggested describing the government in such a state of affairs
as a coach-driver hired and paid by those whom he drives.1 The comparison is very
remarkable. As the coach-driver, doubtless, leads his clients by the virtue of their wills
and not where he pleases, the government rules the people, but only as an instrument to
fulfil their wishes and not as a real master.
All the People
However, the concept of popular sovereignty in its proper and strict sense
applies only to pure democracy in a small community where the people govern directly
by themselves. There is no distinct government and no representation. Every citizen
participates directly in the meetings of the people who in their totality form the
government. As a result of that Rousseau rejects assigning sovereignty to represntative
assemblies. He writes:
"Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable,
cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does
not admit of representation: it is either the same, or other; there is no
intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not
and cannot be its representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can
carry through no definitive acts. Every law the people has not ratified in
person is null and void - is, in fact, not a law. The people of England
regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the
election of the members of parliament. As soon as they are elected,
slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short
moments of liberty it enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose
them."2
The Parliament or the Electorate
However, in England itself continuous constitutional developments have
consolidated the acceptance of the notion of the sovereignty of the representative
assembly, the Parliament, as an essential element in the democratic type of rule. Since
the eighteenth century the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the Crown-in-
Parliament has gained a dominant and central position in British politics.3 In this
1 Paul-Louis Courier, Lettres au redacteur du Censeur (Paris, 1845), pp. 62- 3, quoted in
Simon, op. oilp. 244.
2 The Social Contract, op. cit., p. 240.
3 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 152. For full discussion of parliamentary sovereignty and its modern
developments see R. F. V. Heuston, "Sovereignty", in A. G. Guest, ed. Oxford Essays in
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regard, it is often assumed that the Crown in Parliament is a perfect example of the seat
of sovereignty in the Austinian sense.1 However true this may be, it overlooks the
personal view of Austin. To him, it is not the elected representative assembly which
forms part of the sovereign body but the electorate. Speaking about England he writes:
"Speaking accurately the members of the common house are
merely trustees for the body by which they are elected and appointed:
and consequently the sovereignty always resides in the King's Peers
and the electoral body of the commons.2
In the background of such different interpretation of the doctrine of popular
sovereignty its viability seems to be destroyed. The theory as Rousseau left it and as
Austin supplemented it, though have exerted great influence and inspired all democratic
movements since the French Revolution, yet did not escape severe criticism. Harold
Laski, for instance, one of the leading critics of the theory in the twentieth century says:
"The maze, in fact, to which Austinianism ultimately leads,
implies in the modem State the theory of popular sovereignty. It is well
to urge at the outset that it is impossible to give precision to this view.
The people cannot govern in the sense of acting continually as a unit; for
the business of the modern state is far too complex to be conducted by
perpetual referenda. If popular sovereignty simply means the
paramouncy of public opinion, this is an abstraction of the most vicious
kind. For we need to know when public opinion is public and when it
is opinion. And, if with the French Constitution of 1791, we say that
the nation is the source of all powers which are to be exercised by the
legislative body and the king, we are reducing popular sovereignty to a
metaphor. We should then encounter on the one hand the argument of
Rousseau that to part with paramount power is to betray it, and on the
other the view ...that a restricted mandate is fatal to the moral character
of the representative. All, in fact, that the theory of popular sovereignty
seems to mean is that the interests which prevail must be the interests of
the mass of men rather than of any special portion of the community;
and it is further an implicit insistence that the prevalence of this general
interest is the criterion of political good. But this is to raise debate, not
to settle it; for the real problem is not the announcement, but the
realisation, of the substance of this creed.3
Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1961), pp. 198- 222; Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford,
1972).
1 Laski, A Grammar of Politics, p. 52; Field, op. cit., p. 59.
2 Province of Jurisprudence, pp. 230-1.
3 Laski, A Grammar of Politics, pp. 54- 5.
iii. God
The concept of divine sovereignty occupies an important place in the Western
political thought because it is closely related to Christianity which has been a major
force in politics ever since it became the established religion of the Roman Empire in the
second century. Our main concern here is about the modernized forms of the concept
of the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries which accompanied the emergence of the
other theories of sovereignty. But it does not seem possible to render an explanation of
the concept except in terms of Christian history. Needless to say, the essence of the
Christian doctrine is the belief of a dual nature of man and of a dual control over human
life based on the distinction between spirituals and temporals. In the pure spiritual
sphere the doctrine that power is God's appears to have a perfectly valid and constant
interpretation which has only been challenged by the Reformation. However, the
application of the doctrine to the temporal, that is to say the political, sphere is perhaps
vague, obscure and lends itself to different interpretations.
The Papacy
The starting point in the establishment and government of the spiritual society is
the doctrine of the papacy.1 According to the Christian faith, God became man and
while he was on earth he founded the church as the body of all the faithful, as well as
designating its leader, namely St. Peter. The powers of Peter were the same as Christ's
powers, and by way of succession those powers pass to the following heads of the
church, the popes. The pope, it is believed, does not derive his powers from his
predecessor, nor from the church, but directly from God. According to this principle,
he becomes a vicar of Christ and stands outside and above the church forming an entity
of his own. While his person remains human and he is designated to his office by
men, his power is by no means from man; it is from God alone and its conjunction with
his person is effected by God. As a vicar of Christ, he is the only one authorized to
1 Cf. Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages
(London, 1961), pp. 32- 56.
announce and interpret the divine will. Though he is supported by a class of
professional clergy who offer spiritual consolation, he is singled out for the exposition
and fixation of the Christian norms. His authority of jurisdiction in religious affairs is
final.
Passive Obedience
On the other hand, the Christian theories of sovereignty of God in the political
sphere originate from the important passage in the New Testeament of St. Paul's letter
to the Romans, 'so much so that all Christian political theory may be regarded as one
long uninterrupted commentary on it'.1 The words of St. Paul sound obvious and
positive:
"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is
no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of
God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For
rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not
be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shall have
praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But
if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in
vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon
him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for
wrath, but also for conscience sake. For this cause pay ye tribute also:
for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing.
Render therefore to all their dues: a tribute to whom a tribute is due;
custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honor.2
Yet however clear and definite St. Paul's words, they are given very different
interpretations and are used for a great variety of purposes. In the early Christian
communities, they have helped to combat tendencies to civil disobedience which would
lead to increased oppression or would, it is thought, divert the community from its true
spiritual mission. It became an accepted doctrine that civil obedience is a duty imposed
by God. As all power is of God it is an obligation to submit to it in whatever form it
manifests itself and even evil power must be passively obeyed.3 Such an interpretation
1 D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 183.
2 Romans XIII,1- 7; cf. similar passages in Titus III, 1 and 1 Peter II, 13- 7.
3 Bertrand De Jouvenel, On Power. Trans. J. F. Huntigton (Boston, 1962), p. 29;
D'Entreves, op. cit., p. 184; Sabine, op. cit., pp. 177- 8.
is supported further by the statements of the Old Testament about the nature of the
Jewish kingship.1 According to the Jewish tradition the kingship was founded by God
as a necessary consequence of human rebelliousness, and the king, who was in fact
instituted in power by the anointment of a prophet, was described as the Lord's
anointed. 'In a sense the Christian conception of rulership always implied a theory of
divine right, since the ruler is a minister of God'.2 The influence of such ideas is so
great that it has brought a considerable change in the claims of the Roman Emperors to
power. They have come to recognize in God the origin of their power and to consider
themselves emperors by the grace of God.3 The importance of this change lies in the
fact that it has paved the way for the so-called theocratic rule in the Middle Ages.
Supremacy of the Pope
By the fifth century a new interpretation of St. Paul's formula that all power is
of God has already been emerging. The new trend puts stress on the thesis that if
power is from God and is conferred by his grace it is a source of duties rather than a
source of rights. Instead of defining the principle to induce the subjects to obey
Power, it is interpreted to induce Power to obey God. The holder of power is not
autonomous to use it as he pleases. It is his duty to use it in accordance with divine
law, the law of the Master of his power.4 Several significant alternative conclusions
are now possible to be reached. On the one hand, passive obedience is no longer
needed. On the contrary, resistance to evil power is not only permitted but rather is
regarded sometimes a duty. If the holder of power, in St. Paul's words, is the minister
of God to the people for their good, the obligation of obedience of the subjects is
conditional to his fulfilment of his duties in accordance with justice.5 On the other
hand, when these principles are viewed in conjunction with the papal doctrines, which
1 See I. Samuel, chs. 8- 10.
2 Sabine, op. cit., p. 178.
3 Ullmann, op. cit., p. 57.
4 Ullmann, op. cit., pp. 64- 5; D'Entreves, op. cit., pp. 185- 6; De Jouvenel, op. cit., p.
29.
5 D' Entreves, op. cit., p. 185.
are accounted above, they will illustrate the grounds for the claims of the popes
throughout the Middle Ages to supervision and supremacy over secular rulers.1 The
traditional Christian doctrine places the church and the state side by side as equals each
deriving its power from God.2 But when it is accepted that the function of the secular
ruler is basically the eradication of evil, and that his power is not arbitrary but he is
constrained by Divine law, the state and the church will not stand on the same footing.
Within the papal premises, the pope who is the 'rock' upon which the church is built is
the only one authorized to pronounce what is Divine law, what is evil and what is not
evil in the Christian world. As such he must be in a higher position. The concept of
the role of the churchmen in directing the affairs of the state appears in the words of
Gregory VII to a council at Rome in the year 1080:
"So act, I beg you, holy fathers and princes, that all the world
may know that, if you have power to bind and loose in Heaven, you
have power on earth to take away or to grant empires, kingdoms,
principalities, dukedoms, marches, counties, and the possessions of all
men according to their merits.... Let kings and all the princes of the
world learn how great you are and what power you have and let these
small men fear to disobey the command of your church."3
The theocracy of the Middle Ages is the culmination of the implementation of
this kind of interpretation of the principle of divine sovereignty.4 From the eleventh to
the fourteenth centuries the pope has become the supreme monarch of the church and
the secular ruler is but one of his subjects. The prince is not independent in many
ways. He has to follow the papal law and commands or face excommunication, if not
deposition. And such sanctions have proved to be so formidable that they have
provoked the Emperor Henry IV to kneel down in the snow of Canossa to seek the
forgiveness of Gregory VII.
1 For full discussion see Ullmann, op. cit., pp. 57- 86.
2 This conception is often referred to as the doctrine of the two swords, and is given
authoritative exposition by Pope Gelasius 1 at the end of the fifth century. See Sabine, op. cit., pp.
188- 90.
3 Quoted by Sabine, op. cit., p. 224.
4 De Jouvenel, op. cit., pp. 29 - 30.
However, the Reformation has marked the breakdown of the absolute
government of the pope both in the spiritual and political spheres. To undermine his
authority in the political side two lines of religious argument have developed offering
new interpretations to the doctrine of divine sovereignty. One has stressed the
independence of the secular ruler holding him responsible directly to God with no
earthly intermediary. The other stresses the rights of the people, under God, to provide
for its own civil government.1 It is to be noticed that while both trends agree in the
view that power is of God and both have sought to free the civil government from the
yoke of the pope, nonetheless they run counter to each other. The former is in support
of the royal rights and it has crystalized in the theory of the divine right of kings which
subjects the people to kings as a representative of God instead of subjecting them to the
law of God and the control of the church. The latter is an attempt to limit the power of
the king and assert his accountability to his subjects as well as to God. Therefore,
while the former is a justification of despotism, the latter is a defence of liberty and the
rights of the community. Also it is noteworthy that these theories have emerged in the
sixteenth century at almost the same time when Bodin's theory of sovereignty has made
its appearance. The distinction between them and Bodin's theory lies in the fact that
they are of a religious background where Bodin has omitted God in his thesis and has
accepted a pure secular state.
The Right to Resist
As the doctrine of the divine right of kings has gained popularity because it is
largely directed against the theory which places the people above the kings and justifies
resistance, it may be convenient to look into the latter first. The most interesting
expositions of the theory are those of the French Protestants, and among them the most
famous is the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos which is published in 1579.2 The main
1 Sabine, op. cit., p. 230.
2 An English translation has appeared in 1648 and others thereafter. It is reprinted with an
introduction by H. J. Laski as A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants (London, 1924). The
authorship of the book has been debated since the sixteenth century and it is often assumed that
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outline of the theory of the Vindiciae may be illustrated in the following extracts from
the book:
"The Holy Scripture doeth teach that God reigns by his own
proper authority, and kings by derivation, God from himself, kings
from God, that God hath a jurisdiction proper, kings are his delegates.
It follows then, that the jurisdiction of God hath no limits, that of kings
bounded; that the power of God is infinite, that of kings confined, that
the kingdom of God extends itself to all places, that of kings is retained
within the confines of certain countries.... And, therefore, seeing all the
kings of the world are under his feet, it is no marvel, if God be called
the King of kings and Lord of lords; all kings be termed His ministers
established to judge rightly, and govern justly the world in the quality of
lieutenants.... By the same reason the people are always called the
Lord's people, and the Lord's inheritance, and the king's governor of
this inheritance, and conductor or leader of his people of God.... That
sentence of God Almighty must always remain irrevocably true, I will
not give My glory to any other, that is, no man shall have such absolute
authority, but I will always remain Sovereign."1
Under the title "Kings are made by the people" the book continues to explain its
ideas and says:
"We have shewed before that it is God that does appoint kings,
who chooses them, who gives the kingdom to them: now we say that
the people establish kings, puts the sceptre into their hands, and who
with their suffrages, approves the election. God would have it done in
this manner, to the end that the kings should acknowledge, that after
God they hold their power and sovereignty from the people, and that it
might rather induce them, to apply and address the utmost of their care
and thoughts for the profit of the people.2 Now seeing that the people
choose and establish their kings, it follows that the whole body of the
people is above the king; for it is a thing most evident, that he who is
established by another, is accounted under him who has established
him, and he who receives his authority from another, is less than he
from whom he derives his power."3
In short,God in the scheme of the Vindiciae is the real sovereign and the king
and the people are bound to obey his law. Though the king is instituted by God, God
acts in this matter through the people. Therefore, the king derives his power from God
as his lieutenant and from the people who have elected him as their representative.
Duplessis- Mornay, the counsellor of Henry IV, is its author. However, the book is published under
the pseudonym of Junius Brutus.
1 Laski, ed., A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants, pp. 67- 70.
2 Ibid., p. 118.
3 Ibid.., p. 124.
Thus, God is superior and the people are greater than the king. The king is bound to
their services. If the king violates the law of God, or does not fulfil the duties trusted
to him by the people, resistance against him is justifiable. Such revolt is the duty of the
people. But by the people it is not meant the masses. The reference to the people
throughout the theory means the natural heads of the community who are
commissioned to speak in its name. In this sense, the rights claimed for the people is
not a right of every individual. It is a right of those who possess authority of some
kind and whose position makes them the natural heads of the community. Hence, 'the
spirit of the Vindiciae is not democratic but aristocratic';1 nonetheless, the book has
become 'one of the landmarks of revolutionary literature'.2
The Divine Right of Kings
In reply to the claims of the rights of the people and the revolutionary trends
they raise, the theory of the divine rights of the kings is stated.3 Essentially, it claims
that monarchy is the best, if not the only, form of government chosen by God, and that
a monarch has a right to his throne acquired by birth and derived directly from God.
As the right is hereditary as well as divine, it does not depend on the consent of the
subjects. The king is the representative of God on earth, his power is absolute and he
is accountable to God alone. Ultimately, the law resides in the breast of the king in
spite the fact that it is assumed that he is bound by the divine law and the natural law.
"Kings", James wrote, "are the authors and makers of the laws, and not the laws of
the kings".4 Under such a theory the sacred obligation of the subjects is to render
1 Sabine, op. cit., p. 357.
2 Ibid., p. 352.
3 A comprehensive discussion of the statements of the theory of the divine right of kings is
contained in John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, 1914). Though
the theory has originally been elaborated in France by writers such as William Barclay, it has appeared
at the same time in Scotland and is stated by King James 1 himself. Cf. Charles H. Mcllwain, ed.,
The Political Works of James I (Cambridge, Mass., 1918). A brief account is given in J. W. Allen,
A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1928), pp. 367- 93; Sabine, op.
cit., pp. 364- 9; Ullmann, op. cit., pp. 117- 37; and D'Entreves, op. cit., pp. 182- 90.
4 The Political Works, p. 62.
unconditional obedience to the kings, who "are not only God's lieutenants upon earth,
and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called Gods".1
If the elements of the theory of the divine right of kings is taken into account, it
is not difficult to see that it is nothing but a justification of the same absolute monarchy
which Bodin's theory of sovereignty has attempted to defend. As a means of stability
against tendencies of rebellion it has gained a wide acceptance and has achieved the end
for which it has been invented. Hence, it is not surprising to find the religious theorists
hold to it whenever there is a threat of instability. In the aftermath of the French
Revolution it is called upon again to restore order. The doctrine has been given new
and brilliant elaborations2 and it is able to survive through the eighteenth century and
the first half of the nineteenth century. The basis of this movement is to assert the
doctrine of divine sovereignty. God is the true sovereign of the universe and the real
fountain of political power. Any theory of the religious and political sovereignty of
man is regarded "the principle of all the evils which afflict society".3 It is declared that
"man cannot give laws to himself" only "he can do no more than defend what is
dispensed to him by a higher power".4 This emphasis on the divine origin of power is
to impose limitations by the law of God on the human ruler and to suppress rebellion.
Practically, it disapproves of democracy and favours absolute monarchy. In fact this is
the ultimate end for which the divine right is effectively used.
1 Ibid., p. 307.
2 The leaders of this movement among the Roman Catholics in France are De Maistre in his
Study on Sovereignty and The Pope, and De Bonald in his Theory of Political and Religious Power
in Civil Society. In Germany a good presentation is found in Philosophy of Law by the great
Protestant theorist Stahl. Cf. Merriam, op. cit., pp. 52- 62. The two works of Harold J. Laski,
Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven, 1917), pp. 211- 39; and Authority in the
Modern State (New Haven, 1919), pp. 123- 88, give a summary of the political thought of De
Maistre and Bonald respectively.
3 Bonald as quoted in Merriam, op. cit., p. 54.
4 De Maistre quoted in Laski, Problem of Sovereignty, op. cit., p. 217.
Chapter 2
Criticisms and Restatements of Western Theories
I. Objections to Absolute Sovereignty
Theories of absolute sovereignty as expounded by Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau
and Austin had never been a universally accepted truth. In spite of that they became the
central dogma in the revolutionary changes that took place in Europe in recent
centuries. Firstly, the belief in the sovereignty of the national King challenged the
supremacy of the Pope and the Emperor and succeeded in overturning their power.
Later, the monarchical regime itself collapsed under the pressure of the idea of
popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, those theories were always attacked and strong
criticism has been levied against them, specially during the past hundred years.
Some at least attempted fundamental changes to the traditional views.Others claimed
the total rejection of the concept of sovereignty and disowned it as wrong and
harmful. "It would be of lasting benefit to political science if the whole concept of
sovereignty were surrendered", one critics suggested, "on the grounds that it was of
dubious correctness in fact, and it had dangerous moral consequences".1 Another
wrote:
"It is my contention that political philosophy must get rid of
the word, as well as the concept, of sovereignty ... because this
concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead us if we keep
using it assuming that it has been too long and too largely accepted to
be permissibly rejected, and unaware of the false connotations that are
inherent in it.2
This attempt to refute the theory of sovereignty is claimed to be based on factual
and moral grounds. It is argued that sovereignty with its traditional attributes is
impossible to be identified in reality. In the light of modem political conditions, it is
maintained to be inapplicable to most important developments such as
1 Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925), pp. 44- 5.
2 Jacques Maritain, "The Concept of Sovereignty", in W. J.Stankiewicz(ed.), In Defence
of Sovereignly (New York, 1969), pp. 42- 3.
federalism and modern democracy. Moreover, the growth of international law
has thrown some doubts on the competence of the notion of national sovereignty.
Morally, sovereignty with its mark of unlimited power is seen to be an effective tool
in the hands of despotic rulers. However, it would be out of place here to attempt
anything like a detailed review of this criticism. Yet it appears to be necessary to
outline its origins and then look into the latest views on sovereignty,
i. Irrelevance to Actual Conditions
The arguments supporting the idea that the theory of sovereignty is
incompatible with modern social and political facts, have asserted that there has
been an intense growth in the internal structure of societies and a close association
between the ruling body and the ruled people. It is believed that complexity and
diversity in the distribution of power in the political community makes it inaccurate to
assume that there is an ultimate authority within it.1 In verifying this view a number
of recent political developments are mentioned as examples. It will suffice to take only
the most striking.
Decentralization and Federalism
The arguments for the case that the validity of the concept of sovereignty was
challenged by the developments that took place in many countries towards adopting
decentralization and federalism were stated by a distinguished French critic, Leon
Duguit, as follows:
"Today many countries with a unitary system of government,
and particularly France, move in the direction of a large decentralization.
Federalism is almost the common law in America. In Europe,
Switzerland and the German Empire are already Federal states He is
referring to the Swiss Union of 1848, 1874 and the German Empire of
1871 and the system is without doubt destined to expand. In the usual
theory of sovereignty regional decentralization is a system in which
certain local groups, varying in character and number according to the
state in question, exercise certain prerogatives by means of organs and
agents regarded as representatives of the local group; but their activity is
more or less strictly controlled by the superior authority. The French
Commune is a very clear example of a local and decentralised group. It
1 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, 1986), p. 218.
holds real rights of sovereign character: it has a police power, it can levy
taxes, it has the privilege of eminent domain. These powers are
exercised by organs and agents as representatives of the commune.
Whatever may be said, this is the flagrant contradiction to the conception
of a unified and indivisible national personally exercised sovereign
power... To avoid the disharmony, it has been urged that these
decentralized groups are not really sovereign, that though they exercise
sovereign power, sovereignty itself remains undividedly attached to the
indivisible national person. This is the merest quibling.
As to federalism more even than regional decentralization it
negatives the idea of state sovereignty. It is essentially constituted upon
the basis that there exists on the same territory only one nation but
several states invested as such with sovereign power.1
This new phenomenon of decentralization and federalism stimulated numerous
controversies and immense efforts were made to resolve its apparent incompatibility
with the concept of sovereignty.2 The course of discussions reveals that the problem
faced was of a very perplexing nature, apparently, it was hardly possible to reconcile
the different forms of division of powers in the federal state with the idea of the
monistic indivisible sovereignty. Sovereignty, as was found in the traditional theory,
had to be one, or it was not at all.
The first resolution in america , the pioneer example of federation, was a
tendency to accept the idea of divisibility of sovereignty, which was even reflected
in the constitution of 1887 though in a confused manner. The states and the
national government were regarded as sharing sovereign power between them. While
each retained important portions of it, neither of them became supreme, but both were
limited.3 Those who held this view argued that without admitting the possibility of a
divided sovereignty it was difficult to explain intelligibly the compound system of
government in the United States. The assumption that sovereignty was a unit had to
be corrected because "experience has shown it capable of division".4 On the Continent
the German thinkers adopted, for some time, a similar theory of double sovereignty
1 Leon Duguit, Law in Modern States. Tran. T. Frida and Harold Laski (London, 1921),
pp. 20- 2.
2 See C. E. Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau (New York,
1900), chapters 9 and 10; Preston King, Federalism and Federation (London, 1982).
3 Merriam, op. cit., p. 162- 3.
4 Ibid., pp. 164 n.5.
in the explanation of the character of a federal state. The central government, as it
was reasoned, and each local or state government had its own sphere of operations.
Within the limits of its own sphere, each was sovereign as was the other. Therefore,
there was no contradiction in the concept of a state with many sovereigns, if it was
meant by that independent political entities, each supreme in its own particular
sphere.1
The notion of a divided or a relative sovereignty became widely influential, but
eventually was weakened by other explanations. Under one famous form of
definition, sovereignty was considered as an absolute and unlimited power, but it
was possible that it could be limited by its own will, and only by itself. This
possibility of "self-limitation" of sovereignty, with emphasis on the self, was regarded
as an explanation through the doctrine of sovereignty of what was maintained
against it.2 Moreover, to facilitate the recognition of one sovereignty another
development had appeared. A distinction was made between state and government.
There was an ordinary organization with local and central branches which was the
government. Then, above it there was the state which was supreme and ultimate in its
powers. Governmental powers might be divided among different organs, but
sovereignty remained absolute and indivisible and it belonged to the state itself. Thus
sovereignty was recognized as an essential quality of the state.3 Further, another
theory developed another argument which ran in the opposite direction. It claimed a
divorce between sovereignty and statehood and introduced the idea of the non-
sovereign state. It was asserted that there could be political communities which
were non-sovereign because they were subjected to a higher power, but
nevertheless they could be entitled to the name of state in the sense that they
possessed an authority based on their own right, and not on delegation from the
1 Ibid., pp. 186- 7.
2 Ibid., pp. 193- 7.
3 Ibid., p. 180-2.
sovereign powers, to perform political functions and to establish their own binding
rules. Accordingly in federalism, though the local powers lost their sovereignty,
they still retained their statehood, all parties in a federal state, that is the individual
states and the central state, possessed in common the supreme indivisible power.1
The above discussion summarizes the complicated problems that existed in
reconciling federalism with the traditional theory of sovereignty. The derived
conclusion, however, might be well presented in the following quotation taken
from a recently published book on federalism (1982):
"For various reasons, the classical theory of sovereignty
is inadequate. If we are to regard federation as a form of sovereign
state, it is necessary to indicate in advance what we intend by
sovereign. We may stipulate a sovereign state to be a territorially
defined unit which has established and coherent procedures for
conflict-resolution and decision-making within its borders, which
is neither legally subject to nor substantively bound by any other
entity extended to itself, and which has designated agents (eg.
rulers, civil servants etc) to act on its behalf. Such a definition as this
excludes any considerations of absolute, total, illimitable or
indivisible power as marks of sovereignty. It does not,
however, exclude notions of rule-coherence, finality of decision, or
political hierarchy. With such a definition, there remains no need for the
concept of a 'unitary' state. A federation is merely one of many
different, indeed innumerable, types of sovereign states.2
Complexities in International Relations
Europe in the Middle Ages, under the dominance of imperial ideas and
Christendom, was believed to form a single community governed by one
universal authority, the Emperor or the Pope. The development of separate territorial
entities was accompanied by the appearance of the notion of sovereignty which lead
to the belief that there should be a final and absolute authority within each separate
state. The early formulators of the theory of sovereignty were primarily interested
in the internal political structure of their societies and paid little attention to the
question of relations between nations.3 However, the theory of sovereignty has been
1 Ibid., pp 197- 200.
2 King, Federalism and Federation, p. 141.
3 J. L. Brierly, The Law ofNations (Oxford, 1963), pp. 45- 6.
expanded to apply to the international system.1 In the international context it is
used to mean the antithesis of its internal usage. The theory maintained that
within the single community there should exist a superior power, but internationally
the principle denied the existence of any kind of superior authority over and above a
collection of states.2 Essentially, sovereignty is a territorial concept explaining
the relations between rulers and the ruled. The confusion around its function in
international law arises mainly from the fact that it has been used to express a
wholly different relation which arises between two or more "sovereigns".3
Nevertheless, when the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty was
transformed from a principle of internal order into the international sphere, the
result was confusing.4 The assumption of absolute sovereignty was found to be
incompatible with the idea of international law. If each state has absolute freedom of
action in international affairs, the existence of international law will be
impossible. If the state with its own unlimited supreme will is the sole source of all
law, how could it be subjected to international law?
To escape from this difficulty many devices have been introduced. In one
approach international law was viewed as a law of coordination, not a law of
subordination, a law between and not above the different states. Yet, even in this
sense if states are subjects of international law certainly the law is above them.5
Another attempt to reconcile the notion of absolute sovereignty with the
existence of international law is the theory of self-limitation. According to this
concept, the state by its own sovereign will may voluntarily submit to
international laws and treaties and hence limit its sovereignty . Hence, international
1 See F. H. Hinsley, "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations between Nations", in
W. J. Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of Sovereignty (New York, 1969) pp. 275- 88.
2 Ibid., p. 275.
3 R. P. anad, "Equality of States in International Law", Recueil Des Cours, II, 1986, pp.
26- 7.
4 Mark St. Korowicz, Introduction to International Law (The Hague, 1959), pp. 40- 51.
5 Brierly, op. cit., p. 46.
law, like all other law, is a creation of the individual state. It is an "external state
law".1
Eventually this construction was realized to be inadequate. International law is
not a binding legal system if it depends wholly on the will of the individual state. If
"self-liberation" from "self-limitation" is permitted according to the interests of
each state, then there will be no real obligation.2 However, the dominant
tendency in modern international relations is a move towards increasing
limitation on sovereignty of individual states and assertions of the supremacy of
international law. Sovereignty is defined as the autonomy of the national state within
the limits of international law.3 In the opinion of one authority on international law :
"The present international practice and doctrine recognize
only and exclusively the relative sovereignty of states, i.e sovereignty
limited by the rules of international law which the state co-created
or to which it acceded. These rules are binding upon the state, it has
to obey and apply them faithfully, and it may not unilaterally, by its own
will change or abolish them.4
In this regard, there remains to be considered the remarkable views of Hans
Kelsen, a renowned international jurist, who made a careful analytical study of the
problem of national sovereignty in international law.5 Kelsen excludes the possibility of
the "dualistic position" which assumes the simultaneous validity of international and
national law, for the simple reason that they may conflict with each other, "the one
prescribing that a certain action ought to be performed and the other that this action
ought not to be performed".6 There is left only the "monistic theory" which holds that:
either international law is superior to national law, meaning that the validity of the
latter is derived from the former, or national law is conceived of as superior to
1 Korowicz, op. cit., pp. 42- 5.
2 Ibid., p. 45.
3 See Anad, op. cit., pp. 34- 5.
4 Mark S. Korowicz, "Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty", Recueil Des Cours, I, 1961,
p. 108.
5 See Hans Kelsen, "Sovereignty and International Law", in Stankiewicz, In Defence of
Sovereignty, pp. 115-31.
6 Ibid., p. 117.
49
international law whose validity depends on recognition by nationallaw. If the primacy
of international law over national law is accepted, then the term sovereignty of the state
loses its proper sense, since the supreme order is the international law and not the
subordinated national legal order.1 If on the other hand the primacy of the national
legal order is accepted, bestowing validity on international law only when it is
recognized by the state, then sovereignty of the state acquires its real meaning as
presented in the traditional theory.2 But such a view will lead to state solipsism
because it follows from this construction that only the sovereignty of one state could be
presupposed and the sovereignty of this state would exclude the sovereignty of all other
states.3 Finally, Kelsen arrives at the following conclusion:
"Both systems are equally correct and equally legitimate. To
decide between them on the basis and with the specific means of the
science of law is impossible. The science of law can only describe both
systems and ascertain that one of the two systems of reference has to
be accepted in order to determine the relation between international and
national law. The decision for one or the other of the systems is outside
the science of law. This decision may be determined by political
considerations rather than scientific. One who appreciates the idea of
the sovereignty of his own state, because he identifies himself with his
state in his enhanced self-consciousness, will prefer the primacy of
national law to the primacy of international law. On the other hand, one
who cherishes the idea of a legal world organization will prefer the
primacy of international law.4
Sovereignty, therefore, has been subjected to various views and
criticisms; yet it has also retained its importance in international law as a basic
principle and as a foundation of it. However, the difficulty of the inconsistency of
absolute sovereignty and the existence of international law is not the only
one that has arisen in the application of the international version of sovereignty.
Several other corollaries, such as independence and equality, which are also major
doctrines in international relations, have been constantly reviewed to suit the changing
situations. Independence is an integral part of sovereignty; indeed it is the negative
1 Ibid., p. 121.
2 Ibid., p. 119.
3 Ibid., p. 121.
A Ibid., p. 130.
aspect of it. Yet, in the actual conditions of the world the interdependence between
nations on political, military, economic and technological matters makes it
very difficult for an individual state to pursue an entirely independent policy in
internal and foreign affairs.1 Hence, the the definition of a sovereign
independent state has always been a controversial issue. There had been certain
circumstances in which a region was not under direct foreign rule, yet it was not
ruled by an authority which could be described as fully sovereign and independent.
Examples of such situations can be found in the protectorate system of the
nineteenth century , the mandate system after the First World War, and the Trusteeship
system after the Second World War.2 This led to the rise of the notion of the semi-
sovereign state, which appears to be a self- contradictory term. The problem of
divided sovereignty has also been presented in the development of the conditions of the
British Dominions. The question of what is sovereignty and where it lies in the
British Empire and its parts, or in what later came to be known as the British
Commonwealth of Nations, was very difficult to answer.3 Similarly, there is
much confusion about under what conditions a nation loses its sovereignty.4 Such
difficulties indicate the perplexities at the root of the concept of national
sovereignty whenever the question of the relations of a political entity within a family
of nations is raised.
Moreover, the development over the past century to establish an international
authority superior to national states, especially in relation to their decision as to peace
and war, has resulted in more apparent contradiction between national sovereignty and
international order. Since the Napoleonic Wars, and after every serious war, there has
been a growing tendency to find ways of stopping national states from self-destructive
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th. ed. (New York, 1967), p. 304.
2 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 224.
3 For a brief discussion of the problem see H. E. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty
(Chicago, 1937) pp. 93- 108.
4 See Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 305.
wars. In 1918, at the end of the First World War, the League of Nations was formed.
After the Second World War, in 1945, the United Nations was established. Such
devices could be seen as a movement towards the centralization of the application of
international law. It is always argued that the creation of powerful international bodies,
such as the security council, is incompatible with the notion of national sovereignty.
It is frequently emphasized that the "main stumbling block which thus far has vitiated
all attempts at restraining the struggle for power on the international scene is national
sovereignty itself".1
Further, it has been argued that the principle of equality, which is a
manifestation of a particular aspect of sovereignty, is often departed from in the
practices of international agencies. Article 2 of the charter of the United Nations states
that The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
members; yet it has been frequently pointed out that there are certain deviations from
that rule. These include the authority given to the permanent members of the Security
Council, the veto right and unequal representation in international bodies.2
Such confusion and inconsistency in the concept of sovereignty in its
application to the international sphere have led some thinkers to demand a divorce of
sovereignty from nationalism. One writer explains:
"Political and economic nationalism, as practised by national
states exercising their prerogative of national sovereignty, has been the
perpetual and repetitive cause of war and will continue to be so in
future. Therefore, all attempts to end war have consistently failed
because they have all dealt with the means of war but not with its
cause. Yet in the last 150 years, the modem world, having established
more and more national states, is still busy carving up the earth (and
pretty soon it will be the moon) into small and large national segments.
More and more people are falling prey to the intoxication of
nationalism and aiming for the establishment of independent national
states.
The issue is plain: we have to choose between nationalism and
the acceptance of moral and ethical political principles in a cooperating
world society. The fundamental change over to a lawful society of
nations can only be made if we subordinate nationalism to humanity and
1Jbid., p. 316.
2 Ibid., pp. 302, 309- 12.
only then we can establish a world community exercising the functions
of world wide institutions. The day will come when man's real enemy,
nationalism, will be defeated, and the people of East and West will
march together towards a world human sovereignty".1
Pluralism
Sovereignty has also been criticized from a different angle by a group of
thinkers2 who used a different analysis of the nature of the state and its law. Their
argument stemmed from the fact that they did not view society as a hierarchical
structure in which there was a monistic centralized body possessing the dominating
command authority. In their outlook, the society was rather of a federal stmcture in
which there were many sources of powers. There was, especially in a democratic state,
a diffusion of powers into several molecular units all working at the same time and all
seeking equilibrium. Such an analysis of the nature of power in the society was
comprehensively termed pluralism.
To understand the pluralistic approach, it should be recalled that the monopoly
of power in the hands of the modern state in Europe was a development that followed
the feudal particularism which had divided Europe into "an infinite number of petty
sovereignties".3 That process of centralization of power was supported by the creation
of law by the state. The state had taken the place of the old plural legal system and
became the unique source, arbiter and executor of law. In short, "no power, no law, no
society except with the state and within the state".4 That was the spirit of Hobbes's
"mortal God", Leviathan, which inspired and shaped the modem notion of the state as
expressed in the concept of sovereignty.
To the pluralists Leviathan was a myth. They brought back and developed the
view that in actual conditions there existed with and within the state many centres of
power. Beside the state there were a number of associations of which the citizen was a
1 Arther Freud, Human Sovereignty (New York, 1964), pp. 157, 333, 338.
2 An outstanding example is Harold J. Laski, see his books: Studies in the Problem of
Sovereignty (New Haven, 1917); The Foundations of Sovereignty (New York, 1921); A Grammar of
Politics (London, 1925).
3 A. P. D'Entreves, The Notion of the State (Oxford, 1967), p. 124.
4 Ibid., p. 112.
member, such as the church, trade unions and the like. As opposed to the theorizers of
sovereignty who demanded the monopolization of power in one centre as a necessary
condition for the establishment of order in the society, the pluralists saw
decentralization and distribution of power as the only guarantee of the safety, security
and liberty of the citizen. Moreover, the pluralistic conception of law challenged the
basic construction that the state was the sole law creator. The legal phenomenon was a
characteristic of all rule-controlled social behaviour and was not exclusive to the
sphere of the state.1 Law was not only the command of the sovereign, as defined in the
imperative conception. Not only did law exist outside the state, but within the state
law was issued as an expression and indication of what had already become accepted
standards by common convictions.2 Law was "accepted" rather than "imposed".
Pluralism as a political doctrine was powerfully expounded in the writings of
Laski, whose name was commonly associated with the attack against sovereignty. His
thought may serve as an outstanding example of this attitude, to which he returned
repeatedly in all his books. His ideas in his latest comprehensive treatise A Grammar of
Politics may stand as a summary of his general outlook.3 In his discussion of the
nature of sovereignty he examined it from three different perspectives: historically,
legally and politically. His analysis led him to reject sovereignty as no longer valid.
The historical evolution of sovereignty since the religious struggles of the sixteenth
century, in his view, revealed the relativeness of the concept. "It represents, not an
absolute but a historical logic".4 The question of sovereignty was dealing with power,
and there was in history, a variety of ways in which power might be organized. The
sovereign state, being merely one way of them,5was "conditioned always by the
environment it encounters"; yet , mostly "the logic of its hypothesis is directly
1 Ibid., p. 129.
2 Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford, 1952), p. 213.
3 See Laski, a Grammar of Politics, pp. 44- 88.
4 Ibid., pAS.
5 Ibid., p. 45.
antithetic to the experience it has encountered".1 The difficulty of fitting its
assumptions to the modern state was obvious, especially in a federal state and in the
international side where a unified and interdependent world was needed. Sovereignty
sought to be absolute and irresponsible, but power to serve its ends had to be organized
to work in accordance with rules.2
In the legal aspect of sovereignty, Laski examined the Austinian form given to
it, which emphasized the three fold implications that in each state there was a legal
determinate authority, with unlimited powers, whose command was the law. His
examinations induced him to believe that the assumption on which the Austinian view
was based "make it worthless as an explanation of the modern state for political
purposes". 3 Firstly, to think of law as simply a command did not account for
complex legal phenomena. He gave examples of statues in which "the notion of
command is contingent and indirect; and the idea of penalty is, again save in the most
circuitous way, notably absent".4 Even the King in Parliament, the standard example
of the Austinian sovereign, because of increasing deference to the electorate, public
opinion and pressure groups had become "a machine for registering decisions arrived at
elsewhere".5 The sovereign was forced to will things desired by inferior bodies, or it
would cease to be a parliament. No sovereign anywhere had possessed unlimited
powers. In this respect, it was very difficult to discover such a sovereign in a state
governed by constitution.
On the political side of sovereignty, Laski viewed society "as essentially
federal in its nature".6 Men were not only members of the state, but they were also
members of many other associations. These associations sought to exercise power over
1 Ibid., p.49.
2 Ibid., pp. 48-9.
3 Ibid., p. 51.
4 Ibid., p. 52.
5 Ibid., p. 52.
6 Ibid., p. 59.
their followers and also sought to influence the state.1 Against this background
society was best understood as a multiple of sovereign associations, each controlling
an aspect of the social life of man. The state was only a public service corporation
competing for loyalty from the individual like other associations. It differed from other
associations in that it was territorial in nature, and its membership was compulsory.2
Yet the character of the state was akin to other associations, even if different and
greater in the range it covered. To assume to the state a pre-eminance and a sovereign
position over other associations was not only mythical, but also dangerous in that it
left "to a small number of men an authority it is difficult not to abuse".3 The function
of the state was to coordinate. It was outside its competence to interfere with the
function of other associations as long as they acted within their limits.4
Therefore, the state ought to be responsible. Its will was to be limited in a
variety of ways. It ought to be answerable from time to time to the people from whom
it derived its power. It ought to be powerless to change certain fundamentals. It ought
to be legally accountable for its mistakes, and its officers should easily be suable in
the courts.5 In short, the state ought to be under popular control. To insure this, Laski
introduced some devices such as territorial decentralization, functional representation,
consultative bodies and the right of the citizen to acquire equal education and economic
power.
To sum up it appears that the pluralists attempted to prove that the monistic
theory of sovereignty was seriously inadequate to explain the complex nature of
society seen in the perspective of the numerous autonomous associations it comprised.
As a theory of law it accounted only for a certain part of a wide area of controlled
behaviour which was an outcome of custom and consent rather than a result of a
1 Ibid., p.59.
2 Ibid., p. 69.
3 Ibid., p. 71.
4 Ibid., p. 60.
5 Ibid., p. 62.
command. As a political theory it overlooked large social phenomena and limited itself
to the realization of order as a higher value.1
On the other hand, after all these vigorous attacks, the pluralist could not escape
the fact that there should be in the society a final coordinating authority of some form
for the maintenance of equilibrium. Even in the programme of Laski, he was favouring
the retention of the traditional territorial parliament as the final coordinating organ, with
the addition of consultative bodies. In the end, we find that Laski did not drink the
whole cup.2
ii. Despotism: The Moral Objection to Sovereignty
Another tendency to dismiss sovereignty is the attempt of some critics to
question the morality of the concept on the ground that it justified despotism. One critic
wrote: the two concepts of sovereignty and absolutism have been forged together on
the same anvil. They must be scrapped together.3
The moralist objections are based on claiming that there were certain
connotations inherent in the concept of sovereignty which tended to support despotism.
Primarily, sovereignty is a right to absolute power, and a right to be obeyed without
restrictions. Such notions may be used to vindicate absolutism. In fact, sovereignty
found its real and full meaning in the power possessed by the Absolute Monarchies of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. The state took their place,
characterized basically by the right to possess absolute sovereignty. The inner logic of
sovereignty creates notions of centralization and monopolization of power, and
provides conditions which favour totalitarianism. It puts the law and coercive forces of
the state beyond the control of the people.4 Depending on the idea that sovereignty is
1 C. H. Wilson, "Soverign and Sovereignty", Chamber's Encyclopaedia (?), p. 783.
2 H. E. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty (Chicago, 1937) p. 127.
3 Jacques Maritain, "The Concept of Sovereignty", in W. J. Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of
Sovereignty (New York, 1969), p. 64.
4 W. J. Rees, "The Theory of Sovereignty Restated", in Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of
sovereignty, p. 240.
the power to act without accountability, the state is endeavouring persistently to escape
supervision and control by society.1
In the main, the moralists object to the attributes attached to sovereignty on the
basis that they conflict with other important norms in society, such as democracy,
freedom, individualism, obligation and the like. It is maintained that the value of
order, on which sovereignty rests, is set superior to any other norms. The problem is
especially acute if democracy is held to constitute the main principle in the state. It is not
possible to reconcile pure democracy and sovereignty in its absolute sense.2 Even
the notion of popular sovereignty introduced by Rousseau was not a guarantee against
the misuse of power, because it proved to be, both in theory and in practice, an
ambiguous notion which could easily be interpreted to serve absolutism. Rousseau
himself declared "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so
by the whole body" which "means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free".3
The burden of the cruel tyranny of the Convention was laid on France in the name of
popular sovereignty , and the despotism of the two Napoleons was based on claims of
popular right.4 Many present totalitarian dictators may find support in Rousseau's
arguments.5 In that way Rousseau offered, modern democracies a concept of
sovereignty which is destructive of democracy and which directs towards the
totalitarian state; because he transferred "the superior power of absolute kings to the
point of an unheard-of absolutism, in order to make a present of it to the people".6
In defence of sovereignty against the moralists' objections, it is said that the
misuse of power would have occurred if the notion of sovereignty had never been
1 Maritain, op. cit., p. 63.
2 Stankiewicz, In Defence of Sovereignty, p.6.
3 J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. Tran. G. D. H. Cole, ed. J.
Brumfitt and J. Hall (London, 1983), p. 177.
4 Leon Duguit, Law in Modern State. Tran. Frida and Harold Laski, (London, 1921), pp.
28- 9.
5 Maritain, op. cit., p. 58.
6 Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 57.
formulated as it did before the notion was formulated.1 Those in authority manipulate
sovereignty to justify their absolutist claims and serve their ends as they misapply other
theories to the same purposes. The notions misemployed are, in fact, by-products of
ambiguities and distortions attached to the statement of the theory of sovereignty
which can easily be removed if the proper sense of it is understood. They are neither
necessary to it nor logical .2 The theory does not allow, let alone justify, whatever
the state does or may choose to do. It only maintains that there must be an ultimate
authority in every political society if it is to function effectively. The critics of
sovereignty seem to have misunderstood the real significance and purpose of the
concept.3
II. Recent Restatements of Sovereignty
The objections raised against the theory of absolute sovereignty have stimulated
repeated attempts to reform it and make necessary amendments and additions to it. By
and large, those revisions have been brought about through efforts to identify distinct
types of sovereignty. Such distinctions stem from the separation made between the
two notions of authority and power. To avoid confusion in thought, it is suggested that
they should be distinguished explicitly, though in reality they may be closely related.
According to this view they may be separately defined as follows:
"A man, or a body of men, has authority if it follows from his
saying "let x happen", that x ought to happen. A man, or a body of
men, has power, if it results from his saying "let x happen", that x does
happen."4
This approach gave room to the detection of a variety of kinds of sovereignty.
In the following discussion we shall look into the tendencies which brought about those
distinctions and their impact on the general view of sovereignty.
1 Ibid., p.217.
2 Rees, op. cit., p. 240.
3 Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 217.
4 J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford, 1966), p. 16.
i. Types of Sovereignty
Legal and Political Sovereignty
Perhaps it may be convenient to start examining the new views of sovereignty
by stating the distinction introduced by Dicey, the famous name of the late nineteenth
century in constitutional law in Britain. Dicey, in his reformulation of British
Parliamentary sovereignty points out two different notions, "legal sovereignty" and
"political sovereignty". In his text, Law of the Constitution, he remarks:
"It should, however, be carefully noted that the term
sovereignty, as long as it is accurately employed in the sense in which
Austin sometimes uses it, is a merely legal conception, and means
simply the power of law making unrestricted by any legal limit. If the
term sovereignty be thus used, the sovereign power under the English
constitution is clearly Parliament. But the word sovereignty is
sometimes employed in a political rather than in a strictly legal sense.
That body is politically sovereign or supreme in a state if the will of
which is ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the state. In this sense of
the word the electors of Great Britain may be said to be ... the body in
which sovereign power is vested. For, as things now stand, the will of
the electorate,.... is sure ultimately to prevail on all subjects to be
determined by the British government.... But this is a political, not a
legal fact . The electors can in the long run always enforce their will.
But the courts will take no notice of the will of the electors. The judges
know nothing about any will of the people except in so far as that will
is expressed by an Act of Parliament.... The political sense of the word
sovereignty is, it is true, fully as important as the legal sense or more
so. But the two significations, though intimately connected together ,
are essentially different."1
This line of thought was elaborated further by Lord Bryce at the beginning of
this century. He proposed that it is possible to discover two kinds of sovereignty:
legal and practical. Legal sovereignty (de jure) exists in the sphere of law and chiefly
concerns the jurists. It is the sole legislative authority, the ultimate and the highest
source of Law. Bryce defines legal sovereignty as "the person (or body) to whose
directions the law attributes legal force". It is the power which possesses the ultimate
right of making general rules, or issuing special commands which will bind others and
will not be overruled by any above it.2 This kind of sovereignty is created by and
1 A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 8th. ed. (London, 1915), pp.70-2.
2 James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1901), II, pp. 51- 2.
concerned with law, and law only. It does not relate to the actual forces in the state. It
deals merely with the person or body to whom law in theory attributes supremacy. It
is a mere question of Right as defined by law, which may or may not coincide with the
actual facts. Bryce calls sovereignty that prevails in reality practical sovereignty , and
uses it to denote simply the strongest force in the state. He defines it as "the person (or
body of persons) who can make his (or their) will prevail whether with the law or
against the law". It is the dominant force to which obedience is actually rendered, and
in case of conflict will overcome any resistance.1
While, Bryce holds that legal sovereignty is limited and divisible, practical
sovereignty seems to him to be indivisible and incapable of being limited. It is the law
that defines the sphere and extent of legislative power and may assign it to one authority
or may divide it between two or more authorities each capable in its field of issuing
general rules or special orders. Further, the law may restrict the scope of legislation
of one authority or another. It may hold the right to legislate on some subjects to the
whole people, or it may reserve that certain rules cannot be altered at all even by the
people. Practical sovereignty by its definition, is the strongest force in the state. It is
vested in one person or body of persons and law has nothing to do with limiting its
powers. Yet, in exercising its powers it is practically checked and restrained by
different influences.2
Finally, Bryce remarks that, although the two kinds of sovereignty are distinct
conceptions, they are significantly related to each other. There is a tendency in both
sovereignties to attract each other and unite; and that is the reason which has made
them often confused. The possession of legal right tends to make the legal sovereign
actually powerful. Presumably, legal sovereignty has a moral claim to obedience. In its
turn, practical sovereignty always seeks to be recognized legally , and if it lasts for a
1 Ibid., pp. 59- 60.
2 Ibid., pp. 70-1.
certain period it usually ripens into legal sovereignty.1 However, questions regarding
the grounds and the moral reasons why power has been vested in any given
sovereignty, whether legal or practical, in view of Lord Bryce, lie outside the sphere
of the determination of the nature of either kinds of sovereignty. An inquiry into that
may belong to history, political philosophy or ethics; but they have nothing to do with
the factual existence of sovereignty in the state.2
Legal, Coercive and Influential Sovereignty
Quite recently, in 1950, W. J. Rees has made an extensive re-examination of
sovereignty in a remarkable article, under the title: "The Theory of Sovereignty
Restated".3 He endeavours a resolution of the difficulties inherent in the concept by
proposing a number of possible proper usages of the term sovereignty. These senses
are essentially based on the fact that it is possible to distinguish different species of
power. He explains this as follows:
"To exercise power in a social and political sense, is to
determine the actions of persons in certain intended ways. There are,
however, different species of power, and these may be distinguished
according to the means used to determine persons' actions. We thus
have the following species. (1) Power in the sense of authority,
especially legal authority, where the means used is the formulation of,
or the reference to, a rule of law. (2) Coercive power, where the means
used consists either in the direct use of physical force, or else in a
serious threat of the use of force. (3) Power in the sense of influence,
where the means used may be any means other than the employment of
a rule of law or physical force.4
Consequently, Rees finds that the use of the word sovereignty is valid in at least
three aspects. Firstly, there is the concept of legal sovereignty, which is necessary to
exist in every state; moreover, the question of its location is fundamental to every
lawyer. Rees defines supreme legal authority as "the determination of a person's
actions in certain intended ways by means of a law". By law it is meant "an unwritten
1 Ibid., pp. 64- 5.
^ Ibid., pp. 57,72.
3 Reprinted in Stankiewicz, In Defence of Sovereignty, pp. 209- 40.
4 Ibid., p. 228.
convention or a written regulation enforceable by a sanction".1 However, it is to be
noted that the legal authority is used here to refer to the power of issuing binding rules
whether it is the power of a legislative assembly, an executive ministry or a court.2 It is
noted further that the decisions of such bodies are not by themselves enforceable unless
they are maintained by a coercive power. In other words, it is the use of force, or the
threat of the exercise of force which gives those rules the status of law. It seems
necessary that if certain rules are to be obeyed there must exist some body of persons
who are sufficiently strong to be able to enforce obedience and overcome any kind of
opposition.3
If the above argument is justified, it brings us to the second useful sense of
sovereignty, which is termed coercive sovereignty. It is used to denote the power to
determine the actions of persons in certain intended ways by means of force or the
threat of force. Usually, such power resides in a determinate body of persons
consisting of a professional police or a standing army. In this respect, it is generally
understood that there is a functional connection between the legal and the coercive
powers. Where it is necessary that a legal sovereignty should exist, there is an equal
necessity that a coercive sovereignty should exist. However, sometimes the exercise
of coercive authority may not be in accordance with the law, but may eventually acquire
legitimacy by virtue of its monopoly of power.4
It now remains to explain the third sense of sovereignty which Rees refers to as
the influential concept. This is defined as follows:
"To exercise political influence.... is to determine in certain
intended ways the actions, jointly or severally, of the legal and coercive
sovereigns, provided always that their actions are determined by some
means other than by a rule of law or threat of force. To exercise
sovereignty in this sense is to exercise political influence, as now
defined, to a greater degree than anyone else provided that those who
1 Ibid., pp. 224- 5.
2 Ibid., p. 211.
3 Ibid., pp. 211,223- 6.
4 Ibid., pp. 212,225- 9.
exercise it normally reside within the state whose legal or coercive
sovereign they are supposed to influence.1
It is always important to determine where the political influence lies if effective
ways are sought to intervene in political affairs. For this reason it appears that the
concept of influential sovereignty is useful. It might be possible to attribute it to the
majority of the electorate, to the ruling class, or sometimes the government might be
an instrument in the hands of an oligarchy or a priesthood.2
ii. Controversies over the Uses of Sovereignty
The drift of the recent development, in which many types of sovereignty have
been identified, generated considerable discussion. On the one hand, not only has the
new trend gained supporters, but some analysts have gone further to examine new
forms of sovereignty and make new distinctions. On the other hand, the holders of the
monistic view of sovereignty sharply criticized such approaches on the ground that
sovereignty is indivisible. But against the background of the vigorous attacks upon the
classical theory of sovereignty, they have developed new arguments to defend their
position. As these notions mark the recent phase in the history of sovereignty, it is
necessary to review them.
Advocates of Classification
Among the advocates for the classification of sovereignty into different classes
is Sir Ernest Baker.3 Primarily, in his view, sovereignty is a legal term and its use is
logical and consistent only in the legal sphere. This stems from the fact that he holds the
view that the state is a legal association which acts to control actions through uniform
rules. According to this view, sovereignty which is an attribute of the state, is by its
nature legal and it is confined to the sphere of law.4 Within the State, and looking only
to the State, it is possible to see two forms of legal sovereignty, both distinct and
different in kind. The first form is the ultimate sovereignty which is the constitution
1 Ibid., pp. 231-2.
2 Ibid., pp. 229- 31.
3 See his book: Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford, 1952), pp. 59-69, 219- 6.
4 Ibid., p.60.
itself by which the state is brought into being and which defines its subsequent
operations. The second form of legal sovereignty is the immediate sovereignty which is
the body that issues, subject to the constitution, ordinary laws and rules and possesses
the general control of their enforcement.1 It is significant that Baker ascribes the legal
sovereignty in its first kind to the constitution itself which is a norm, and ascribes the
second type of legal sovereignty to an organ: the legislative or the law- and rule¬
making body. Moreover, Barker sees a third form of sovereignty which acts beyond
the state. Looking outside the legal limits of the State into the broad area of society and
social thought, which is the basis of law and of the existence and inspiration of the
activity of the whole legal association, he comes to the conclusion that, over and above
the legal association, there is the idea of justice which determines the right order of
relations of the members of the national society. He refers to this justice as the extra¬
legal or supra-legal sovereignty. Therefore, his third form of sovereignty, is what he
calls "the socially created idea of justice", which is the product of social thought and
social discussion.2
However, Barker is not content to reduce the three sovereignties to one by
seeking to unite them in a single personal source of will, whether it is the individual
will of a person, the collective will of a body of persons, or the will of the people itself.
It is his contention that:
" In the sphere of social and political theory, which is bound to
embrace both Society and the State, there is no one and only
sovereignty of which we can say Its will is our peace. The peace of
aquiescence in such a will is denied us by our own nature."3
Another important contribution to that trend of thought is an essay of Stanley
Benn entitled "The Uses of Sovereignty".4 He has attempted an exhaustive
1 Ibid., pp. 61, 215.
^ Ibid., pp. 214-5.
3 Ibid., p. 216.
4 Political Studies, III, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 109- 22. Reprinted in Stankiewicz, In
Defence of Sovereignty, pp. 67- 85. See also S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, Social principles and the
Democratic State (London, 1963), pp. 257- 363.
examination of a number of distinct usages of sovereignty determining their
interpretation, application and usefulness in different fields of study. He begins with
the term legal sovereignty and relates it to the judicial view of the legal system. The
judge, he pointed out, sees the law as a body of given rules which guides his
judgement. His judicial decisions are reached in the light of norms. Therefore he needs
a normative supremacy which determines which rules belong to the law, and is itself
not open to challenge. That highest basic norm which provides the validity of the
whole legal system constitutes the legal sovereignty. In Benn's analysis, such a
supreme norm is the constitution itself, written or unwritten, or to speak effectively it is
"the traditional judicial interpretation of the constitution".1
However, beside the static view of the judge to whom the law appears as a set
of rules, there is the view of the political scientist who is interested in the dynamic
process of making the law. Therefore, his main concern is with law-makers and
legislative organs. To differentiate between the supremacy attributed to a norm, which
is important to the judge, and the supremacy that may be attributed to the legislative
organ by a political scientist, Benn suggests using "legal sovereignty" for the former,
and "legislative sovereignty" for the latter. Yet, his discussion leads him to believe that
the necessity that directs the judge to seek a supreme norm is not paralleled by a
similar necessity that directs the political scientist to seek s supreme legislative organ.
In his opinion, it is neither logically nor practically necessary to find a legislative organ
in every state, though there may be some states in which it is possible to discover such
organs. The reason that makes him arrive at this rather surprising conclusion is that "a
constitution may allocate fields of legislative competence between coordinate organs, or
place certain matters beyond the competence of any organ".2
In any case, Benn stresses, that to attribute sovereignty to a legislative organ
does not mean ascribing to it any actual ability or a de facto power. It only means that
1 Ibid., pp. 69- 74.
2 Ibid., pp. 74- 8.
it possesses a legal capacity which makes the judge sets its rule in a supreme position in
relation to the rules of other organs. Therefore, when supremacy is applied to a
legislative organ that does not necessarily mean that it is the organ which is rendered
more obedience than other organs. It only means that its legislative act is considered as
the highest directive to a judge.1
Sovereignty in a de facto sense of power, according to Benn, is a supreme
coercive power. By coercive power he means the imposition of physical constraints
by the exercise or threat of the use of armed force. In this sense coercion is a necessary
characteristics of a state if it is to survive violent opposition. Nevertheless, Benn points
to the difficulties that arise in the application of the concept of sovereignty as a supreme
coercive power. Coercive power in any state is in the hands of determinate institutions
and the decision to use force is undertaken by whatever men happen to occupy the
appropriate offices as the state order provides. Since the coercive power in the state is
normally only exercised by the organized organs of the state, it is trivial to speak of
them as supreme. It is because supremacy implies conflict, and whenever conflict
arises it is always caused by a coercive group which is not part or acting as part of the
state order. Moreover, while the concept of coercive sovereignty may be useful in
historical and sociological studies to describe power relations in a particular territory at
a particular time; yet it might be misleading. To understand the role played by
military powers in political events, it is more helpful to analyse the interplay of forces
within them than to lump them collectively as "the supreme coercive power".2
The final type of sovereignty in Benn's discussion is sovereignty as "the
strongest political influence". In his opinion such a concept has no place in a normative
study because the influence of a person or a group can only be established through the
observation of the behaviour of others in relation to him and not by examining his
status in a normative order. Consequently, it is fruitful only in historical and social
1 Ibid., pp. 76- 7.
^ Ibid., pp. 79- 82.
studies. However, it should be noted that the influential sovereignty should only be
attributed to the group that exerts a great dominant influence over a fairly wide range of
political issues. In many cases state policies are the outcome of an interplay of
influences and not only shaped by a single prevalent influence. It will be misleading to
speak of an influential sovereign in such cases. It may be more apposite to use terms
like pressure group or body. It is misleading also to attribute influence to the
electorate or the majority, since they have no single intention. Thus, the concept of
influential sovereignty may be valuable in certain circumstances, but it has the
disadvantage of posing the wrong questions, or obscuring rather than illuminating .l
In short, Benn's conclusion is that sovereignty may be useful and meaningful
if employed in the juristic field, though there may not be a determinate sovereign in the
legal sense in every state. But sovereignty in a political sense is misleading, especially
if it is interpreted to mean a determinate body, because "political action is always the
result of a conflict of wills, never an expression of a single independent will".2
In Defence of Unity: Obedience as the Basis of Sovereignty
The critics who reject the proposals to classify sovereignty into many types
developed new arguments to support the unity of sovereignty. They claim that the new
formulations have disregarded the real intent of the concept and the functions for which
it was formed. It is admitted that there are, no doubt, different kinds of power.
However, such observations and classifications of distinct classes of behaviour will
be only a generalized description of the fact. What is needed is a theory that brings
those different types of behaviour and gives them a meaning which is valid, not only
in one society, but in different types of societies. The true function of the theory of
sovereignty, it is argued, is its ability to do this. Its real significance is its capacity to
integrate a large number of distinct concepts into one comprehensible working
assumption. Sovereignty joins in a rational system a number of concepts such as
1 Ibid., pp. 82-4.
2 Benn and Peters, op. tit., p. 263.
power, authority, obligation, legitimacy and community.1 To ignore this fact is to
misunderstand the purpose which the concept is intended to achieve. As the editor of
In Defence of Sovereignty observed:
"The classical discussions of Bodin and Hobbes derive
much of their continuing interest from their capacity to bring together
into a logical whole the state's normative order, its coercive power and
the public's 'obligation' or readiness to accept the coercive element - and
by accepting it, to give it in effect the power to be coercive."2
However, the most significant argument in support of the view that there is only
one sort of sovereignty is developed through a line of thought which places great
emphasis on obedience as the basis of sovereignty.3 It is generally assumed that
obedience is an important element in composing sovereignty. Sovereignty which is not
obeyed does not exist. The view under consideration builds up this assumption and
works out its consequences. It is argued that "sovereignty in any sense is constituted by
consent, the development of the habit of obedience and by nothing else".4 Perhaps,
such proposition may seem obvious and trivial as it follows directly from the definition
of the sovereign as the person or body of persons to whom habitual obedience is
rendered. But it would be shown to be of great importance. In the case of political or
actual sovereignty it may be thought that it rests on force. It is true that fear of force is
one possible motive among others which urge people to obey. But it would be hardly
true to say that obedience is secured only by force or fear of punishment. Probably, it
may be safer to say that in most cases most people are influenced simply by the habit to
obey. An illustration of this can be found in the armed forces or the police who
concentrate the power of the application of force in their hands. Since these bodies obey
the sovereign, it can hardly be supposed that they act, themselves, merely from fear of
force. Yet, on the other hand, it is essential for effective sovereignty to have a body
1 W. J. Stsnkiewicz, "The Validity of Sovereignty" in Idem., In defence of Sovereignty, pp.
294- 5.
2 Stankiewicz, In Defence of Sovereignty, p. 13.
3 See G. C. Field, Political Theory (Strand, 1963), ch. 4, 5.
^ Ibid., p. 75.
capable of applying force under its command, though it will be misleading to regard
them, in some sense and to some degree, as the real sovereign; simply because in
normal cases they act in obedience to orders. The only conclusion, then, is that real
sovereignty is constituted of habitual obedience, which is the central fact.1
Turning to legal sovereignty, the same question is often asked. What is it that
makes it sovereign? It is not possible to answer that it is the law, as it will seem very
odd to say that the law makes the sovereign, and the sovereign makes the law. Taking
the case when a sovereign is overthrown by the illegal use of force, usually the people
eventually develop the habit of obedience to the new authority and its commands are
accepted as law. Sooner or later it will be recognized as the legal sovereignty and the
source of law. This shows that the legal sovereignty is not a distinct type of
sovereignty which is constituted in a different way. It is simply an abstraction from
actual sovereignty. We begin to speak about legal sovereignty when obedience has
become definitely established.2
We may end by saying that there is no significant distinction between different
types of sovereignty. The fundamental constituent of sovereignty is obedience and
from that power emerges.3 Important results can be reached upon such a view. In the
light of it some resolutions to the traditional controversies about sovereignty may be
attempted. The question whether sovereignty is limited or unlimited takes a simple
form: will the people obey sovereignty absolutely? There may be occasions in history in
which that has happened, but in the majority of societies there have been always limits.
As regards the question whether sovereignty is divisible or indivisible, it can be
reduced to whether the people can possibly distribute their obedience among different
bodies, by obeying each body in its proper sphere. Apparently, this is possible and has
happened in many cases.4
^ Ibid., pp. 61-9.
^ Ibid., pp. 72- 75.
3 Ibid., p. 78.
4 Ibid., pp. 78-9
Finally it is claimed that:
"The general conclusion is that much less can be deduced from
the general nature of sovereignty than has in the past been supposed.
We cannot tell from the fact of obedience who is going to be obeyed,
how far they will be obeyed, or who ought to be obeyed. The first two
questions are matters of fact which would have to be answered by a
consideration of the circumstances of each particular case. The last is a
question of the policy that we are going to pursue, and the one thing that
we can say with reasonable certainty is that it is important that it should
be answered. That is to say, for a state, or any organized society, to
function at all it is necessary for the people in it to make up their minds
whom they are going to obey and to turn this decision into a habit which
is broken only with difficulty and in exceptional conditions."1




To investigate the existence of the notion of sovereignty in Islamic thought, or
any similar idea, much care should be given to the semantic problem.1 Confusion often
results from the misuse and misunderstanding of words. Terms and expressions used
at one time can become foreign and hardly understood at another age. The problem is
complicated further when difficulties of translations exist. The words used in one
civilisation can sometimes be translated into the language of another only in
approximate equivalents. Each word is deeply rooted in the culture and circumstances
in which it has originated and sometimes it might not convey the same meaning to the
people of other cultures or who are under different conditions. Concerning the political
concepts of Islam, the semantic problem forms a considerable obstacle. On the one
hand, the terminology used in the Qur'an or in early sources and thought might not be
grasped in its full and original meaning. Islamic terms such as khilafa, umma, ahl al¬
kali wa-al-'aqd sound sometimes strange when they are used in modern politics. They
might be misinterperated if they are equated with modern words, such as state for
khilafa, nation for umma, and people's representatives for ahl al-hall wa-al-'aqd.
Such vague and loose usages could sometimes muddle the subject from the start. On
the other hand, the tendency to use modem words in explaining political ideas in Islam
can also be misleading. For example, the question whether democracy exists in Islam
seems to be a puzzle and answers are often confusing. The initial difficulty is that
Islamic ideas are unique and distinctive. The other difficulty, which is equally complex,
is that the word democracy cannot be precisely defined.
1 Abu ai-A'la al-Mawdiidi, Nazaryat al-lslam wa-Hayuh fi-al-Siyasa (Bairut, 1968), p. 241;
H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 22-4.
Such difficulties do not apply only to Islamic concepts. They have existed and
affected political language most of the times. For instance, words used by Aristotle
which are translated as "the state" or "the law" can mislead us to believe that they meant
to him what they mean to us today.1 As far as the idea of sovereignty is concerned, the
debate on its history is partly constituted by the semantic problem. A historian on
sovereignty admitted that "the history of this concept is full of pitfalls".2 In his view,
initially this is due to the fact that "there is a danger of misinterprating and
misunderstanding the ideas to which men have given expression in earlier times".
Moreover, "there is also the possibility that they entertained ideas to which they could
not or did not give expression". However, men in most ages have expressed general
ideas closely associated with the notion of sovereignty in the words for "power" and
"rule"/'empire" and "country", "king" and "government"; but, in his opinion "they are
less precise and specific, less technical and sophisticated than the idea of sovereignty.3
In the face of such difficulties it seems essential to explore the equivalent words
used for sovereignty and the ideas related to it in Islamic sources. In modem Arabic,
the term al-siyada, a derivative of sayyid, is in common usage for the word
sovereignty. Also in modern Islamic political thought the word hakimiyya, derived
from hukm, is often in use to denote sovereignty in its modern sense. However, before
the Western modern thought began to have a great impact on the Muslim political
conceptions and terminology, there had been a number of expression that signify the
interpretation and exercise of power in Islam. Many words of Arabic origin, such as
caliphate, imamate, emirate, sultanate, are widely known and commonly used in
reference to the ruling body and the supreme authority of the Muslims. It is possible
that those terms and concepts that are associated with them may bear indications of the
sense of sovereignty as conceived by Muslims.
1 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 23.
2 Ibid., p. 22.
3 Ibid., p. 24.
Therefore, it is proposed to start by analysing the original Islamic terms of
power, like caliphate, imamate; and giving a brief account of the political theories
related to them. In that way an initial clearing of the ground may be achieved before
attempting a detailed analysis of the views of modem Muslim thinkers on sovereignty.
II. Nature of the Caliphate
The doctrine of the caliphate is a central theme in Islamic sources, especially in
the fields of theology, jurisprudence and history. Accordingly, there is an abundance of
literature on the subject. As the fundamental concern of the present study is to search
for an Islamic concept of sovereignty it will seek to emphasize only the relevant ideas as
they appear in their Islamic context without interpreting them in the light of Western
concepts. It may be extremely misleading to read into the Islamic sources ideas and
theories along lines familiar in Western thought. In most cases it is often possible to
find in such sources, isolated elements which when gathered and rebuilt can be
interpreted as equivalents to occidental notions. A full treatment of such an approach,
and in particular its effect in shaping attitudes in modern Muslim political thinking
toward the concept of sovereignty, will be discussed later. It suffices to say here that it
is essential in this preliminary stage to let the early Islamic sources speak for
themselves and explain their ideas in their own terminology. It may be necessary to
examine them, as the famous French orientalist, Louis Massignon pointed, from 'the
inside', "transposing into ourselves the categories of thought imagined by the Muslims,
in order to appreciate their original interdependance, their intimate structure, and their
real historical growth".1
i. The Nature of Power in Human Civilization
The development of the views of the early Muslim thinkers on the political
phenomena culminated in the outstanding analysis of the nature of power in human
1 Revue du Monde, Musulman,XXXIX (1920), p. 152; quoted in Malcom H. Ken, Islamic
Reform (Berkerly, 1966), p. 12.
civilization comprehensively expounded by the historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406),1
and expanded and elaborated later by Ibn al-Azraq (1427-1491).2 Ibn Khaldun has
attempted an explanation of the principles governing the political organization and a
description of how it worked in any human society in general and in the Islamic
community in particular. In respect of the true character of political power, which Ibn
Khaldun gave the term mulk, he stated that association (ijtima'), which provided the
natural means for the growth of civilization, was a feature of human life. Since injustice
and aggresiveness characterized the animal nature of man, such (ijtima.') could not
persist. If there was no restraining body in the society to stop people from destroying
each other a state of anarchy would prevail. Therefore, it was required by human nature
that there must be a constraining body (wazi' ) who would be the ruler {hakim) over
people. This wazi' or hakim was the one among them who was forceful and could
actually exercise constraint over them. In other words, as Ibn Khaldun says:
"Mulk, in reality, belongs only to one who dominates the
subjects, subjugates the people, collects revenues, sends out military
expeditions, and protects the frontiers; and there is no other human force
over him. This is generally accepted as the real meaning and the true
character ofmulk"?
It may be clear from the above statement that the essence of mulk was the
competence to control and bring about actual subjection of the people, so as to carry out
the various functions of government such as finance or defence. Moreover, the other
basic feature of mulk was that there was no one above and stronger than the one who
possessed it. If any one, Ibn Khaldun explains, failed to acquire one or another of these
qualities, then his mulk was defective. The degree and extent of that defectiveness
depended on the kind and range of the missing feature. Generally, that could take two
forms. The first type of defectiveness might be the incapability to perform some of the
' See 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, edited by 'All 'Abd al-Wahid Wafi, 3rd
ed., 3 volumes (Cairo, 1980). English translation by Franz Rosenthal, 3 volumes (London, 1958.)
2 See Abu 'Abd al-Allah Ibn al-Azraq, Badai' al-Sulkfi Tabai' al- Mulk, edited by 'All
Sam! al-Nashar, 2 volumes (Baghdad, 1977.)
2 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., II, p. 574; cf. Ibn al-Azraq, op. cit. v I, p. 89.
functions of rule like collecting taxes or defending the subjects. The other kind of
defectiveness was not being strong enough to gain supremacy (isti'la') over other
groups and bring them under subjection, which would result in the existence of a
superior authority. This was often the case in large countries where there were
independent rulers of local regions who dominated their own people but at the same
time rendered obedience to the state (dawla) which they were all under.1 On the other
hand, there was a natural tendency in mulk, according to Ibn Khaldun, to exercise
absolutism (istibdad). Bacause the quality of egotism (ta'alluh) is innate in human
nature, mulk at one stage of its development must claim exclusive authority and would
not permit any one to have a share in it.2
In another passage in his discussion, Ibn Khaldun proceeded to describe the
relation between mulk and qawanin (laws) and distinguished three kinds of states
according to the kind of law governing them. Mulk, he stated, is necessarily required to
be based on obligatory political norms which were accepted and submitted to by the
masses. Without the existence of such political laws, mulk would hardly succeed in
establishing its supremacy and obtaining obedience and order. Mulk would be ruinous
if it was based on arbitrary power whose sole purpose was to employ the people to
fulfil the interests of the ruler. Therefore, it became an accepted principle to found mulk
on a binding set of rules as was the case in old Persia and other nations. Such laws
could be ordained in two ways. Firstly, they could be decreed by the knowledgeable
and wise leading personalities of the state who were grounded in rational reasoning.
Secondly, they could be ordained by God through a lawgiver, a prophet, who would
state and instruct them.
1 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 574.; Cf. Ibn al-Azraq, op. cit., p. 90. Ibn Khaldun gives
examples of both types of defectiveness. For the former he refers to the Berber ruler of the Aghlabib
dynasty in al-Qayrawan and the Persian rulers at the beginning of the Abbasid dynasty. For the later he
mentions the relationship of the Sinhajah with the 'Ubaydis (Fatimids), the Zanatah with the Spanish
Umayyads at one time and with the 'Ubaydid (Fatimids) at another, the Persian rulers with the
Abbasid, the Berber rulers with the European Christians in the Maghrib prior to Islam, and of the old
Persian states with Alexandar and the Greeks.]
2 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit.x pp. 539,554.
Accordingly, Ibn Khaldun classified mulk into three kinds. He called the first
kind mulk tabl'l (natural mulk), which was based on arbitrarily forcing the masses to
act. Such type of rule was considered reprehensible because it would ultimately lead to
tyranny and injustice. The second kind of rule was called mulk siyasi (political mulk),
which was based on siyasa 'aqliyya (rational politics), by which he meant a law
established by human reason; and which induces the masses to act in furtherence of the
interests of their wordly welfare. This sort of rule was also considered reprehensible
because it was derived by speculation without the guidance of God. Ibn Khaldun
asserted that it was only God who was most knowledgeable of what was good for
mankind. The third type of mulk was the one based on siyasa diniyya, that is to say,
revealed political norms. Divine law, Shari'a, was described by Ibn Khaldun as a
comprehensive system of human affairs which covered their worship of God and their
dealings with their fellow men ('ibada and mu'amala). It also comprised the
organisation of mulk which was necessary for human society. Therefore, mulk was
dictated to follow the course of the revealed religion because all human affairs should
be supervised by the insight of the lawgiver. Such mulk belonged to the prophets who
instructed the divine law, and to those who took their position after them, the caliphs.
Thus the caliphate, in its essence, was a succession to the lawgiver, the prophet, whose
purpose was to further, like him, both the religious and the temporal interests of the
masses.1
It is important to be aware of the fact that Ibn Khaldun's views regarding the
nature of political power are not solely the outcome of his independent thought. It
would be more accurate to say that they developed as a continuation of the thought of
the preceeding Muslim political theorists.2 An example of the similar ideas of the early
1 Ibid., pp. 576- 78.
2 Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "Background of Ibn Khaldun's Political Theory", in Studies on the
Civilization of Islam (London, 1962), p. 168.
thinkers which Ibn Khaldun took and expanded in greater precision can be found in the
following passage written by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). He says:
"All mankind cannot accomplish their welfare, either in this life
or in the next, except through association (ijtima' ) and mutual
support. Their cooperation and mutual help is for attaining things of
benefit to them, and keeping off things harmful to them. For this reason
it is said that 'Man is a political being by nature'. But when they come to
live together it is necesary that they do certain things to acquire their
welfare and avoid certain things in which there lies mischief.
Consequently, they will be obedient to the one who commands them to
the aims of furthering their welfare, and who restrains them from evils.
In short, all mankind must render obedience to a commander and
restrainer. Those who do not possess divine books or who do not
follow any religion, ultimately, obey their kings in all what they think
will achieve their interests of the material world, being sometimes right
and sometimes wrong. Those who are followers of altered religions
such as the polytheists, or those who are possesed of divine books
which are altered or abrogated, are obedient to whatever they think is
good to them both in religious and material interests.
However, if it is necessary to render obedience to a commander
and restrainer, evidently it is better to be obedient to God and His
messenger.... For this reason the Prophet instructed his followers to set
up rulers in charge of their affairs {ulu. al-amr)... and instructed the
people to obey them in matters that are in accordance with obedience to
God.1
ii.The Terms: Caliphate, Imamate and Emirate
The words khilafa, imdma and imdra are commonly associated with the office
of the head of the Muslim community. In discussing the nature of authority in Islam it
is worth considering the origins of these terms and the historical circumstances related
to their application. Although the three words may be sometimes accepted to signify the
same office, yet they are not identical. Firstly, historically, each term has made its first
appearance in different conditions. More significantly, each term seems to emphasize a
special attribute of the office. However, all words are deeply rooted in the language
and have diverse meanings.
1 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, al-Hisba fi-al-lslam (Beirut, n.d.) pp. 2, 3, 5; Cf. Gibb, op. cit.,
p. 169.
Imama:
In respect of our study it may be convenient to start with imama because the
term is most common in political theory and, for our present purposes, it seems to
comprise the idea of supremacy. Imama is derived from the verb amma which means
to intend, to purpose and to aim at. One of the derivatives of this root is amam which
means the location that is before, ahead of, in front of. Hence, comes the word imam
which denotes anything that is taken as an example or a pattern, combining the two
original ideas of attaining a purpose and being in front of. Various things are called
imam. For example a road or a way; the string which is extended upon, or against, a
building and according to which one builds; the lesson of a child that is learned each
day; and a book or scripture which is taken as an example such as the Qur'an. Among
persons, for instance, it refers to a driver or conductor of camels, a guide who shows
the way, a leader of an army, a chief, a learned scholar, and a leader of the prayer.1 In
the Qur'an the word is used in many of its above literal meanings.2 Significantly, the
Qur'an uses the word imam to refer generally to leaders of goodness, such as the
prophet Abraham;3 but it is also used for leaders of evil with a special indication in the
context.4 In the traditions of the Prophet the word occurs in several places, and in
some cases it is clearly meant to refer to the head of the Muslim community, such as the
reference to jama'at al-Muslimin wa-imamuhum.
However, associated with the above usages, the word imam emerged as a
desingnation of the head of the Muslim community and the word imama is applied to
signify his office, state or power, especially in the field of political thought. Yet it is not
certain when and how that usage originated. Most likely, the term has made its first
1 Muhammad Ibn Manzur, Lisdn al-'Arab (Cairo, 1300 A.H.), XIV, pp. 289-91; Cf. Edward
W.Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon (London, 1863), Book I, pp. 88-91.
2 Muhammad F. 'Abd al-Baqi, al-Mu'jam al-Mufahras li-alfaz al-Qur an (Istanbul, 1984 ),
pp. 80-1.
3 The Qur'an 2:124.
4 Cf. Muhammad al-Rayyis, al-Nazariyat al-Siyasiyya fi-al-Islam (Cairo, 1979), pp. 110-1;
Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate (Oxford, 1924), pp. 33-5.
appearance with the shi'ites who started to call 'All, the third caliph, by the title
Imam.1 According to their doctrine he was the first one qualified to the office of
imdma because he had been appointed by the prophet through nass (valid designation)
either explicitly or implicitly. Significantly, the shi'ites used to call their heads whom
they think had the right to nile by the name imam, but when these heads succeeded in
seizing power they applied to them the titles caliph or amir.2 This can be understood as
that they think of the imam as the de jure ruler, and of the caliph as the de facto ruler.3
In any case, the term imama became widely accepted and unanimously employed,
particularly by theologians and later by political theorists. One of the first textual
witnesses to the usage of the term is found in a work entitled "Conditions of Imdma",
which is claimed to be written by Abu al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 728), a famous scholar of
the first century.
With regard to our present research, it is very significant to note that the
attribute of supremacy is expressly attached to imdma. To distinguish the office of the
head of the state from other kinds of imdma, such as leadership of prayer, the former is
commonly called imama 'uzmd.4 'Uzma means greatest, highest, supreme and major.5
The name imdma which refers to other positions such as the position of a learned
scholar, or of a leader of prayers in a particular mosque, is described as imama sughra.
Sughra, the antonym of 'uzma, means smaller, lower and minor.6 Even, in one
opinion, it is maintained that the word imdma when used unrestrictedly relates only to
the supreme leadership, while to refer to other positions it should be used in a genitive
construction such as to say the imam of a particular place or in a particlar sphere.7
1 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p.638.
2 Ibid., p.639.
3 al-Rayyis, op. cit., p. 119.
4 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 578.
5 Lane, op. cit., V, p. 2087.
6 Ibid., IV, p. 1692.
7 Abu Muhammad 'All Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal fi-al-Milal wa-al-Nihal (Beirut, n.d.), IV, p.
90.; Cf. al-Rayyis, al-Nazariyat al-Siyasiyya, p. 112.
Furthermore, there is another important connotation of the term imama which is
worth noticing. It has been observed that the term is most common in theology and
political thought. The reason for this may be that the actual practical political power
was not viewed by these thinkers as an ideal Islamic authority. In their opinion the
actual power in most cases was not identical with the true caliphate as they conceived it.
They argue that the real caliphate had lost its character and only remained in name.1
Therefore, it appeared more suitable to them to use the term imama in discussing the
ideal character of power. In other words, imama was thought to be the ideal Islamic
rule which ought to prevail, though in reality that was not the case.2
Imaro
The second title associated with the head of the Muslims is Amir al- Mu'minin.
The Arabic verb amara means to command, order, bid and enjoin. Hence, the words
amir and wali al-amr denotes the person in possession of command. Imara and
wilaya is used for his position.3
The term amir was in customary usage in early Islamic period to designate the
commandors of Muslim expeditions. The word amir compounded with al-mu'minin
made its first appearance, according to the sources, when it was designated to Sa'ad
Ibn Abi Waqqas, the leader of the Muslim army at the battle of Qadisiyya against the
Persians. Later on, it was adopted by 'Umar, the second caliph. After him it is
employed exclusively as a title of the head of the Muslim community.4 Christian
Europe during the Middle Ages usually know the Caliph by the title, though under
peculiar forms such as: 'Elmiram mommini', 'Miralomin', 'Mirmumnus', and others.5
1 Cf. Ibn Khaldun, op. cit. ,the passage on 'Transformation of the caliphate into Royal
authority', pp.598- 608.
2 al- Rayyis, al-Nazariyyat al-Siyasiyya, p. 121.
3 Ibn Manzur, op. cit., V, p. 86.
4 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 638-9; H. R. Gibb,"Amir al-Mu'minin", £./.2, I, p. 445.
5 Arnold, op. cit., p. 38,
Concerning the office of imarat al-mu'minin, there are two implications in its
meaning which need to be emphasized. First and foremost, the term is clearly based on
the idea of command. Consequently, the fundamental element which constitutes, the
imara is the possession of command. Normally the possession of command implies the
necessity of being obeyed. In fact, rendering obedience to the amir is regarded as a
religious duty in the eyes of the Muslims, though it is claimed to be limited in scope and
degree. The nature and extent of this obedience will be discussed later, but it must be
emphasized here that the posession of command, which is the basic feature of imara,
involved the element of obedience. The other important inference from the office of
imarat al-mu 'minim is the notion of generality. Ibn Hazm remarks that the word al-
mu'minin (the faithful) necessarily indicates that this imara is of a general character as
its authority is above all the faithful in their totality. While it is true that a leader of an
army, ar a ruler of a district can be called an amir, but as any one of them is a head of
only a part of the Muslims, it is incorrect to call him amir al-mu'minin. The title amir
al-mu'minin applies only to the one who is in possession of command over all the
affairs of the Muslims, or one who ought to be so even if in reality some sections of the
people disobey him.1 It is remarkable that Ibn Hazm mentions two levels of generality;
one relating to all the people, the other to all their affairs. Another feature of generality
is expressed by al-Juwayni who described the imam as though all Muslims have
become one person embodied in his person, because he has undertaken responsibility
of managing their affairs and thus he is a representative of the whole of them.2
Khilafa
The term khlaifa is the third main title applied to the supreme leadership of the
Muslim community. The root of the word in Arabic has two meanings: a successor
who comes after and follows on, or a vicegerent who is a substitute and in place of
1 Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 90.
2 Abu al-Ma'all al-Juwayni, al-Ghiyathi, ed. by 'Abd al- 'Azim al-Dib (Cairo, 1401 A.H.),
p. 210.
someone.1 The word and its derivatives is used in the Qur'an in both meanings. Three
verses in particular are most relevant to our discussion. In one verse the reference is
made to Davidf'O, David, We have made you a khalifa on earth so judge between men
justly".2 The word khalifa in this verse is associated with political authority and is
addressed to a prophet and a ruler who was made the second King of Israel. This can
mean that he was a successor in the sense that he came after and in place of the
previous prophets, or in the sense that he was a vicegerent of God.3 In another passage
Aaron is mentioned:"... And Moses had charged his brother Aaron: act for me amongst
my people".4 The verb used in Arabic is ukhlufni which is translated "act for me", and
as one of the commentators remarked it is a clear reference to vicegerency.5 The third
verse refers to Adam, "Behold, your Lord said to the angels, I am placing a khalifa on
earth.6 This verse is surrounded with much controversy \ One view holds that Adam is
called khalifa because he succeeded the inhabitants before him on earth. In another
view Adam is thought of as a vicegerent of God who would judge in his name and
execute his orders. Others argue that the reference is not to Adam, but it is to his
progeny, as every generation succeeds the previous preceding one.7
In tracing the origins of the term khalifa it may be useful to mention that the
word is also found in some traditions of the Prophet. According to the sources there
appears some evidence that the usage of the word khalifa was current during the life of
the Prophet. Historians mention that it was the habit of the Prophet to appoint a deputy
to act in his place in Medina whenever he used to travel out of the city. The main
1 Ibn Manzur, op. cit., X, p. 340.
2 The Qur'an 38:36.
3 Muahammad Ibn Ahmad al- Qurtubi, al-Jami li-Ahkam al-Qur'an (Cairo, 1966), XV, p.
188; Abu Ja'far Muahammad Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan fi Ta'wll al-Qur'an (Cairo, 1968),
XXIII, p. 151.
4 The Qur'an 7:142.
5 Qurtubl, op. cit., VII, p. 277.
6 The Qur'an 2:30.
7 Tabari, op. cit., I, p.199- 201.
function of the deputy was to lead the prayers as well as to perform other activities.1 In
one incident the Prophet delegated 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib to act in his place in Medina, and
addressed him by saying :"Would you not like to be in my place. In the same position
as Aaron was in Moses place".2 Bearing all this in mind it seem justifiable to assume
that it was not wholly a creation to apply the term khalifa to Abu Bakr, the new head of
community after the death of the Prophet. Although some historians claim that the term
originated with application to Abu Bakr,3 that seems unlikely. It is true that at that time
it was not customary among the Arab tribes to call their heads by the title khalifa. So
the evolution of the conception of khalifa as a tide of the head of the community would
seem to have taken place in the life time of the Prophet before it was applied after his
death. It could also be assumed that the Qur'an in particular was the main source from
which this tide was derived.4
Having examined the circumstances which led to the appearance of the title
khalifa and its meaning as a successor or a vicegerent, a question arises: whom was he
acting on behalf of? When the term was first used in reference to Abu Bakr he was
called khalifat rasul Allah (the successor of the messenger of God). This emphasizes
that he was taken to be in place of the Prophet who had died. It is said that the Prophet
in his final illness was about to write a decree nominating his successor, but because of
some reasons he changed his mind.5 It is more probable that he was contented that the
Muslims were in a position to choose the right person without his help. However, Abu
Bakr was chosen afterwards and it could not be claimed that he was a khalifa in the
sense that he was an appointed deputy by the Prophet. His authority was not given to
him by the Prophet, but most likely he was thought of as succeeding him in the
1 Cf. Ismail Ibn Kathir, al-Fusul fi Ikhtisar Sirat al-Rasul (Damascus, 1400 A.H.), pp.
113, 123- 5.
2 Qurtubi, op. cit., VII, p. 277.
3 Muhammad al-Khalidl, Ma'alim al-Khilafa fi-al-Fikr al-Islami (Beirut, 1984), p. 17.
4 Cf. W. M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1980), p. 32.
5 Cf. Muhammad Ibn Ismail al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari (Cairo, 1953), III, p. 65-6;
Arnold, op. cit., p. 19.
exercise of authority.1 It is an accepted belief among the Muslims that the prophetic
office ceased with Muhammad, but his other powers and functions were held to have
passed to his successors.2 The majority of the Muslims jurists and theologians seem to
support the opinion that the khalifa is acting in the place of the Prophet,3 even though,
historically, the title khalifat rasu.1 Allah was only applied to Abu Bakr. In fact when
the second Khalifa 'Umar came into power he was addressed in the first days of his
reign by the title 'khalifa of the khalifa of the Messenger of God', but this was
dropped because it was too long. Nevertheless, this gave rise to the view that the
khalifa was simply a successor to the previous one.4 This seems to be an attempt to
simplify matters and avoid the objections made against the other opinions.
The other common theory is that the khalifa is a vicegerent of God. Those who
advocate this theory tried to base it on the Qur'anic application of the word to Adam and
David.5 The most popular possible meaning attached to the concept of vicegerency of
God is that the khalifa is executing the orders of Allah and implementing His laws.6 It
is unlikely that anyone understood that the khalifa is an appointed deputy by Allah.7
However, most of the Islamic scholars reject the usage of the title khalifat Allah
(God's Caliph) arguing that vicegerency is to a person who is absent or dead, and
since Allah is alive and always present it is not possible to attach a vicegerent to Him.8
According to the sources this title began to be used unofficially since the Umayyads,
1 Watt, op. cit., p.33.
2 Arnold, op. cit., p. 27.
3 Ahmad Ibn 'Abd Allah al-Qalqashandl, al-Inafafi M'alim al-Khilafa (kuwait, 1964), p.
16.
4 Ibid.., p. 17.
5 Ibid.., p. 16.
6 Qurtubi, op. cit., p.263.
7 Cf. Watt, op. cit., p. 32.
8 This is the opinion of al-Mawardi, al-Farra', al-Juwayni and Ibn Taymiyya. See
Qalqashandi, op. cit., p. 15.
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especially in poetry, public addresses and political propaganda. With the Abbasids the
title made its appearance in some official correspondences.1
However, it may be significant in this respect to consider the interpretation of
the tradition:" The sultan is the shadow of God on earth" which is commonly associated
with the concept of God's Caliph. Ibn Taymiyya, who holds it to be authentic, makes
a remarkable explanation to it. He observes:
"Definitely the sultan is a servant of God, created by Him,
always in need of Him, and cannot dispense with Him, But there are
some qualities possessed by the sultan like ability, authority, protection,
support and other attributes of mastery (su'dud)2 and lordship
(,samadiyya) on which rests the control and welfare of the people. That
is the reason why he resembles the shadow of God on earth; besides he
is the most effective cause to put the affairs of the people in order. If the
one who is possessed with power is good, then the affairs of the people
will be set in a right state. If he is corrupt there exist pandemonium and
injustice in accordance with the extent of his corruptiont though the
people will not be in a state of complete disorder in every aspect. There
must exist some benefit as long as the sultan exists, because he is the
shadow of God. But shadow may sometimes be completely dark and
sheltering from any kind of harm, and sometimes it protects only
partially. However, if there is no shadow there will be complete
disorder. That is a case similar to the situation if God does not exist,
because God is the one who sustains all mankind.3
To sum up , the conclusions derived from the meanings attached with the three
titles: imamate, emirate and caliphate, are quite significant. While the first two indicate
supremacy and generality, the third suggests in some sense subordination. As all of
them are descriptions of the same office, apparently it is viewed from different angles.
In one consideration it is the highest, greatest and general. According to the other
opinion it is either a vicegerency of God, or a succession to prophethood. Apparently,
there is an implicit conflict between the three views which needs to be resolved. We
have already seen the explanation offered by Ibn Taymiyya to reconcile them.
1 Cf. W.M.Watt,"God's Caliph: Quranic Interpretation and Umayyad Claims", in Iran and
Islam, ed C.E. Bosworth (Edinburgh 1973), p. 571; Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God's Caliph
(Cambridge, 1986), pp. 6-19.
3 It is noteworthy that Su dud or siyada is the modern term used for sovereignty.
J Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa (al-Ribat, n.d.), p. 46.
Nevertheless, that possible contradiction originated a rich discussion which has
continued up to the present time.
iii. The Standard Definition
The nature of the Muslim authority is prescribed with great precision in the
technical definitions of the imama. We take as our starting point the well-known
definition of al-Mawardi who describes it as: "The succession of Prophethood for the
preservation of the religion and the organisation of temporal affairs".1
It may be evident that the definition comprises three basic elements. The first
element specifies the imama as a post originally occupied by the Prophet and after his
death he is followed by successors who are acting in place of him. Ibn Khaldun's
analysis of the nature of rule may throw additional light on this aspect of the imama.
According to him, the caliphate is that kind of rule which is based on the
implementation of the revealed law. Therefore, such rule belongs primarily to the
prophets who are the lawgivers that instruct the revealed law. Since prophethood has
ceased and, as a result of that, the ordination of revealed law has also ended, the
prophets are succeeded by rulers who act in their place and enforce the revealed law.2
In this view, the caliphate is not considered as a successor office only to the Prophet
Muhammad, but to the office of prophethood in general. Such an idea may be infered
from a well-known tradition of the Prophet which states that the Israelites used to be
governed by prophets, but since there is no prophet after Muhammad, his people will
be governed by caliphs.3
As a result of the fact that the caliphate is a successor to the lawgiver, the
prophet, its main function will be to observe the continuity of the enforcement of the
revealed law, or as in the expression of al-Mawardi "the preservation of religion
1 Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (Cairo, 1973), p. 5.
2 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 578.
3 Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim (Cairo, 1931), XII, p. 231.
(hirasat al-din)," which forms the second element in his definition. Apparendy, this is a
fundamental feature of the caliphate which establishes the theoretical basis of the unique
relationship between political power and religion in Islam. That relationship, as
elaborated by al-Mawardi, can be viewed to consist of two inseparable sides. On the
one hand, political power is founded on religion and it functions according to its
norms. On the other hand, political power acts as a guardian which protects the religion
and preserves its doctrines. In other words, as al-Mawardi states, if religion does not
possess political power, ultimately it will not be observed and its norms will be altered.
Similarly, if political power is stripped of religion it will become a despotic rule and a
cause of disorder.1 Hence, religion and political power, or din and sultan, are regarded
as dependent on each other and the relationship between them is seen to be analogous to
the relationship between twins. The thesis describing that relationship is expressed in a
statement that is repeatedly quoted by theorists which says that "al-Dln uss wa-al-
sultan haris", signifying that religion is the foundation of the whole structure and that
political power acts as a guardian to it. The statement goes on to assert that any
structure without a foundation can simply be destroyed, and that anything that is not
guarded can easily be lost.2 In the light of this, the caliphate appears to be as a political
institution which is established on the basis of religion and according to its norms. It
may also be evident that political power is an effective instrument of Islam used for the
implemenation and the protection of its norms.
On the other hand, the caliphate is not designed to carry out only religious
duties. It has to render the services which any other political institution usually
provides. Those functions are summed up in al-Mawardi's definition in the phrase
"siyasat al-dunya", the organization of temporal affairs. There are several points to be
noticed with regard to this function. In respect of the necessity of this task, Ibn
Khaldun points out that, as civilization ('imran) is necessary for mankind, the care for
1 Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, Adab al-Dln wa-al-Dunya (Beirut, 1978), p. 115.
2 Ibn al-Azraq, op. cit., pp. 106 -7.
the various interests of that civilization is also necessary. Any secular political power
may suffice in serving those interests, though the welfare of human civlization would
be more perfect if it is served through the religous revealed laws, the shari'a, because
God has a better knowledge of human benefits. Certainly, the Prophet was concerned
with both functions, says Ibn Khaldun, the religious affairs in his capacity to transmit
and implement the religion, and the temporal affairs in his responsibility to care for the
benefits of human civilization. Smilarly, the caliphate in succession to him is to carry
the same functions and is to care for both religious and worldly affairs.1
Moreover, the relation between the two functions may be shown in the
statement of al-Ghazali, who asserted that: "good ordering of religion is brought about
only by good ordering of temporal affairs". To prove that, he refers to the basic needs
of any human being such as health, clothing, lodging, food, and security without
which life will not be possible. He asserts that the religious duty to know and worship
God can be performed only if those necessities are attained. If a man is busy, all his
time to gain a living and to guard himself and his property, how can he have time to
gain knowledge and practice worship?2 In other word al-Ghazali is saying that "the
supreme purpose of man's life is to know and worship God", and consequently "the
supreme purpose of all the organization of human communities is to facilitate the
attainment of that end by individuals".3 The same view is expressed by al-Juwayni
who maintains that dunya sustains din and serves as a means to achieve its objectives.4
In addition to that, al-Ghazali's discussion casts some light on the explanation
of the terms religion (din) and temporal affairs (dunya) and the distinction between
them. He uses din to mean knowledge and worship of God, and by dunya he refers to
all things needed for the maintenance of life. In that context dunya, al-Ghazali explains,
1 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 624- 5.
2 al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 135.
3 W. Montgomery Watt, "Authority in the Thought of al-Ghazali", in La notion d'authorite
au Moyen Age (Paris, 1982) p. 60.
4 al-Juwayni, op. cit., p. 180.
is not opposite to din, it is a requirement of it.1 That interpretation reflects the most
general tendency in the usage of the phrase "din wa-dunya" with reference to political
thought and in particlar regarding the definition and function of the caliphate. The word
din in Arabic is a rich root which have several derivatives and meanings. Basicly, it
signifies the senses of: a) Obedience and submission; b) custom, habit and usage c) a
law, a statute or an ordinance; d) judgement and requital.2 When used in a general
sense it denotes "the corpus of obligatory prescriptions given by God to which one
must submit".3 Since those prescriptions in Islam are all-comprehensive, din in that
sense covers all conduct of life.4 On the other hand, dunya can simply mean nearer,
nearest, lower or lowest, and when combined with life (haya), either explicitly or
implicitly, it means this world or life, particularly the material side of it. It is an
antonym of the life after death (akhira).5 According to Islam, the interests of this world
may oppose the next only if they are not aimed at the service of God. But if material
life is used to serve God, then dunya becomes necessary for the exercise of din. This is
the essence of the above remark of al-Ghazall that dunya is not opposite to din. In fact,
dunya appears to be comprised in din, or as M. Laoust observes in his comments on
the political doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya that:"din is intimately bound up with dunya".6
It is worth mentioning here the remark which many Western writers have made
that the meaning of the words din and dunya when translated into Western terms may
often be distorted. Most likely, the translation may be given Christian connotations.
Often din is translated into 'religion'; and the concept of din is undoubtedly quite
coincident with the common sense of religion. Dunya is traslated to "temporal" or
"secular affairs", which may mislead to the indication that dunya is opposite to din. But
as is shown above the two terms are closely connected, especially in reference to
1 al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 135.
2 Ibn Manzur, op. cit., 17, pp. 24-30; Lane, op. cit., Ill, p. 944.; E.I?, II, p. 293.
3 £./.2,II, p. 293.
4 Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 29.
5 Ibn Manzur, op. cit., XVIII, p. 297; Lane, op. cit., Ill, p. 922.; E.I?-, II, pp. 295, 626.
6 Doctrines socials el politiques d'lbn Taymiyya, p. 280; Quoted in E.I?, II, p. 295.
politics. That is to say, there is a unique unity of politics and religion in Islam, and
whenever the phrase "religious and temporal" are used in political context that unity
should be regarded as implied.1
In the light of this discussion it appears to be difficult to draw exactly the line
that seperates din and dunya. Though the terms are used in the definition of the
caliphate presumably to denote seperate functions, it is difficult to find a precise
distinction between them. In reviewing the functions of the caliphate listed by the
political theorists there seems to be no criterion to distinguish between which belongs to
din and which belongs to dunya; except in very obvious cases such as describing the
establishment of prayer as being religious.2 Even when some writers like al-Juwayni3
and Ibn Khaldun4 have attempted to classify those functions under seperate headings,
claiming that some belong to din and others to dunya, there is no agreement between
them. It is not only that their lists are not identical but in most cases their clasification
itself is questionable. According to Ibn Khaldun the judiciary (qada') is associated with
din, while al-Juwayni relates it to dunya. Moreover, most items classified under dunya
may clearly be described as religious, such as finance (amwal) and security of life and
property (amn). Perhaps, an explanation of this may be found in the fact which has
already been emphasized that din and dunya are closely correlated. The revealed
shari'a laws, as Ibn Khaldun says, is concerned with the material life and has laid
down legislations for its various aspects.5 Hence, din comprises dunya, and when
dunya is mentioned distinct from din, it is to emphasize its importance rather than to
seperate it as an opposite concept of din.
1 Erwin Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 8- 9; Watt,
Islamic Political Thought, p. 29.
2 Cf. Mawardl, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, pp. 15- 16; Badr al-Din Ibn Jama'a, Tahrir al-
Ahkam, ed. Fu'ad 'Abd al-Mun'im (Dawha, 1985) pp. 65-70.
- Cf al-Juwaynl, op. cit., pp. 180-206.
4 Cf. Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 624-625, 663-665.
5 Ibid., p. 669.
III. Features of Rulership
Apparently, the standard definition of al-Mawardi has shaped the basic features
of the caliphate, though it has clearly stressed the aspects of its function. However, the
other technical definitions have viewed the caliphate from different angles and either
added a new element or attempted to lay the stress on other features. Now those
additional characters of the caliphate shall be briefly considered.
i. Generality
It has already been mentioned that one of the chief qualities attributed to the
caliphate is generality. Commenting on the title amir al-mu'minln Ibn Hazm has
remarked that it indicates the possession of command over all the affairs of all the
Muslims.1 To signify the importance of that attribute, al-Taftazanl, a great theologian
and jurist of the eighth century (d.791/1388), included it in his rephrased definition.
He pictures the imamate as: "a general leadership (ri'asa 'amma) governing both
religious and temporal affairs in succession to the Prophet".2 In an earlier definition
which was coined by al-Juwayni, a contemporary to al-Mawardi, the emphasis was
put on both the generality and the totality of the imamate. He states that: "the imamate
is a total authority and overall leadership ( ri'asa tamma va-zi'ama 'amma ') concerning
general and special (affairs) in religious and temporal matters".3 In another place in
his treatise he asserts another level of generality when he describes the Imam as though
all the Muslims have become one person embodied in his person.4
The discussion of generality leads us to consider the concept of general wilaya
which is often assigned to the office of the Imam. The verb waliya means to have
charge or command over something,5 and its derivative wilaya is defined as "the
1 Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 90.
2 Sa'ad al-Taftazani, Maqasid al-Talibin (Astana, 1305 A.H.) qouted in M. Rashid Rida, al-
Khilafa (Cairo, 1988), p. 17.
3 al-Juwayni, op. cit., p. 22.
4 Ibid., p. 210.
5 Ibn Manzur, op. cit., XX, p. 287; Lane, op. cit., p. 3060.
carrying through of a decision affecting another person whether the latter wishes or
not".1 The essence of wilaya, as Ibn al-Athir says, is that it indicates power and ability
to carry out what is decided.2 Wilaya is applied to anyone who has got that power.
While it is regarded as an attribute of God, a number of persons holding public and
private responsibilities are also designated with the power of wilaya. Accordingly a
distinction is made between general and special wilaya. The general power (wilaya
'amma) is assigned to the Imam. A vizier or an amir over a province may also have
general wilaya delegated by the Imam. Other officials possess special wilaya, such as
military comanders, judges, financial officials, leaders of prayers and of pilgrimage
(haj). In private affairs, special wilaya is possessed by persons such as a guardian of
an orphan child, an insane person or a relative of a woman independently of whom her
marriage cannot be performed.3
ii. Supremacy
Supremacy is another basic attribute assigned to the imamate. Al-Qadi 'Abd al-
Jabbar regards it as the main quality that distinguishes the imamate from other
authorities. He defines the nature of the imamate as follows:
"Etymologically, imam means the one who is put forward
whether he is worthy to take the position of being ahead of others or
not. As a technical term in shar' it is the title applied to the one who
possesses wilaya over the people to act according to his will in
managing their affairs in such a way that there is no force above him to
overrule his decisions (la yakun fawq yadih yad). This distinguishes his
authority from that of a judge or a governor of a province. Though they
also manage the affairs of the people, but the Imam has authority above
them".4
Furthermore, supremacy is considered from a different standpoind in an
interesting discussion by al-Juwayni, who phrased the word " istiqlal" (independence)
1 'All M. al-Jurjani, Kitab al-Ta'rlfat (Beirut, 1969), p. 275; E.I.*, IV, p. 1137.
2 Ibn Manzur, XX, p. 287.
3 E.I.1, IV, pp. 1137- 8.
4 'Abd al-Jabar Ibn Ahmad, Shark al-Ussul al-Khamsa, ed. 'Abd al-Karim 'Uthman (Cairo,
n.d.), p. 750.
as a general term which comprises all the major qualities attributed to the imamate. In
its broadest sense, his concept of independence may be interpreted as an essential
corollary of supremacy. Perhaps, it is an established view that the person who is to be
an imam must ideally have certain qualities such as knowledge, administrative ability
and piety. Al-Juwayni argues that most of those qualities can possibly be traced back
to one origin, that is to say, independence. In his view, it is a requirement that the
imam must be independent if the imamate is to perform its religious or temporal
fuctions. It is essential, he explains, that the imam, in his capacity as a leader in both
din and dunya, should be followed. He should not be subordinate to or follow
anyone. The chief purpose of the imamate is to unite the people, make them accept to
follow a certain course of action, and render their obedience to one man, in spite of
their different natures, wills, wishes and conditions. If that fails to be achieved, there
will be no stable government. In religious affairs, the independence of the imam
necessitates that he must possess the knowledge and qualifications which enable him to
make his own judgement (ijtihad). Because if he is not a mujtahid, he has to observe
the ideas of the 'ulama' and obey their instructions and prohibitions. According to al-
Juwayni, following the 'ulama contradicts the position of chiefdom and the office of
the imamate. Similarly, the imam has to attain high ability to administer temporal
affairs in order to be independent in his decisions. However, al-Juwayni says that it
may be objected that his concept of independence is not a necessary condition of the
imamate on the ground that the imam has to hold consultation (shura) and decide
according to it. However, he believes that conducting shura is not inconsistent with
the quality of independence of the imam because the Prophet himself used to hold
consultations on many occasions and was ordered by the Qur'an to do so. Therefore
the imam is required to observe shura, no matter how highly qualified and greatly
independent he may be as long as decisions based on arbitrariness (istibdad) are most
likely to be unjust. In short, al-Juwayn holds that independence (istigqlal) is a chief
feature of the imamate from which other qualities such as knowledge and ability can be
derived.1
iii. The Authority of a definite person
According to al-Razi the imamate is "a general authority concerning religious
and temporal affairs assigned to a definite person".2 It appears that his definition is
unsatisfactory and has actually been rejected on the ground that it also applies to
prophethood.3 But that disapproval does not seem to be an objection to the contents of
the definition, it is rather a reference to its incompleteness. It is most likely that the
missing element is the fact that the imamate is in fact a succession to prophethood.
Nonetheless, al-RazI's definition seems to introduce an important feature when it
emphasises that the imamate is to be assigned to a definite person. In other words, the
imamate is an authority which is possessed by a certain body in the society. It is not
abstract. It is not attributed to a norm. It belongs to a real person, a living person,
neither hidden nor unseen and, besides, who is fixed and known. There is even a
rather extreme opinion of a scholar which imposes an obligatory duty on all the
Muslims to know in person the imam by name. Al-Mawardi criticizes that view, but
maintains that such a recognition of the imam is only required from those who are
entitled to choose the imam and on whose pledge of allegiance the imamate is
contracted. Ordinary people are only required to know that the imamate is assigned to
a cetain person.4
However, our concern here is that the imamate is the power which is brought
into the hands of a certain person. Al-Razi continues to explain why he laid down that
condition. He states that defining the imamate as the authority designated to one
1 al-Juwaynl, op. cit., pp. 84- 90.
2 Quoted in Rida, op. cit., p. 17.
3 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iji, al-Mawaqiffi 'Ilm al-Kalam (Cairo, n.d.), p. 395.
4 al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, p. 15.
person excludes the idea that it belongs to all the umma (the people) because it is in
their power to depose the imam in certain cases, particularly if he does not meet the
requirements of righteousness.1 Commenting on al-Razi's statement, al-Taftazani
supposes that his reference to the whole umma most probably means ahl al-halxwa-al-
'aqd (the people who bind and loose), assuming that they possess authority above the
rest of the people.2 However, whether the authority to depose the imam resides in ahl
al-hallwa-al-'aqd, or belongs to the whole umma, it seems that al-Razi seeks to rule
out the possibility that they possess the supreme authority. Therefore it is clearly stated
in his definition that the imamate is that authority which resides in one definite person,
that is to say, it is not the authority of the whole umma or the authority of ahl al-hali.
wa-al-'aqd. Though they hold some kind of authority, but apparently it is not the al-
imama al-'uzma.
In this respect, it may also be useful to explore the concept of the unity of the
imamate which the theorists regard as an essential characteristic. Generally, it is an
accepted idea that there should be appointed only one person for the office of the
imamate to rule all the Muslims wherever that is possible.3 This opinion is basically
founded with reference to certain Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions which
expressly indicate the unity of all the Muslims in general and, in particular, that the
caliphate has to be rendered to one at a time.4 Besides, there are some interesting
arguments which are proposed in support of the doctrine of unity. Ibn Hazm, for
example, argues that if it would be possible to have more than one imam at a time, then
it would be possible to have numberless imams. There are no grounds, he says, to rule
out the possibility of having an imam for every town, or for every village, or even
every individual could be the imam of himself; and evidently that would be utter
1 Rida, op. cit., p. 17.
2 Ibid., p. 17.
3 al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, p. 9 ; al-Farra', op. cit., p.25; al-Juwayni, op. cit.,
p. 172 ; Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 88 ; al-Rayyis, op. cit., p. 243 ; Ibn Jama'a, op. cit., p. 56 ; Ibn al-
Azraq, op. cit., I, p. 76.
4 Cf. Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 88 ; al-Rayyis, op. cit., p. 245.
chaos.1 But Ibn Hazm gives no reason for his supposition that either there must be one
imam for the whole world, or power will be divided into a number of infinitive parts.
Perhaps, the most convincing argument which endevours to make a conclusive proof of
those assumptions is made by al-Juwayni. He applies his concept of independence of
the imamate which has been explained before. He argues that:
"The office of the imamate necessitates independence in actions.
Therefore it is impossible to assign to two independent persons together
the supreme leadership. The jurists have disagreed whether it is
permisible to appoint two judges in one district, if it is assumed that
each one of them is given general authority over all the area. It is more
proper that it is not allowed. But it may be presumed to be possible on
the ground that the imam is above the judges, the governors and the
other officials, and therefore if any two officials are inharmonious and
there is a conflict between them, the Muslims can turn to the authority of
the imam to finally resolve the disputed matter. As for the imamate, it is
the utmost end above which there is no authority that may be assumed,
which can be turned to or followed".2
Hence, the indivisibility of the imamate is not permisible. In other words, it has
to be allocated to one definite person if his control over the whole Muslim world is
possible. Yet, al-Juwayni explains that the unity of the imamate may sometimes be
impracticable for various reasons. For example, if there is a remote country from the
Muslim world, its people can appoint an independent amir to rule them as long as it is
not possible for them to be governed by the central authority of the Imam. That amir is
not regarded as an imam, and when the difficulties which prevent the extension of the
power of the imam of the bulk of the Muslims are removed, the amir will become one
of his subjects. On the other hand, if the Muslim world itself is divided into different
countries, and each country is ruled by an amir, none of them will be regarded as an
imam. In that case, according to al-Juwayni, the office of the imam is considered to be
1 Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 88.
2 al-Juwayni, op. cit., pp.178, 179.
vacant, "because the imam is the one with whom all the Muslims are associated".1 In
short, al-Juwayni is saying that there must exist only one imamate or there is none.
iv. The Imamate and the Law
Now we turn to an important issue in the study of the nature of any political
power, that is, the relation between it and law. As has been stated before, Ibn Khaldun
has asserted the necessity of establishing political power on the basis of binding laws
which may either be man-made laws or revealed laws ordained by a prophet.
According to his focus on the element of law, he defines the caliphate as that institute
which "enforces the populace to act in accordance with the judgement of the shar' in
furtherance of their interests of this world as well as the other world".2 This
definition is significant in several aspects, especially in reflecting the relation between
the caliphate and the laws of the shari'a. It describes the basic purpose of the caliphate
as being the enforcement of the shari'a laws. It may be self-evident that those laws
are not created by the caliphate, but they have been ordained by God through the
Prophet. In other words, the caliphate is not the primary source of laws, yet its
fundamental function is to use the the power it possesses to put into execution those
laws. The fulfilment of that end is not only seen as the main duty of the imamate, but it
is regarded as the cause that necessitates its very own existence.
In fact, the discussion about the reasons behind the necessity of the imamate is
one of several aspects which show the indisputable facts of the supremacy of the
shari'a laws. This discussion is found in most political treatises,3 and it is sufficient
here to give a brief account of the major arguments. The significant fact with regard to
our present consideration of the point of the supremacy of the shari'a is that almost all
1 Ibid., pp. 174, 175.
2 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 578 ; cf. the English translation, Rosenthal, op. cit., I, p. 387.
3 Cf. al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, p. 5 ; al-Farra', op. cit., p. 19 ; Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp.
578 - 81 ; Ibn Jama'a, op. cit., p. 48 ; al-Razr, op. cit., pp. 133 - 5 ; Ibn Hazm, op. cit., pp. 87 - 9 ;
al-Iji, op. cit., pp. 395 - 8 ; Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, Ghayat al-Muraam fi 'Ilm al-Kalam (Cairo,
1971), pp. 367 - 74 ; al-Rayyis, op. cit., pp. 127 - 51.
the opinions agree that the necessity of establishing the imamate is derived from those
laws. It is maintained that the arguments for it are based on shar' and not on 'aql, that
is secular human reasoning. That is to say, phrasing it in contemporary terms, that the
religious law, the shar', creates the imamate. Generally, there are two ways to prove
that the imamate is necessary according to the religious law. The first proof is the
consensus (ijma'). It is argued that on the death of the Prophet, the men around him
proceeded before his burial to choose an imam. It is reported that Abu Bakar addressed
them saying that: "There is no doubt that the Prophet has died. Therefore, in order to
preserve the religion there must be a person to take over". All the people agreed to that
and no one objected. That was also the case in subsequent periods and there was no
time when the people were left without an imam.1 The second proof claims that there
are many religious duties which can only be carried out collectively and cannot be
performed by each individual by himself. Such collective religious duties, it is argued,
can only be performed under the leadership of an imam. Therefore, it is obligatory
(■wajib) to establish an imam, because that is the only means to carry out the several
obligatory collective duties.2 Even those extremists, who have taken the exceptional
position that it is not necessary to have an imam, are not against the supremacy of the
shari'a. On the contrary, they argue that it is only necessary to observe the shari'a
laws, and they think that it is possible for all the people to agree upon the practicing of
justice and the obedience of the law, without the existence of an imam.3 However,
there are some thinkers who hold that the necessity of the imamate is indicated by
human intelect {'aql) only, but according to their doctrine the shar' is a manifestation
of human reasoning and in the end their opinion is not a denial to the principle of the
supremacy of the religious laws.4
1 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 579 ; al-Ijl, op. cit., p. 395 ; al-Amidi, op. cit., p. 364.
2 al-Amidi, op. cit., p. 366 ; al-Iji, op. cit., p. 396.
3 Cf. Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 580 - I.
4 Cf. al-Rayyis, op. cit., p. 131.
The relation between the imamate and the law is shown further in the discussion
about the Shi'a theory that the imamate is needed since it is the only source of the
knowledge of the religious laws, and that is the reason why they believe that the imam
must be infallible. The Sunnis, and others, who reject this theory, hold that the
imamate is needed only for the execution of the religious laws, since those laws have
already been known. They maintain that they are all included in the Qur'an and the
Sunna, and what is needed is a power to enforce them, not a source to instruct them.1
Furthermore, the doctrine of the supremacy of the revealed religious laws has
been asserted and thoroughly explained in the face of a grave challenge that faced the
Muslims after the invasion of the Mongols who destroyed the Abbasid Caliphate in
Baghdad and captured a great part of the Muslim world. Those Mongols used to have
a traditional code, called the Yasaq or Yasa, compiled and written by Chingiz Khan2
which embodied their tribal rules and customs. When they assumed power over the
Muslims, though they themselves ultimately adopted Islam, they still continued for
some time to govern following their ancient law. Such a situation was totally new to
the Muslims who for centuries followed the shari'a as the only source of legal
judgement. In the face of that new challenge, the Muslim scholars took up to show
more expressly the obligatory nature of the shari' laws, the necessity to enforce them,
and the essential requirement to reject totally any tendency to displace them. One of the
leading exponents of this period was Ibn Taymiyya who expounded his view in various
works, especially in his replies, fatawa, to the worried queries raised about the
inclinations of some judges to follow their masters, the Mongols, and substitute for the
shari'a the code of the so-called Yasaq.3 However, after a long and a slow process, the
1 'Abd al-Jabbar, op. cit., pp. 751 - 2 ; cf. al-Rayyis, op. cit., pp. 159 - 70.
2 Cf. Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya wa-al-Nihaya (Beirut, n.d), XII, p. 144 ; Thomas Arnold, The
Caliphate, (Oxford, 1924), p. 109.
3 Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa (al-Ribat, n.d.), 35, p. 408.
Mongols princes were fully Islamized and the laws of the Yasaq were entirely
disestablished.1
It is not possible to examine all the expressions of Ibn Taymiyya on this issue.
It must suffice to look into some of his discussions on the matter, especially those
related to the general character of judgement (al-qada'). In his investigations he
explains obligatory nature of the laws of the shari'a, the nullification of any laws
contradicting them, and to what extent the decisions of rulers and judges can be
regarded as compulsory. A summary of his ideas on those questions may be given in
the following points.
(1) Quoting the Qur'an,2 he states that the decisions of governors must always
be based on justice. He interprets justice as to mean the revealed laws contained in the
Qur'an and the Sunna, which he calls shar' munzal. So, justice is shar', and shar' is
justice. It is an obligation on all mankind to follow this shar', basically because it is
God alone who ordains the law. In support of this principle, he brings forward the
important doctrine that God is given the attribute of being al-Hakim (the arbitrator), the
decision belongs only to him (in al-hukm ilia li-llah), which means He alone is the
law-giver. Ibn Taymiyya quotes various authorities to verify that beliefs among them
are the Qur'anic verses which state that command, decision and judgement belongs to
God alone.3 Those laws of God are included in his Book and conveyed by His
Messenger Muhammad. Therefore, the Qur'an and the Sunna teach the revealed
religious law, shar' munzal, which is obligatory on every one to obey, and it is the
duty of the Muslims to use every force they possess to protect its enforcement and
compel its obedience.4
(2) On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya firmly invalidates the imposition of any
laws other than the shari'a. He signifies any norms inflicted in place of the shari'a
1 Arnold, op. cit., p. 111.
2 "When you rule people, judge amongst them with justice", IV:58.
3 For example see verses 12:40 ; 42:10.
4 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa, 35, pp. 361 - 6.
by the phrase "shar' mubdal", that is, replaced and changed laws. As an example of
such type of law, he particularly mentions the customary rules of the Tatars, codified
in the collection called the Yasaq. Ibn Taymiyya strenously denies such laws and
confirms that no Muslim is allowed to give or accept any judgement based on them.
He holds a strong conviction that ruling by them or agreeing to an arbitration on their
basis forms a great sin which in certain cases may amount to apostacy from Islam.1
He demonstrates his ideas by providing many evidences from the Qur'an.2 To give an
example of his approach, we shall consider his comments on one citation which appear
to be, in particular, of great significance in elaborating the concept of lordship
(.rububiyya), and later in shaping the idea of sovereignity of modern Muslims. He
states his remarks in his explanation of the verse which describes the Jews and the
Christians by saying: "they have taken their doctors of law and their monks for lords
beside God".3 Quoting the Prophet and the early commentators, the verse is interpreted
to mean that they obeyed their religious leaders in what they allowed and what they
forbade. It does not mean that they worshiped them and prayed to them as actual gods.
They are described as being lords taken beside God, because the lordship of legislating
what is permissible and what is forbidden has been assigned to them, while it ought to
be assigned only to God. Ibn Taymiyya has no doubt that the heads who give
themselves the authority to make deliberate changes in the laws of God and those who
obey them in that are both blameworthy. If those alterations are acknowledged to be
authentic and the heads admit having the right to set them, though it is known that they
are cotradictory with the laws of God, then this is regarded as unmistakable apostacy
and shirk. It may be a sin that does not amount to shirk only in the case when the
belief in the original laws of God remains unshakable despite the fact that their
displacement is imposed and complied with. Apparently, Ibn Taymiyya seems to be
1 Ibid.., 28, pp. 200, 201 ; 35, pp. 361-6.
2 For example see verses 4:60 -56 ; 5:50.
3 The Qur'an 9:31.
convinced that giving men the right to set laws other than the laws of God is a
contradiction of the belief in the Lordship of God.1
(3)Yet, beside the revealed religious laws, shar' munzal, Ibn Taymiyya
acknowledges another set of rules, for which he coins the term shar' mu'awwal. By
that he means the different interpretations of the Muslim scholars regarding the revealed
law. No doubt, the application of the limited number of the revealed statements, nusus,
has led to the emergence of a wide range of different opinions, either in their
explanation or in their employment to cover new situations. That area in which ijtihad
is used and especially when there is no agreement between the mujtahids, is what Ibn
Taymiyya calls shar' mu'awwal.
His concern in relation to this area of legal order is to show that its rules are not
as compulsory as the revealed laws, in the sense that individuals have the choice to
follow what they think is correct. No ruler has the right to use his power to compel all
the people to follow one opinion and abandon other opinions. The ruler and other
people stand on an equal footing and the authenticity of each opinion depends on the
evidences provided. Force is to be used to impose the legal decision of a ruler or a
judge only upon the particular people brought to their court in a specific case. Besides,
any judicial decision is an independent judgement of the person who passed it and there
is always room for human error. Therefore, neither a ruler, a judge, nor any scholar
may claim that his decision on a certain matter is equated with the judgement (hukm) of
God. God's hukm is his revealed law, and its application and interpretation is
necessarily human action.2
This distinction between the decision of God (hukm Allah) and the judgement
of the men (hukm al rijal) has been emphasised as early as the era of 'All Ibn Abl
1 Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., 7, pp. 67 - 71 ; Cf. Ibn Kathir, op. cit. ,13, p. 114 ; Ibn Kathir is
one example of the followers of Ibn Taymiyya who echoed his views on the impementation of non-
Islamic laws. The impact of Ibn Taymiyya is felt up to the present age especially in opposing the
imposition of Western laws in Islamic countries.
2 Ibid., 7,pp. 376 - 88 ; 28, pp. 384 - 6 ; 10, pp. 470- 1.
Talib, the fourth Caliph, in the course of his conflict with the Kharijites. One of their
original objections was expressed in the slogan: La hukm ilia li-llah, by which they
mean "the decision is God's alone". This was a reference to their disaproval of the
arbitration between 'Ali and Mu'awiya, on the ground that it was a decision of men,
hukm rijal. They hold that the Qur'an had already decided that a party whose conduct
was felt to be outrageous, like Mu'awiya's party, should be fought until they submit to
the head of the community.1 Therefore, to seek a resolution through the arbitration was
interpreted by them as a rejection of God's decision and would be equal to apostacy,
kufr. 'Ali strongly opposed their contention on the basis that it was a
misunderstanding of the doctrine that decision belongs only to God and a misuse of it.
He and other scholars, namely Ibn 'Abbas, attempted to clarify that the Qur'an was a
book containing the words written in ink and was unable to speak for itself and decide
for itself. Men were needed for its application and interpretation. In support of their
view, they made reference to the fact that the Qur'an itself allowed the appointment of
two men as arbitrators to settle marriage disputes.2 Then, why should it not be
permissible to go to arbitration to prevent bloodshed and settle a conflict between two
fighting parties?3 'All explained further that setting a human deciding-body, like an
imarate, was necessary for mankind, and certainly he did not see any contradiction
between it and the doctrine that 'the decision is God's alone' (La hukm ilia li-llah.4
v. The Caliphate in relation to obedience
Obedience forms a major constituent in the establishment of any political
power. With regard to the caliphate, an attempt has been made to define it in relation to
obedience by two scholars, namely al-Iji and Ibn 'Arafa. The former defines it as: "the
1 Cf. the Qur'an 50:9.
2 Cf. the Qur'an 4:35.
3 Ibn Jarir, al-Tabari, Tdrikh al-Rusul wa-al-Muluk (Cairo, 1963), 5, pp. 64 -6,72- 3 ; Ibn
Kathir, op. cit., 7, pp. 304 -7.
4 Cf. Kamal al-Din Maytham al-Bahrani, Shark Nahj al-Balagha (Tahran, 1362), II, p. 101.
succession to the Prophet in the execution of the religion whereby a duty is imposed on
all the people to render obedience to it".1 In the latter's definition it is described as: "an
acquired quality which requires obedience of the order of the person to whom it is
assigned on conditon that his order is not deemed as evil (munkar)",2 It may be clear
that the focus in both definitions is shifted to obedience and it is reflected as a major
component of the caliphate. Ibn al-Azraq ,in his comments on this approach, shows
his approval to it and asserts the importance of obedience in relation to the imamate.
In his view, "the imamate will cease to exist if obedience to it is lacking".3
It may also be clear that, besides emphasizing the significance of obedience,
these definitions explain further its character and extent. Obedience is represented as a
common duty imposed on all the people. In rendering it that quality of generality, it
becomes possible to distinguish the imamate from other kinds of authority, like the
judiciary, which receive obedience to some degree.4 In addition to that, the scope of
obedience is also defined. Though the whole people ought to obey the imamate, but
their obedience is not unlimited. They ought to abide by ma'ruf, and to disobey
munkar. Ma'ruf is a general term denoting anything deemed lawful according to the
Shari'a, and munkar is the opposite of it. In other words, political decisions to be
obeyed have to be in conformity with the Shari'a laws. To understand the nature of
obedience in general and the restrictions limiting it, we have to trace the sources of the
notion in politics and theology.
No doubt, the principle of submission to the imamate is acknowledged as a
religious duty.5 Ibn Taymiyya,, for example, says:
"Obedience of the rulers is a duty of everybody, even if he has
not sworn allegiance to them or has not made firm pledges to them, as it
1 al-Iji, op. cit., p. 395.
2 Ibn al-Azraq, op. cit., 1, p.91.
3 Ibid., 1, p. 77.
4Jbid., 1, p.91 ; al-IjI,op. cit., p. 395.
5 al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya, p. 17 ; al-Farra', op. cit., p. 28 ; Ibn Jama'a, op.
cit., pp. 61,62.
is a duty of everybody to perform five prayers, zakat, fasting,
pilgrimage, and other practices of worship which are ordained by God
and his Messenger. If a person takes an oath for that it is only a
verification and a confirmation".1
This firm conviction is based on the Qur'an from which the whole concept of
obedience of the rulers has originated. In two closely related verses it is said: a) God
commands you to give back trusts to those worthy of them, and when you judge
between people, to judge with justice b) O! You who believe, obey God and obey the
Apostle and those who possess the authority to command among you (ulu al-amr) ,2
The commentators are almost in agreement that the first statement is addressed to the
rulers, and the latter to the subjects. The rulers are directed to observe to be
trustworthy and just in their government, and when they do so it becomes a duty on the
subjects to render them obedience.3 This view is supported further by a number of
traditions which assert the importance of performing the obligation of loyalty to the
rulers, and at the same time restricts it to the limits of ma'ruf, that is, legality according
to the Shari'a.4 Therefore, basically obedience is to God, and the decisions of the
rulers are to be obeyed as long as they agree and do not contradict with the orders of
God.5
This is a general outline of the concept of obedience to the rulers as expressed
in theory. However, political realities in Islamic history may in many cases portray
different implications. Many despotic rulers had claimed unlimited powers and had
received unlimited obedience from their subjects, regardless of whether they were just
or unjust. Nonetheless, such despotism and the total subjection of the masses to it was
most likely due to the misuse of force, and it can hardly be said that political theory
1 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fataawa, 35, p. 9.
2 The Qur'an, 4:58,59.
3 Cf. Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan 'an-Ta'wil al-Qur'an, (Cairo, 1968), 5, pp. 144-
50; al-Qurtubi, op. cit., 5, pp. 255 - 61.
4 Cf. 'Ala al-Dln 'All al-Muttaqi, Kanz al-'Umal (Beirut, 1979), V, pp.778- 98.
5 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa, op. cit., 10, pp. 266- 7.
appears to be in support of it.1 Apparently, the concept of obedience, in the sense that it
has to be rendered to a just ruler whose decisions are in harmony with the dictates of
the Shari'a, has remained unchanged. Even at a later age when despotism had become
almost the dominant system of rule in most countries, the same doctrine was declared
and circulated by political thinkers, such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328),2 Ibn Jama'a
(d.1333)3 and Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406),4 who had made clear statements that the
instructions of an unjust ruler were to be carried into excution only when they would
appear to be in themselves just and lawful.
Yet, submission by the subjects to despots is not by itself a sign of approval of
their rule. Besides, the question of to what extent disapproval can lead to resistance
against them and to their deposition is a totally different matter either in theory or in
practice. In fact, historical realities seem to have had a great influence in shaping ideas
about revolution against the rulers which had always been very controversial.5Even
then such ideas are not to be confused with the doctrine of obedience however closely
related they may appear, as there is no doubt that political concepts are often
overlapping. However, the impact of actual historical facts may be best shown in our
next discussion on the basis of the caliphate and whether it is founded on consent or on
force. It may also appear there that the Sunni attitude is primarily to obey the laws of
the Shan'a whenever they are applied by any ruler. As regard their position towards
the evils of governments they are inclined to follow a nonviolent course of protest
rather than be involved in an unseccessful revolution.
1 Cf. Arnold, op. cit., p. 47- 9 who holds this view ; and see a criticism of his views in al-
Rayyis, op. cit., pp. 344 - 64.
2 Cf. al-Fatawa, 29, p. 196.
3 See his book Tahrir al-Ahkam, pp. 61- 2.
4 See al-Muqaddima, 2, p.622.
5 For concepts of revolution cf. al-Rayyis, op.cit., pp. 349 - 364.]
III. Basis of Rulership: Consent or Force?
The question about what constitutes the caliphate and whether it rests on
consent or force, is not related to why people render obedience to it. In fact it is an
examination of the method of how the office of the caliphate is filled. Though,
undoubtedly obedience is an important element in composing the power of the
caliphate, yet the problem under consideration is not an investigation into the motive
behind the phenomenon of obedience and whether it is consent of fear of force. The
question, as the Muslim thinkers have layed it, is directed to the way in which authority
is acquired.
i. Consent
According to the Sunni view, the caliphate is originally conceived to the based
on consent, in the sense that it is regarded as an elective office. Therefore, the principle
of election and the rules associated with it are discussed in almost all expositions on the
subject. Generally, the reference is made to two verses in the Qur'an which are
understood to demand the setting up of a consultative government. The first verse
described the members of the community as those "whose affairs are decided by
mutual counsel (shura).! The second verse was addressed to the Prophet who was
told to "consult them in the affairs".2 As one of the commentators observes, this
doctrine of shura found its practical expression during the lifetime of the Prophet in a
number of matters especially war affairs; but it was not applied to law-making as all
binding legal rules were being ordained by God through revelation. After his death, it
was first employed to the determination of the caliphate as he did not designate a
successor. Then, it also came to be used in the legistation of laws which were derived
from the Qur'an and the Sunna.3 In the meeting of the Muslim notables of Medina after
1 The Qur'an, 42:38.
2 The Qur'an 3:159.
3 Al-Qurtubi, op. cit., 16, p. 37.
the death of the Prophet a consensus was reached to choose Abu Bakr as the first
Caliph. That consensus has set the precedent on which the principle of regarding the
caliphate an elective office is based.1 In fact, in the early days of the caliphate the
shura was seen to be the only way by which authority is invested. 'Umar, the second
caliph, is quoted to have said in a public talk in Medina: "If any one swears allegiance
to a man without taking counsel with the Muslims he is not to be obeyed".2
Despite the fact that great importance is placed on shurd, yet there is no
insistence on a precise electoral system. In general, the rule is that the election is
carried by a group of notables who possess certain qualifications such as moral
probity, good knowledge and sound judgement;3 besides holding influential positions
in the society.4 The term ahl al-hal wa-al- 'qd (people of loosing and binding) is
commonly used to denote these electors, who have remained an unspecified electorate
in spite of the definition of their qualifications. Some jurists have also attemped to
specify the least number of electors authorised to grant the caliphate depending on
historical precendents of the Rashidun Caliphs. They were led to conclude that even
one or just a few electors are sufficient.5 However, that assumption appears to be a
misinterpretation of the events. In the analysis of al-Juwayni,6 al-Ghazali7 and Ibn
Taymiyya,8 it is stated that the choice of a few number of electors can not empower a
person to the caliphate if he is met with a lot of opposition. The assignment of the
caliphate will be effective only when it is given the support of a sufficient number of
followers which will enable it to attain the necessary power needed to generate the
1 Cf. al-Juwaynl, op. cit., pp. 54 - 8.
2 Al-Bukhari, al-Sahih (Cairo, 1953), IV, p. 127.
3 Cf. al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, p. 6 ; al-Farra', op. cit., p. 19 ; al-Juwayni, op. cit., pp. 62 - 6.
4 Such capacity is not stated clearly in the sources, but it is inferred from their discussions.
Cf. Malcolm Kerr, Islamic Reform (Berkerly, 1966), pp. 43- 4. See also al-Juwayni, op. cit., p. 72,
who indicates the importance of influence.
5 Abu Bakr al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid (Cairo, 1947), p. 178 ; MawardI, al-Ahkam, p.7.
6 Al-Juwayni, op. cit, pp. 70 -2.
7 See his book al-Radd 'aid al-Batiniyya (Leiden,1916), pp. 64-5. Quoted in al-Rayyis,
op. cit., p. 223.
8 See his book Minhdj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya (n.p., n.d.), 1, pp. 189- 90.
obedience of the rest of the community. In most cases this may mean that the consent
of the majority of the electors is to be ensured. However, the key point in this
contention is that the determining factor lies in the acquirement of effective power
(shawka). The support of any number of electors which establishes sufficient shawka
and brings about the obedience of the masses is enough. In short, the significnat point
to be noticed is that it is consent that actually confers authority, and that seems to be the
essence of shura.
As regards the procedure of the election, it also appears that there is no demand
for a precise way. The account of the elections of the early caliphs, the Rashidun,
reveals varient forms.1 However, al-Mawardi gives a brief description of a procedure
which seems to be in accord with the process followed in the selection of Abu Bakr.
He says:
"when the ahl al-hal wa-al- 'aqd meet for election they have to
examine carefully those who possess the qualifications of the imamate
and give preference to the pre-eminent and highly qualified among them,
whom the masses will easily obey and do not hesitate to render
allegiance to him. On arriving at a decision to choose one of them, they
offer him the imamate; and if he accepts they swear allegiance to him on
it. By their oath (bay'a) the imamate becomes fully contracted to him
and it becomes compulsory for all the people (the umma) to give bay 'a
to him and subject themselves to his rule".2
In light of this view the decision of ahl al-hal wa-al-'aqd appears to be final.
There is an obligation on the populace at large to follow and it is implied that their
consent is assumed to be automatic. The multitudes show their approval in a second
oath known as the public bay'a,3 though it is not necessary that everyone should
swear it. Al-Mawardi clearly states that it is not necessary, even after full installation of
the imamate, that everybody should know the imam by name. The whole responsibility
1 Cf. al-Bukhari, op. cit., IV, pp. 173-4.
2 Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, op. cit., p. 7.
3 Al-Mawardi, Quanin al-Wizara, p. 34, quoted in Fathi al-Drini, Khasa is al-Tashri' al-
Islami fi-al-Siyasa waal-Hukm (Bayrut,1982), p. 427 ; cf. Kerr, op. cit., p. 36.
is in the hands of ahl al-hal wa-al-'aqd, who are the competent authority and on their
decision the imamate is contracted.1
ii. Force
We have seen that the determining factor in consent as a means to confer
authority is that it should enable the acquisition of effective power, shawka. However,
political realities gave rise to the question what if effective rule is imposed by force?
Many political writers have expressed their opinions on this issue. A summary of the
Sunni postion may be best shown in the following ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, who says:
"A man will not become an Imam until he wins the approval of
the people who possess influence and whose obedience will enable him
to carry out the purposes of his office, because the fulfilment of the
functions of the imamate depends on competence and might. Therefore,
whoever is pledged an oath of loyalty which provides him with
competence and might will become an imam. That is the reason which
made the Sunni scholars hold that anyone who obtains might and
competence to accomplish the functions of rule is to be considered as
one of the holders of authority (ulu al-amr) whom God have ordered to
be obeyed as long as they do not command evil.... The fact of the
matter is that the possession by a person of the office of an amir, a
judge, a wall, or any other position in which might and competence are
inherent, becomes real and exists when the necessary might and
competence is obtained. If it is not obtained it does not exist... As the
power to adminster the people can be constituted by their willing
obedience or by their being coerced, any one who becomes able to rule
them, willingly or unwillingly, should be regarded as the actual holder
of authority. He is to be obeyed if his commands are in accord with
obedience to God. Imam Ahmad (Ibn Hanbal) has said that: "whoever
occupies the caliphate , either by the consensus of the people and their
acceptance or by his sword against their will, and consequently
becomes the de facto caliph and is given the title amir al-mu'minin,
then it will be correct (Ja'iz) to pay him the religious dues (sadaqat),
regardless of whether he is pious or not"... The question of the
legitimacy of his actions is not directly related, because realities of rule
and authority are effected by aquiring the necessary competence. In the
course of that, authority may be acquired in the desirable correct way
like that of the Rashidun Caliphs, or it may be obtained in the wrong
way like the authority of the tyrants (al-saldtin al-zalimin).
Concerning the Umayyad and the Abbasid caliphs, the
Sunnis do not claim that they were entitled to be empowered, nor that
they were to be obeyed in all their decisions. However, the Sunnis
describe the status quo and advise the appropriate course of action. As
1 Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, p. 15.
a result of their recognition of the realities they called for the suitable
requirements to observe the rules of God and his Messenger. They
admitted that those caliphs were the persons who came into power and
possessed might and competence which had enabled them to carry out
the functions of rule, wilaya, such as the enforcement of revealed
punishments (hudud), the provision and division of welfare money
(.amwal), the setting of district governors (wulat), the waging of war
{jihad.) against enemies and the establishment of pilgrimage (hajj),
festivals (a'yad) and Friday congregation (jumu'a). The sunnis called
for disobedience of any of them or their deputies in any action which
was in violation of God's law (ma'siya). But they were to be
cooperated with in their pious deeds, iike making jihad under their
leadership, praying jumu 'a and a 'yad and performing hajj with them,
as well as helping them in enforcing hudud enjoining good and
forbidding evil. They were to be supported in whatever was good and
correct and not to be aided in whatever was evil and wrong".1
It may be clear from that long quotation how the Sunnis responded to the
challenges that were brought about by political realities. Since the era of the early four
Caliphs, al-Rashidun, there has been a gradual change in the ideal form of the
caliphate, especially in its elective nature which is regarded as one of its significant
features. Such transformations were a result of alterations in the Islamic society as
vast territories and diverse people came under the Islamic fold and the impact of other
cultures began to be felt among the Muslims. It is generally agreed that the first major
change was the transformation of the proper Prophetic manner of the caliphate (khilafa
'ala Minhaj al-nubuwwa) into monarchy, mulk, which was founded and promoted
by the Umayyads who were "kings" and not caliphs but in name only.2 In the analysis
of Ibn Khaldun, the alterations into monarchy, mulk, was a natural outcome of
'asabiyya (group feeling) which began to develop at that time as the Umayyads banded
together round Mu'awiya, and had he opposed them and had not claimed all the power
for himself and them, it would have meant the complete crumbling away of the Islamic
edifice which everyone had fought to uphold. Ibn Khaldun believes that the
designation of the caliphate to Yazid, the son of Mu'awiya was made for the same
reason.3 Yet, that change into mulk was not a total alteration in the functions and
1 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhaj al-Sunna, pp. 189 - 95.
2 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa, 35, pp. 18 - 20; Ibn Kathlr, al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya, p. 22.
3 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., 2, p. 604.
characteristics of the khilafa as the basic structures were preserved. That marked the
beginning of a gradual and slow process of change in which at first the characters of
khilafa and mulk were intermixed and finally absolute monarchy remained alone. Ibn
Khaldun observes:
"It has thus been shown how the form of rule came to be mulk.1
But inspite of that there remained the traits that are characteristic of the
caliphate, namely preference for Islam and its ways, and adherence to
the path of truth. A change became apparent only in the restraining
factor (wazi') that had been Islam and now came to be 'asbiyya and
the sword. That was the situation at the time ofMu'awiya, Marwan, his
son 'Abd al-Malik, and the first Abbasid caliphs down to al-Rashid and
some of his sons. Then the features of the caliphate were totally lost
and only its name remained and the rule is transformed into monarchy
pure and simple. Absoluteness reached its extreme accompanied by its
other outcomes such as coercion and gratification of desires and
pleasures."2
Mulk, which is basically political authority founded and built on force, is
originally not permissible, as Ibn Taymiyya states, and in fact it is the elective caliphate
which is required, unless there is inability to establish it.3 Moreover, it is an agreed
principle among Muslims, according to Ibn Hazm and others,4 that it is illegal to inherit
the office of the caliphate. However, the type of succession which is very similar to the
hereditary succession, is the one in which the caliphate is passed within the same
family such as the Umayyad or the Abbasid dynasty. Such way of succession has been
justified by the principle denoted by the term 'ahd. According to this rule, power is
designated by the reigning caliph to a successor who is in most cases a son or a
relative, though in theory he may be any other person. The origin of this way of
obtaining the caliphate is traced back to two historical precedents which are claimed to
have been approved by consensus, namely, the designation of 'Umar by Abu Bakr and
later, the appointment by 'Umar of a body of six persons for electing his successor.5
1 Cf. Ibid., 2, pp. 598 - 608.
2_Ibid., p. 608.
3 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa, 35, p. 22.
4 Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal, 4, p. 167 ; cf. Ibn Khaldun, 2, p. 614.
5 Al-MawardI, al-Ahkam, p. 10 ; Ibn Khaldun, op.cit-., 2, p.611.
Apparently, there is disagreement on the analysis of these precedents which has lead to
different conclusions. In the opinion of some jurists, which seems to be the only view
quoted by al-Farra' in his treatise al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, the choice of a successor
by the reigning caliph through 'ahd is regarded as a nomination, and power is invested
to him only by consent of the electorate body.1 On the other hand, al-Mawardi
mentions the above view but goes on to support that it is equally correct to choose and
invest power to a successor without any regard to the will of the electorate.2
However, after close examination of the historical account of the empowerment of both
'Umar and 'Uthman, which are taken as precedents for the principle of 'ahd, it can
hardly be said that they took place without any regard to the consultation and consent
of the electors.3 If this fact is established, it may reveal the weakness in the argument
of al-Mawardi.4 Nonetheless, mulk has always been at pains to legalize itself by the
principle of 'ahd, and has not fallen short of means to gain apparent approval of the
people to render a seeming legitimate bay'a. Coercion has become the basis of power
especially in the later stages of monarchy.5
Besides mulk there have also emerged a new situation after the middle of the
third century as a result of the use of force which is expressed later by the term imarat
al-istila' (emirate by seizure). Since the days of the Prophet and the Rashidun
Caliphs the rule over different occupied territories was invested to appointed
representatives. Such a provincial governor or administrator, who was commonly
called 'amil and later had come to to be known as amir,6 was generally allowed a high
degree of local autonomy under the authority of the caliph who appointed him, had full
1 Al-Farra', op. cit., pp. 25- 6.
2 Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, p. 10. Al-Juwayni seems to support this view. See his book al-
Ghiydthi, p. 139.
3 Cf. al-Bukhari, op. cit., IV, pp. 173-4.
4 Cf. al-Rayyis, op. cit., pp. 239 - 49 ; 'Arif Abu 'Id, Wazifat al-Hakim fi-al-Dawla al-
Isldmiyya (Kuwayt,1985), pp. 87 - 92 ; Kerr, op. cit., p. 33.
5 Cf.Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., 2, p. 608.
6 See 'Amil in £./.2; cf. W.M.Watt, Islamic Political Thought, (Edinburgh, 1968), p. 52.
control over him, and could depose him if he liked.1 However, that system of
administration began to break up under the Abbasids when the central power of the
caliphate had weakened. Powerful territorial amirs who possessed strong military force
had claimed a greater measure of independence especially with regards to succession
which they passed to members of their family. The caliphs were too weak to oppose
them and their authority had lessened to the recogition of their de facto rule over the
lands under them. The first dynasty to enjoy that right were the Aghlabids of Tunisia,
followed by the Tahirids in Khurasan, and after them there had emerged many other
dynasties who either had captured power by force or had originally been delegated
authority by the caliph. In all cases they had continued to rule in the name of the caliph
while in reality they had held all effective power in their hands.2
In the discussion of the new phenomenon by the political jurists it is given the
term imarat al-istila and is defined as that situation in which an amir captures a
territory by force and the caliph finds himself compelled to grant him recognition and
authorizes him sole control of policy and administration over the territory. Because the
caliph has no power to change the de facto state it has become necessary for him to
grant his approval. Moreover, this grant of recognition and authorization saves the
unity of the caliphate and the rights and the interests of the public. By the caliph's
permission the amir enjoys a lawful status and his rule becomes legitimate, while in
return he acknowledges the rights of the caliphate, show respect to it, and rule under
its name.3
On that basis many independent dynasties had emerged and the Abbasid
Caliphate was fragmented into various self-ruling kingdoms though the caliph was still
regarded as its nominal head. But his position had continued to weaken even in the
capital Baghdad itself where effective power had passed into the hands of the Turkish
1 For the powers and functions of a provicial amir see al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, pp. 30 -3.
2 B. Lewis, "The Abbasids", in E.I2.; Watt, Islamic Political Thought, pp. 99 - 101.
3 Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, pp.33-4; al-Farra', op. cit., pp.37-8; Ibn Jama'a, op. cit., p. 61 ;
Gibb, op. cit., pp. 162 163.
mercenaries employed by him. In the same manner, their authority was seized by
force but was granted recognition by the Caliph who was a mere puppet in their hands.
That development had culminated in the event in which a military commander of
Baghdad was granted the title of amir al-umara' (grand amir) to signify his supremacy
over his colleagues.1 By the year 334/945 the armies of the Buwayhids, a ruling
dynasty of the eastern provinces, entered Baghdad and assumed power marking a new
era in the decline of the Caliphate. In spite of the fact that they were Shi'ites, they had
continued for about one century to be the actual rulers of the central area of the
caliphate, while the caliph was decreased to a formal authority from which officially
they derived authorization.2 After the weakening of the Buwayhids, the Seljuqs
captured Baghdad and replaced them in their position in much the same way.
Afterwards, the Abbasids had never gained effective power, and after the Mongol
invasion they were installed under the Mamluks as caliphs in Cairo with even less
ceremonial duties.
One of the significant results of the new developments was the appearance of
the office of the sultanate. The word sultan in Arabic originally means a proof, an
evidence or an argument, but it is also used to denote competence and ability.3 These
are also the senses attached to the word in its different occurences in the Qur'an.4
From its meaning of competence it has been applied to refer to political power in the
early centuries of Islam and in that usage the caliph is called a sultan.5 Ibn Khaldun
mentions that a minister of Harun al-Rashld, namely Ja'far b. Yahya, had been
bestowed the title of sultan6 to indicate that he had been a leader of all ministerial
affairs like the modern office of prime minister. Later on, it had become common
1 B.Lewis, op. cit.; Watt, Islamic Political thought, op. cit., p. 100.
2 C. Cahin, "The Buwayhids" in E.I2.
3 Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab, 9, pp. 192-4; Lane, op. cit., p. 1407; Ibn Jama'a, op. cit.,
pp.73-4.
4 As an argument see for example the verses 7:71, 12:40, 21:21, 40:23; and as an ability see
55:33, 69:29.
5 J.H. Kramers, "Sultan" in E.I.1
6 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit.,2,p.669.
among the independent amirs of the provinces to adopt the title sultan mainly as a sign
of their autonomy. For the same reasons, the Turkish military commander of Baghdad
before the Buwayhids was given the title amir al-umara' when he had been elevated
to the most powerful position in the capital. However, the title of amir al- umara'
soon fell into disuse after the Buwayhids had entered Baghdad. Afterwards, sultan
had become the regular title of the usurpers of the authority of the caliph either in the
capital or in the provinces, and its official application had continued till it was also
assumed by the Ottomans.1
These new developments were reflected in political theory as early as al-
Mawardi who wrote during the time of the Buwayhids. In a brief remark about the
curtailment of liberty of the caliph he points out the case in which he is being
dominated by one one of his subordinates who claims all effective power to himself.
He states that, while the caliph is still regarded as being in office, the usurper is also
considered as a legitimate ruler as long as he shows signs of loyalty to the caliphate
and acts in conformity with the Shari'a? This line of thought seems to be followed by
succeeding political jurists who are inclined to recognize the status quo as no one is
able to change it, and attempted to save as much as possible of the Islamic
charateristics of government, especially the enforcement of the laws of the Shari'a?
However, it must be pointed that the view that actual competence and ability (shawka)
is regarded as the basis of authority, whether it has been acquired by consent or by
force, stands out as a significant conclusion.
1 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., 2, p.669; Arnold, op .tit., p.202.
2 Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, pp. 162-4.
3 Cf. al-Juwagni, op. tit., pp. 451 - 546 ; W. Montgomery Watt, "Authority in the Thought
of al-Ghazali", in Goerge Makdisi, la notion d'autoriteau Moyen Age, (Paris,1982) , pp. 57 - 8 ;





In the following chapters we shall review the emergence of the new attitudes of
the Muslim thinkers towards the problem of sovereignty. Such modern trends are
largely the product of the confrontation between the Muslim mind and the Western
civilization which has had a great impact on the developements of the way of thinking
and the way of life in the Muslim world during the late centuries. We shall also
consider to what extent the Western notions of sovereignty are absorbed into the body
of the modern Islamic political thought in which, for various factors, the whole
question of authority is raised once more. In the entirely different circumstances the
statements of the early scholars about rulership is expressed in a new language amongst
which the word sovereignty is in common use or new equivalents are derived to
denote its borrowed sense.
Owing to different natural and historical reasons, Turkey became the first
major Islamic area of the conflict between Islam and the West. Therefore, it is
normal to find the Ottoman Turks make the first attempts to address the problem of
sovereignty in the modern era and cast their opinions on it. The two other areas,
next to Turkey, which have become the scene of the struggle between the Islamic and
Western civilizations are India and Egypt. It seems appropriate, then, to review the
Turkish and Arab modern thought and the ideas in the Indian Sub-Continent.
I. The Ottoman State Tradition
The Ottoman state has emerged in the fourteenth century in the
aftermath of the invasion of the Mongol, the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate and the
breakdown of the Muslim World into indepedent kingdoms and sultanates.
Osman, the founder of the dynasty, was at first only a tribal leader ruling a small
principality in Anatolia. As a result of significant military achievements he was
confered the title of a bay by the Seljuk Sultan as a recognition of his
independent political authority.1 Later, the Ottomans gained supremacy over
vast territories which enabled them to assume not only the title of the sultan but also to
claim the inheritance of the caliphate after they had defeated the Mamluks in Egypt and
ended their state in 1517. It was claimed at that time that one of the descendants of the
Abbasids who continued to hold the caliphate nominally under the proctection of
the Mamulks transferred his rights to the Ottoman dynasty.2 However, whether the
Ottomans occupied the seat of the caliphate or the sultanate the fact remains that their
authority was pure monarchy. They rose to supremacy and continued to hold actual
power only on the basis of effective force. In fact, the remarkable military ability of
the Turks was the main reason behind their dominance of the Islamic World and
consequently the Ottoman state was in its conception and essence a military
institution.3 The Turks followed the shape of government which the former Islamic
sultanates took, especially that of the Seljuks and the Mamluks. In addition to these
influeces which include the effect of Islam, the Turkish tribal tradition also had a great
impact on the shape of their state.
i. The Sultan
At the top of the Ottoman hierarchy was the sultan who was commonly called
padishah by the Turks. The title of sultan, which had come to mean a head of state who
recognized no superior,4 and the title padishah, which denoted something like super
king or king of kings,5 might imply the notions of independence and supremacy which
were attached to the personality of the ruler who enjoyed almost absolute authority. The
people, like in other Muslim states, played no rule in the appointment of the sultan.
There was no election and his succession to the throne was determined by heredity.
One of the pecularities of the Ottomans in this regard was that a law was issued by
1 Muhammad Farid, Tarikh al-Dawla al-'aliyya al-'Uthmdniyya (Beruit, 1977), p.40.
2 Cf. Ibid., p. 76; Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey
(Cambridge, 1976), I, p.85.
3 Sir Harry Luke, The Making ofModern Turkey (London, 1936), p.20.
4 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago, 1988), p.53.
5 Ibid., p.57; Cf. El1, s.v. Padishah.
Mehmed the Conquror permitting the murder of the brothers of the new sultan on his
accession in order to safeguard the throne against their ambitions and revolt.1 The
slaughter of the brothers was carried out up to the end of the sixteenth century when it
was replaced by the confinement of all the princes to speacial appartments in the
palace.2 The sultanate had passed from father to son for thirteen generations from the
foundation of the sultanate to the beginning of the seventeenth century. A new law was
then proclaimed passing the succession to the eldest male in the royal family.3 In spite
of this fact, the sultans had maintained the traditional ceremony of allegiance, bay' a
which marked the formal acceptance of the people of the sultanate as a legitimate
authority. As a result of the actual conditions that had prevailed long before the
establishment of the Turkish sultanate that acceptance was not regarded as incompatible
with the Shari'a on the ground that the sultan possessed the de facto power, the
shawka.
ii. The Officials
Another feature of the Ottoman rulership was the employement of slaves in the
adminstration as well as in the army. This, indeed, was a common practice in Islamic
history since the Abbasid Caliph. However the slaves of the Ottoman sultans4 occupied
almost all the highest positions in the state and essentially formed the permanent central
army of the sultan.5 Such a system was advantageous to the sultan as it had ensured
the absolute loyalty of the civil and military officials to him because he was their ruler
as well as their master. However, as a result of the oppresive and absolute nature of
rule, each official in his relation with the people considered himself a mini-sultan.6
1 For the text of the Law see Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bown, Islamic Society and the
West, (Oxrofd, 1950), I, p. 36.
2 Ibid.,?. SI.
3 Ibid.,?. 37.
4 Those slaves were called in Turkish kapikullari (slaves of the Porte). Originally, they were
Christian children captured by governmental agents who were converted and trained through a speacial
system of recruitment. Cf.Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, I, pp.113-5; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-
Shinawi, At-Dawla al-'Uthmaniyya (Cairo,1980), I, pp. 120-8.
5 For full account see Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, I, pp.112-32; al-Shinawi, op.
cit., I, pp. 356-71; Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., I, pp. 39-87.
6 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Hull,1985),p.29.
At the apex of the offcials was the chief minister, called sadr-i azam by the
Ottomans and known as grand vizier in the West, who was delegated full authority and
considerable powers. In fact, he was defined in the state Law -code, kanunname, as
the absolute representative of the sultan. Beside the grand vizier there was a council
which was the most important central body in the Ottoman administration. The council
was referred to by the Persian term Diwan-i Humayan which means the sultanate or
the imperial council. The membership of the council consisted of the viziers, including
the governors of important provinces, the chiefs of the scribal and financial institutions,
the military commanders and the judicial chiefs (kazaskers) representing the religious
institution, the ulema. The work of the council was to discuss and determine the state
policy as well as carrying the functions of a high court and acting as a legislative body.
At first the cuoncil was chaired by the sultan himself, but later the grand vizier became
its head.1 Nevertheless, the council was not a limitation to the absolute powers of the
sultan. In fact, the council was but a tool to help the sultan rule effectively his vast land
and numerous subjects and was necessitated by the growing complexities of the state
functions. As the members of the council were officially appointed by the sultan, and
their decisions were subject to his approval, consequently, the council was just an
extension of the sultan and did not enjoy any administrive, judicial or legistative powers
of its own.2 However, whereas earlier the sultans maintained a true hand, gradually
they lost their authority and became puppets in the hands of various powers behind the
throne inside and outside the palace.3
iii. The Religious Institution
In principle, the authority of the Ottoman sultan was limited only by the Shari'a.
Indeed, the Ottoman state was Islammic in its character. The sultan was not only, in
1 For a full discussion of the Ottoman central administration, the foundation and development
of the grand vizierate, and the Imperial council see Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., I, pp. 107-36; Shaw,
History of the Ottoman Empire, I, pp. 24-5, 118-9; al-ShinawI, op. cit. , I, pp. 357-95.
2 al-Shinawi, op. cit^ pp. 391-5.
3 Ibid., I, p.471.
principle, subordinate to the Islamic revealed law, the Shari'a, but also derived the
legitamcy of his throne from it. One of his main functions was to maintain the
observance of Islamic ideals and traditions in the society. Under the circumstances of
the Ottoman era, he was the most powerful defender of Islam against Christian Europe
and of Sunnism against the Shah of Persia. The ulema, the religious intellectual elite,
were the machinery through which the state obtained its Islamic nature.1 They were the
muftis who interpreted the Shari'a, the judges who administered it in courts, the
teachers who taught it in schools and trained the ruling class in it including the sultan
himself, as well as being in its service in mosques as prayer leaders and public orators.
Accordingly, their role and their influence was great. Since very early, the Ottomans
formed a regular organization of the ulema and made the office of Shaykh-u-'l-Islam as
its head2 ranking him virtually equal with the grand vizier.3 The authority of shaykh-u-
'1-Islam consisted in his capacity to issue legal opinions (fatwas) on various public and
private affairs based on the Shari'a. It was true that these /arwas espically those
concerning political problems such as authorizing the deposition of a sultan or the
declaration of war,4 made of him an important figure in the Ottoman politics. Yet, he
had no real power as he had no competence to carry out his judgements. He was
dependent on the other holders of the power like the sultan, the grand vizier or the
military forces.5 Apparently, the strength of the office was mainly determined by the
personality of its holder. While there were times when it was filled by strong influential
characters , on many occasions it was a tool used by powerful politicians to legalize
their acts.6
1 For a full account of the Role of the Ulema see Gibb and Brown, op. cit., pp.81 - 178 ;
al-Shinawi, op. cit., I, pp. 396 - 470.
2 Cf. Michael M. Pixley, "The Developement and Role of Shaykh-u-'l-lslam in Early
Ottoman History", Journal of The American Oriental Society, 96 No. 1 (1976) pp. 89 - 90.
3 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit.,I, part II, p.86.
4 For examples of these (atwas see al-Shinawi, op. cit.,I, pp.411-4
5 Niazi Berkes, The Developement of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), p. 16.
6 al-Shinawi,op. cif.,I,p.414.
In the final analysis the whole Ottoman government structure appear to be
based on the power of the sword and whoever had effective control of it would be able
to manipulate it to fulfil his purposes. The sultan was the centre of the system and in his
person, though sometimes nominally, the whole state was structured. Islam was the
main source of the ideals of justice and order. However, eventually that traditional
scheme began to breakdown in the face of a great influence, that is to say , the impact
of Europe. It is time now to turn to study these new effects and the ideas of rulership
which they had stimulated.
EL The Impact of the West
From the sixteenth century there had been a constant decline of the Ottoman
Caliphate and a swift rise of Europe. Yet, the Ottomans continued to believe in their
supremacy and were not aware of the reality. They came to recognize that fact only after
successive military defeats which were mainly, because of the inadequacy of their
traditional military methods in the face of the modernized well equiped European
armies. A report written in the year 1717 and discussed by the government was a clear
sign of its realization of the necessity of change.1 In the year 1713 one of the earliest
books which dealt exclusively with the question of reform was printed and at the same
time presented to the sultan. The book, entitled Usui al-Hikam fi-Nizam al-Umam
(Rational Bases for the Politics of Nations) was written by Ibrahim Muteferrica the
founder of the Turkish printing press who was very keen on the adoption of European
techniques and ideas. The book is important for our present purpose as it potrayed the
first opinions on Western systems of rule. In it Ibrahim briefly asserted the significance
of a well-organized government, described the different forms of rule in other
countries, examined the role of the army and the new European military art, besides
discussing the uses of modern geographical and scientific knowledge. Following the
1 Berkes, op. cit., pp.31-32.
classification of government into the three forms, that is monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy, he gave a short account of each form. In monarchy, which was the system
of rule in most countries, "the people obey a just and a wise sovereign and follow his
opinions and measures in all of their affairs". In aristocracy "sovereignty is in the hands
of the dignitaries of the state and one among them is elected as head, but he is
dependent upon the rest in counsel and decision, lest he tend to deviate from the law of
justice. In the case of democracy, in which "sovereignty belongs to the people", he
referred to the Netherlands and England as examples and examined in more detail
parliaments and methods of representation. He concluded:
"All the wise men of the world agree that the people of Turkey
excel all other peoples in their nature of accepting rule and order. If they
learn the new military sciences and are able to apply them, no enemy can
ever withstand this state.1
i. Steps towards Westernization
The first practical steps towards reform took place in the era of Selim III (1789-
1807) by the establishment of new military units which adopted the Western methods
not only in training and armaments but also in uniform.2 But once that 'dose' of
westernization was injected it had widespread effects and began to destroy the whole
traditional system. According to the historian Toynbee, that was an ultimate
consequence for the simple reason that:
"...Any civilization, any way of life is an indivisible whole in
which all parts hang together and are independent. For example the
secret of the West superiority to the rest of the world in the art of war
from the seventeenth century onward is not to be found just in Western
weapons, drill, and military training. It is not even to be found in the
civilian technology that supplied the military equipment. It cannot be
understood without also taking into account the whole mind and soul of
the Western society of the day; and the truth is that the Western art of
war has always been one facet of the Western way of life. Hence, an
alien society that tried to acquire the art without attempting to live the life
was bound to fail to master the art."3
1 Berkes, op. cit. pp.42-5; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford,
1961),p.47 .
2 For the reforms made by Selim III see Berkes op. cit., pp.72-81, Shaw, History of
Ottoman Empire, I, pp. 260-7; Farid,op. cit., p. 179.
3 Arnold Toynbee, The World and the West (London, 1953),p.26.
Whether the statement of Toynbee is right or wrong is the theme of the
controversy which accompanied westernization in most of the Islamic world. In the
case of Turkey it seems to be true as the importation of the Western warcraft initiated a
countinuous progress towards the imitation of the West in all aspects, though it
naturally encountered with wide disapproval and suffered repeated hindrances. The
reforms of Selim III agitated a revolt against him in which he was deposed and latter
killed. His successor also met the same fate.1 During the revolt, however, an important
development took place. A document, called shar'i hujja, was written in order that the
sultan should be subjected to it to ensure his observance of the shari'a.2 Nevertheless,
the setback to the trend of reform was only temporary. In 1808, soon after the
accession of the sultan Mahmud II, the notables and provincial governors were invited
for the first time to a consultative assembly, (majlis mashura), which resulted in
signing a deed of fourty six articles known as Send-i-Itifak (Document of Agreement).
The document was a confirmation of loyalty to the sultan and support to the new
military reforms. Although there was an attempt in the document to restrict the power
of the sultan especially with regard to taxes, and to lay clear duties and rights on the
ruler and the ruled, yet the itifak was of insignificant effect as it was soon forgotten.3
ii. The Tanzimat
The most significant result of the itifak was that the reform movement resumed
its pace. A few decades later the trend of political change turned into a new stage during
the years known as the period of the Tanzimat (Reforms). The term was used for the
series of acts between approximately 1839 andl860 which shaped the state in a new
order.4 The most important developments were the decrees of 1839 and 1856 issued
1 See Farid, op. cit., pp.186, 190,194; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, I, pp.273-7.
- Berkes, op. cit., p.90.
3 Farid, op. cit., p.219;, Shaw, History, II, p.2; Berkes, op. cit. pp.90-7. Some writers
describe the document as a Magna Carta of the Ottomans, but that is only an exaggeration despite the
outside similiarities . Cf. Shaw, op. cit., II, p.3; Heper, op. cit., pp.37-9.
4 Tanzimat is the plural of tanzim which mean ordering. The nearest equivalent in English
may be Reforms. See Berkes, op. cit.,pp. 144-5.
by the sultan, taking into account that the latter edict was only a confirmation of the
provisions of the former whose implementation had for various factors been delayed.
The aim of the edict was to reorganize state affairs and secure in particular safety of life
and property and equality of rights amongst all the subjects.1
With regard to the structure of the government the edicts expanded the principle
of consultation (mashura). Various central and provincial councils were established
during the Tanzimat period which dealt entirely with legislation.2 The local councils
were to some extent representative and their members were selected from and by the
notables and the governmental officials. But all the members of the central councils
were appointed by the sultan and though they were assigned powers of legislation
through free discussions and majority vote, yet their decisions were to be ratified by
him to become formal laws.3 Therefore, those councils do not appear to be an
imitation of the Western parliamentarianism though their establishment were brought by
westernization-oriented intellegentsia.4
Undoubtedly, the Western element penetrated not only into their procedure, but
also appeared in their method of codification and more important, in their general
inclination towards secularism.5 Through them the westernizers monopolized power in
their hands and used it to open wider the door for modernization. In view of the fact
1 The texts of the edict are found in many places in Turkish, French, Arabic and English. See
Farid, op. cit., pp.254-60; Rodenic H Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876
(Princeton, 1963), p.38, n.62 and p.54, n.10.
2 See Stanford J.Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman
Reform Movement Before 1876", Int. J. ofMiddle East Stud., I, no.l (Jan 1970), 51-84; Idem., "The
Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: The Provincial Representative
Councials, 1839- 1876", Near Eastern Round Table, New York 1969?.
3 Berkes, op. cit.,p. 146.
4 The outstanding leaders of reform were Resid, Ali and Fuad who dominated the government
during the Tanzimat period and who were very favourable to westernization. See Shaw, History, II,
pp.58-64.
5 In 1840 a penal code was promulgated which was prepared by the Supreme Council. It
contained secular codes side by side with others taken from the sharia. In 1868 a pure secular penal code
was enacted based on the French Penal Code of 1810. A secular Commercial Code taken from the
French Code of 1807 was enacted in 1850 followed by the Code of Procedure of the Commercial courts
in 1861 and the Code of Maritime Commerce in 1863. Attempts were made to adopt the French Code
which had been translated into Turkish but failed. For Secularism of the Tanzimat see Berkes,
Development of Secularism, pp.155-200.
that the Shari'a continued to be the main source of legislation and that the origins of
those councils were found in the previous traditional institutions, it may be true to
describe them as being of a dual nature, one Western and the other traditional. In fact,
dualism was a common feature of most of the establishment of the Tanzimat period. "In
politics, in administration, in education, in intellectual life, two sets of institution, two
sets of ideas, two loyalties - one to the old and the other to the new - stood side by
side".1 These circumstances led to the appearance of a multi-standard trend.
Modernist thinkers who accepted Western elements of progress began to advance
arguments to justify them in the light of Islamic norms.2 For instance, Ubicini at the
middle of the century wrote that "all essentials of modem democracy" were to be found
in the Qur'an, and that the Shari'a "formally sets forth the sovereignty of the nation,
universal suffrage, the principal of election to all, even to the governing power, equality
between all members of the body politic...", and so on.3
iii. The Young Ottomans
This brings us to the most striking modernist ideas in which for the first time in
Turkey, and most probably in all the Muslim world, we find a definite and systematic
expression of the Western modem concept of sovereignty studied from an Islamic point
of view. Such ideas were originated by a small group of men known as the Young
Ottomans who dominated the Turkish political thought in the late Tanzimat period and
for few decades after. The Young Ottoman society was established in 1865 at a time of
a growing disapproval of the westernized secularism of the Tanzimat with the main
objective of introducing a constitution in Turkey as an important vehicle for bringing
reform. The Young Ottomans, who were for most of the time based in Paris and
London, were well acquainted with Western ideas of constitution, popular sovereignty
1 Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation (London,1959), p. 17.
2 Ahmed Davutoglu, "The Re-Emergence of Islamic Thought in Turkey - Intellectual
Transformation", Proceeding of the International Conference on Middle Eastern Studies
(Oxford, 1986), p.232.
3 J.H Abbdolonyme Ubicini, Letters on Turkey. Trans. Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I,
pp.57,132, quoted in Davison, op. cit., p.67.
and parliamentary rule which were gaining a steady strength in Europe. Owing to their
dissent from westernization after seeing the failure of the reforms of the Tanzimat, they
searched for a synthesis allowing borrowing from Europe without abandoning their
Islamic tradition. By and large, the thought of the Young Ottomans in being half
European and half Islamic represented an early pattern of modernism whose line of
development was reproduced elsewhere 4
One of the distinguished Young Ottoman intellectual was Namik Kemal
(1840-1880) whose views on popular sovereignty were the best exposition on the
theme.2 Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine them. The political ideas of Namik
Kemal were not expounded in any single treatise but appeared occasionally in a number
of articles in newspapers. There were various political principles for which he was
most concerned, but the sovereignty of the people seems to be a key concept in his
thought. He was vigorously opposed to absolute rule and strongly believed that a good
government should be based on the consent of the members of the community. He
stressed the fact that consent was the primary base of rule in Islam as the choice of an
imam was the right of the community. The community exercised its right through the
process of bay'a which constituted a contract between the ruler and the ruled.
According to that contract the ruler was in fact the servant of the people and not their
master. If the ruler did not fulfil his duties to serve the community, the community had
the right to depose him. He stated:
"There is no quality of the Padishah, which gives him the right
to govern men other than that which, under the name of bay'a, is
granted to him and with which the ministers are vested by way of
appointment. This is the connotation of the saying of the Prophet to the
effect that the masters of the tribe are your servants.
If the people of a country gather and pledge allegiance to a man
for the Sultanate or the Caliphate, this man becomes Sultan or Caliph.
1 A good study of the thought of the Young Ottomans is found in Serif Mardin, The Genesis
of Young Ottoman Thought (Princton,1962).
2 For the life and thought of Namik Kemal in Turkish sources see Berkes,The Development
of Secularism in Turkey, p.209 n.7. A brief account is found in Ibid.., pp. 209-13; Mardin, op. cit.x
pp. 283-336; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 137-42.
The Sultan or Caliph preceding him is invalidated, for the imamate is a
right of the community."1
That reasoning led him to the assumption that "the right of sovereignty belongs
to all".2 Accordingly, he viewed the government as a delegation of the community,
since it was impractical for all the people in their totality to perform governmental
duties. In his words:
"Since it is impossible that the community perform the tasks
which befall it... the appoinment of an Imam and the formation of
government is a necessity. This, on the other hand, is nothing other than
the delegation of certain individuals by society for the performance of
the above mentioned duties."3
"The 'government' or the 'state' is the name given to the way in
which this delegation of the power of the community is exercised. On
the other hand,the name 'community' is used for the whole of a
civilized society when one sets aside this delegation."4
Namik Kemal concidered that the main function of the government thus
delegated by the society was to preserve the natural rights with which each individual
was endowed. As he expressed:
"Every community can delegate command to a greater or lesser
degree, according to its needs and character. However, it is a precept of
reason that regardless of the time, the place, or the method used, the
government should choose the road which will least limit the freedom of
the individual."5
At this point an important question imposed itself. How could the government
determine the rights of the individuals and the limit imposed on their freedom in order
to maintain the right of other individuals? In his attempt to answer it, Namik Kemal
arrived at a considerably different concept of popular sovereignty from the one known
in the West. In his view, if the laws determining the definition and scope of the rights
of the individual were left to the individuals themselves the result would be anarchy as
each individual would claim absolute rights to himself. Nor could such laws be made
1 Namik Kemal, "Wa Shawirhum", Hurriyete, 20 July 1868. The translation of this and the
following are taken from Mardin, op. cit., pp. 283-336.
2 Ibid., p.l.
3 Ibid., p.l.
4 Namik Kemal, "Bazi Mulahazat", Ibret, no:27, 9 October 1872 in Mustafa Ozon, Namik
Kemal ve Ibnet Gazetesi (Ankara,1938),.p.132.
5 Kemal, "Wa Shawirhum", p.l.
by the will of the majority of the people as in such case the individual could be
deprived of his freedom or the majority could be tyrannical to the minority. Moreover,
Namik rejected that the source of Law could be the will of all the community, the
general will as termed by Rousseau. Such a conception appeared to him to be vague
and ambiguous. In criticizing it he believed that it was the myth of the general will that
made Europe one time regard it a crime whose penality was capital punishment to shout
"Long Live the King", and four months later the same punishment was applied to the
cry "Long Live the Emperor", and four years later any one who said "Long Live the
Republic" was to be sentenced to death.1 He wrote:
"In reality, sovereingty is not an abstract right which is attributed
to the totality of the people, it is the right of sovereignty which is
congenitally present in every man... The sovereignty of the people,
which consists in the idea that the source of power of the government is
the people, and which is called bay'a in the religious law, is not a
power that derives from the abstract meaning attached to the
conceptions such as the 'majority' or the 'people'. It is a right which
derives from the congenital independence with which every individual is
endowed at his creation, and follows from personal independence.
'Every one is the ruler of his own world'."2
Therefore, in order to preserve the freedom of the individual as well as fulfilling
the interest of the community as a whole there should be, he maintained, a source
outside popular sovereignty which would determine right and good (husn). In every
society there was invented "an absolute normative force for the protection of the
freedom".3 To the Muslims this force was the Shari'a,4 Again in an other occasion he
explained:
"When societies became larger, states and governments were
formed and it became necessary to enact a binding thread which would
elecit common opinion in matters of general administration for the
individuals who made up every civilized society. This binding thread is
the Shari'a which is the political Law serving to protect and govern the
members of society jointly and severally. Its intepretation is determined
1 Namik Kemal, "Hukuk-u-Umumiye", Ibret, 8 July 1872, in Ozon,op. cit.,p.97.
2 Ibid., p.97.
3 Namik Kemal, "Wa Shawirhum", p. 1.
4 Namik Kemal, Hukuk, in Ozon, op. cit., p.51.
by the assent of the community but its basis is natural Law. For us that
natural Law is the same divine justice as has been set by the Qur'an."1
In short, Namik Kemal conceived popular sovereignty and the will of the
community to work within the limits of the Shari'a. It would not determine the right or
create the law of justice, it could only maintain them. As he clearly expressed: 'justice
is only protected by the power of the majority". "This does not mean that justice exists
in what the majority prefer, or in what it regards as useful". "An unjust act is unjust
and unlawful even if it were sacnctioned and carried out by the whole population; still it
would be tyranny".2 Obviously, Kemal attached great importance to the Islamic law
and in that regard he was quite consistent with his original background. His
standpoint was shown further in his vigourous attack on the movement of legal
secularization that began in the Tanzimat. In furious remarks he questioned the benefits
of the new secular laws and courts of the Tanzimat. "Of what use have these been", he
wrote, "other than weakining the Mohammadan Shari'aV "Are these courts more
impartial than religous courts and are these laws more perfect than the precepts of the
Shari'a ?3
With respect to the form of government which would embody the sovereignty
of the people, Namik Kemal had the conviction that while Islam did not insist on a
particular form and that monarchy was a possible system which was ideal for Turkey,
yet the Islamic state was, in principle, "a kind of republic".4 He wrote:
"What does it mean to state that once the right of the people's
sovereignty has been affirmed, it should also be admitted that the
people can create a republic? Who can deny this right? That a republic
would cause our (Turkey's) downfall is a different matter which nobody
will deny, and this idea would not occur to anybody in our country, but
the right to create (such a system) has not elapsed, because of the mere
fact that it has not been used."5
1 Kemal, "Develit-i Aliyyeyi Bunlundugu Hal-i Hatarnaktan Halasin Esbabi", Hurriyete, 24
August 1868, p.2.
2 Kemal, Makalat-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye (Istanbul, 1911), quoted and translated in Berkes,
op. cit., pp.211-2.
3 Editorial, Hurriyete, 30 November 1868, p.3.
4 "Usui al-Mashura", Hurriyete, 14 September 1868, p.5.
5 Kemal, "Wa Shawirhum", p. 1.
If Namik Kemal did not favour a republican regime in Turkey, he suggested,
like most other liberals of his days even in Europe, a constitutional monarchy. As a
modernist, he was quite content that it was necessary for Turkey to import a
constitution and a parliamentary system from Europe and there was no need to develop
one of its own. He argued that a constitution and a parliament were not undesirable
innovation, bid'a. They were no more a bid'a than steamships.1 "As we are
commanded to receive all products of progress from any part of the world, there is no
need to return to the past, or to come to a halt in the present".2 Moreover, if the
imported system from the West was agreed upon by the consensus (ijma') of the
community (umma), it would not be a bid'a, but part of the shari'a.3 The only
problem that troubled Kemal was from which country should the constitution, which
would be suitable for Turkey, be imported. His view regarding this point was not so
clear. At one time he rejected the American and British systems because they were
impractical for Turkey and favoured the French.4 But at another time his choice
seemed to fall on London for he spoke highly of its parliament and criticised the Paris
Chamber under Napoleon 111.5 Following the French model he suggested three
organs; a council of state, Meclis-i Sura-yi Devlet, formed of appointed members to
draft the laws and supervise their administration, a popular council, Meclis-i Sura-yi
Ummet, with elected members to vote the laws and control the budget, and a senate
(.Meclis-i Ayan) composed of notables to ratify the laws and protect the constitution
and liberties.6
1 Davison, op. cit., p. 224.
2 Kemal, Makalat-l Siyasiye ve Edebiye, quoted in Berkes, Development of Secularism in
Turkey, p. 213.
3 Ibid, p.213.
4 Ibid., p.213; Mardin, op. cit., p.311.
5 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 141-2.
6 Mardin, op. cit., p.311; Davison, op. cit., p. 224; Lewis, Development of Secularism in
Turkey, p.213.
The elements of European influence in the thought of Namik Kemal was not
only his proposed constitution.1 His use of terms such as sovereignty (,hakimiyya),
the people (umma), freedom (huriyya), constitution (dustiir) and others, marked the
development of a new political terminology which was largely coined by the Turks.
Such terms, which were mainly a direct translation of European concepts, became the
common vehicles used by thinkers up to the present day to express Islamic political
ideas with more or less modified interpretations. With respect to sovereignty, Kemal's
emphasis on locating it with the people formed a major opinion among modern
Muslims. But there were notable differences between his concept of popular
sovereignty and that of the West. His sovereignty of the people had to work within tha
frame of the revealed law. Its main function was to maintain the laws of justice not to
create them.
Nevertheless, Kemal's popular sovereignty found a counter idea developed by a
rival named Ali Suavi who was contemporary with him and who belonged to the same
group, the Young Ottomans.2 Suavi argued against Kemal's attempts to establish that
the concept of popular sovereignty had always been part of Islamic political theory.
Suavi reasoned that the term was not only meaningless according to the political
theology of Islam, but also appeared to be fallacious from the point of view of the
European political philosophy.3 In his discussion he defended the opinion that
sovereignty, in its true sense, belonged only to God. It is noteworthy that the statement
that sovereignty is God's formed an important political belief held by leading Islamic
reform movements today. We find powerful expression of it made recently by a
number of intellectuals who most probably did not hear about Suavi's exposition. As a
matter of fact, Suavi appears to be the first Muslim to produce a modern statement of
the thesis of divine sovereignty in response to European theories. His ideas appeared
1 For the European origins of Kemal's ideas see Mardin, op. tit., pp. 332-6.
2 For his life and thought see Mardin, op. cit., pp.360-84.
3 Ibid., p. 366.
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in the year 1869 in a Turkish journal published by him in Paris in a short article entitled
al-Hakim Haw-Allah (Sovereign Powers is God's). He wrote:
tf
There exists a term which has gained considerable notoriety
nowdays, "popular sovereignty', as the expression goes. This term is a
translation from the French. Its original reads "seuverainete' du
peuple'. Now let us inquire into the meaning of these French words.
What does ^ souverainete' mean? This word is originally from Latin
"sprenos' which means "does what he desires', "sole master of himself
(hakim-i binnefs), absolute authority (amir-i mutlak), free in his
actions (ia'il-i mukhtar). Well, what is it in fact, that rules by itself and
has absolute power over things? Something which cannot be qualified
with any attribute other than that of Divinity. Thus, in this sense, there
does not exist a single human being who possesses "souverainete'."1
Man, in his opinion, was vested with a relative kind of sovereignty in the
sense that his freedom of action was regarded as long as he abided by the divine Law.
He argued that such a fact was implied in the statements of the Western philosophies in
which they acknowledged the existense of an overall organizing force which, according
to him, was only a poor substitute of God.2
iv. The Constitution Movement
However, the dualism of the modernist trend of the Young Ottomans was put to
the test by the promulgation of the constitution of 1876 and the election of a parliament
thereafter, in the first years of the reign of Abdul Hamidll.3 Namik Kemal, as a
leading theorizer of constitutionalism, was one of the authors of the constitution but its
practical implementation was accomplished by a successful statesman, Midhat Pasha.
The first Ottoman constitution, following the Western charters on which it was
modeled, contained a clear recognition of the location and rights of sovereignty.
Unsuprisingly, sovereignty was not attributed to God nor to the people: like most of
the librals of that age, the framers of the constitution favoured a constitutional monarch
1 Ulum, 1 August 1869, p. 18, quoted in Mardin,_op..cit1 p.376.
2 Ibid., p. 376.
3 A detailed account about the constitution of 1876 and the first Ottoman Parliament is found
in Robert Devereux, The First Ottomen Constitutional Period (Baltimore, 1963). A short summary
is found in Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 11, pp.174-86; Davison, op. cit., pp.358-408;
B.Lewis, "Dustur", E.IA, 11, pp.640-4. An English text of the constitution is provided in Suna Kili,
Turkish Constitutional Developments (Istanbul, 1971), pp. 150-9.
and they, therefore, vested sovereignty in the person of the Sultan. The constitution
declared that the Ottoman Sovereignty was included in the supreme caliphate of Islam
which belonged to the eldest member of the Dynasty of Osman (article 3). Article 4
recognized the Sultan as the protector of Islam under the title of supreme caliph and
added that he was the sovereign and padishah of all the Ottomans. Apparently, the
constitution equated sovereignty with the Islamic caliphate and the traditional Turkish
kingship. Unless that is assumed, the titles attributed to the Sultan will look an unusual
mix. Moreover, the person of the Sultan was considered to be sacred and he was
responsible to no one in his acts (article 5). The concept of the sacred nature of the
Sultan and responsibility of his acts had important implications and consequences since
it emphasized his absolute character.
Several other sections of the constitution reflected the absolute powers of the
Sultan. The provision dealing with his sovereign right placed in his hands sole
authority over almost all state affairs.1 The executive powers of the ministers,
including the Grand Vezier, depended entirely on the will of the Sultan since their
appointment and dismisal was his sole right and their acts became executory only on his
approval. The constitution did not give ministerial responsibility to the cabinet, nor
made the cabinet responsible to the Parliament. The Assembly could summon a
minister for explanations of his acts, but the minister was authorized either to appear in
person, send a delegate or even postpone indefinitely his reply. A minister, who was
accused by the chamber through a two-thirds majority vote could only be brought to
trial by virtue of an imperial irada. (See articles 27-40). The parliament created by the
1 Article 7 states: Among the sovereign rights of his Majesty the Sultan are the following
prerogatives: He makes and cancels the appointments of ministers; he confers the grades, functions,
insignia of his orders and confers investiture on the chiefs of the privileged provinces according to the
forms determined by the privileges granted to them; he has the coining of money; his name is
pronounced in the mosques during public prayers; he concludes Treaties with the Powers; he declares
war and makes peace; he commands both the land and sea forces; he directs military movements; he
carries out the provisions of the Shari'a (the Sacred Law) and the other laws; he sees to the
administration of public measures; he respites or commutes sentences pronounced by the Criminal
Courts; he summons and prorogues the General Assembley; he dissolves, if he deems it necessary, the
Chambers of deputies, provided he directs the election of new members.
constitution (articles 42-8) was not a real legislative organ and legislation was entirely
in the hands of the Sultan. The Parliament was composed of two chambers, a senate
(mejlis-i-ayan) whose members were appointed directly by the Sulatan, and a chamber
of Deputies (mejlis-i-mebusan) who were elected by a second ballot. Law bills which
the ministers reserved the exclusive right to iniate, had to be submitted first to the
chamber of Deputies and then to the chamber of Notables. Laws passed by the two
chambers had to be ratified by the Sultan. By such limitations the role of the parliament
was reduced to a consultative body, rather than a legislative organ. However, the real
power of the parliament was its control over finance and apparently neither the
government nor the sultan could override that control. (Articles 97-100).
In addition to those extensive powers placed in the hands of the Sultan, he was
given the right to declare a state of siege whenever he deemed necessary and to exile
anyone, who, according to police information, was suspected of being dangerous to the
security of the state (article 113). By virtue of this clause, the Sultan was given
arbitrary authority which he could constitutionaly use against any opposition.
In short, the constitution took the shape of an absolutist reform charter which
asserted the rights of the ruler and payed lip-service to the rights of the subjects. This
was contrary to the wishes of the constitutionalists whose main objective was to put
limitations on one-man rule. But, it must be realized that the constitution was granted
by the ruler himself and the constitutionalists were compelled to compromise lest the
constitution should not be promulgated. Abdul Hamid was not against
constitutionalism in principle, but he wanted a constitution which would suit his views
of reform. As a Western historian observed: "many Turks and Muslims felt, as Abdul
Hamid did, that under the veneer of Western liberalism, so much admired by Turkish
liberals, there was something anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic, which had nothing to do
with whether or not Turkey had a constitution".1 Abdul Hamid wanted to rescue and
1 Berkes, op. d/.,p.231.
strengthen the Ottoman state without parting with Turkish and Islamic tradition and
without any limitations of the powers of the sovereign as padishah and Khalifa.1 The
constitution gave him a legal base of his extensive powers which he used to opppose
the ideology of the Young Ottomans. On the basis of Article 113 of the constitution,
Midhat, the chief promoter of the constitution and a leading opponent of the Sulatan's
concept of his own role in the government, was exiled as a danger to the security of the
state.2 Other Young Ottomans, like Namik Kemal faced similar fate. Later on, the
Sultan dissolved the Parliament and suspended the constitution in 1878.3
Thereafter Abdul Hamid continued to rule autocratically for thirty years. He, in
collaboration with the Sufis and the 'Ulama', suppressed the Modernist views, which
were by and large, a synthesis of Islamic and Western ideas. But, the more the
suppression intensified, the more the modernist revolted against religion as an obstacle
in the way of progress, and the more they steadily took over to Western ideas. This
new trend towards total westernization crystalized in the movement known as the
Young Turks.4 Among them was the Committee of Union and progress who led the
political struggle against Abdul Hamid. It eventually succeeded in enforcing the Sultan
to reinstate the constitution of 1876 and elect a Parliament in 1908 and subsequently in
overthrowing him. To enable the revolution achieve its aims, a series of amendments
were made to the constitution. The amendments severely reduced the powers of the
Sultan and strengthened the parliament. Sovereignty continued to be vested in the
Ottoman sultan, but the parliament had the right to depose him if he did not fulfil his
obligation to respect both the Shari'a and the constitution. The collective responsibility
of the ministers, who were appointed by the grand vizier, was clearly stated and they
were made accountable to the parliament rather than to the sultan. The right to proclaim
1 Ibid., pp. 229-31, Davison, op. cit., p.403.; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 11, p.
212.
2 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 11, p. 180.
3 Ibid., p. 187.
4 See Earnest Edmondson Ramsaar, The Young Turks (Princeton, 1957) and feroz Ahmad,
The Young Turks (Oxford, 1969).
martial law was no longer in the hands of the Sultan, but it was given to the cabinet.
The dissolution of the parliament was made a more difficult process and its convening
each year was not subject to the will of the Sultan. Both the parliament and the cabinet
held equal rights to initiate legislation and the parliament had the full right to pass laws
even if the Sultan objected to them.1
In general, the constitution favoured a constitutional monarchy with a
powerful parliament. The Islamic nature of the state was preserved though in reality
the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress was strongly secularist.2
However, the Unionists, shortly after the reinstatement of the constitution, failed to
live up to their democratic ideals. In the face of external and internal crises, especially
the acute struggle between the political parties that emerged, the country ended with a
Unionist dictatorship. Several amendments were again made to reduce the role of the
parliament and increase the authority of the Sultan who was in effect controlled by the
Unionist.3 The policy of the Unionist put them under vigorous attack from both the
Islamists and the Westernizers. On the one hand they were criticized for being
secularists and not following the Shari'a. On the other hand, they were blamed for not
going far enough in destroying the old order and replacing it with European system.4
v. The Abolition of the Caliphate
The total collapse of the old regime was brought after the defeat of the Ottomans
in the first world war in 1918. Most of the Ottoman territories fell under European
occupation and the Allied force even entered Istanbul. During the events that followed
and the war of independence that broke out, the Turkish nationalists emerged as a
powerful force under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. In 1920 he established a new
government in Ankara and formed a new parliament under the name of Grand National
Assembly which consisted of some members of the last Ottoman parliament and
1 Shaw, History, pp.282-5.; Kili, op. cit., pp. 16-7.; Lewis, "Dustur", £./.2, II, p.643.
2 For modernization under the Young Turks see Shaw, History, pp. 305-10.
3 Lewis, "Dustur", El.2, 11, p.643.
4 Idem.,The Emergency of Modern Turkey, pp. 229-33.
representatives of the national resistance groups.1 With monopoly of power in his
hands, Kemal transformed Turkey into a secular nation state. The Grand National
Assembly passed a constitution, Law of Fundamental Organisations, in 1921 in which
the Western doctrine of popular sovereignty was fully accepted. The first article
declared that: "sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation". The system of
administration is based on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct
their own destinies. The Assembly was to elect the ministers and its chairman who
also was to be the chairman of the council of ministers. The Assembly was to be
elected every two years.2
To reconcile the new government with the existing Ottoman caliphate, the new
sultanate was separated and ended in 1922 leaving only spiritual religious authority to
the Ottoman caliph. In support of this kind of caliphate, Zia Gokalp, the theorizer of
Turkish nationalism , furnished a new explanation of the nature of caliphate in history.
He argued that the only function of the caliphate was to serve the religious life of the
Muslims. He wrote:
"The caliphacy has taken four forms in the history of Islam. As
these four types are each of a different nature, we shall call them by
different names. The primary function of the Rashidun caliphs was
caliphacy. Since there were no state organization at that time, these
Caliphs were invested with political authority or sovereignty in addition
to their original function. We call this type the "Caliph-Ruler' type.
The primary function of the Ummayad, Abbasid and Ottoman Caliphs,
on the other hand, was political rulership. They were invested with
caliphal authority in addition to their original political authority. We
shall call this type the "Ruler-Caliph' type. In Baghdad at the times of
the Seljukes and in Egypt during the reign of the Mamluk Sultans, the
caliphs were not only divested of any political authority, but also were
without any religious organization, which they needed to carry out their
religious functions. Because of the non-existence of a religious
organization, these caliphs failed to perform their religious function in
the real sense. We shall call this type "caliphacy without organization'.
Finally, the last type which is to be born now will be separate from
political sovereignty and will be in a position to fulfil its functions in a
1 Shaw, History, 11, p. 348.
2 Kili, op. cit., pp. 17-8.
true sense. We may call this type the v independent and organized
caliphacy'."1
Gokalp suggested a religious organization similar to the Christian Churchs of
the West in which the caliph would be more or less like the Pope. The smallest units
would be the mosques of the locality linked to the larger mosques which in each town
would be under a mufti. The muftis of each state would be under a great mufti, a
shaykh al-Islam. All the shu.yuk.h-al- Islam would be associated with the caliph.2
Thus, all the Islamic community, the Umma, comprising all nations would join the
caliphate while each nation would have its own independent political authority. In
other words, in order to give the caliphate a character compatible with the principle of
national popular sovereignty, the powers of the caliphate should be separate from
political authority and directed only to the pure spiritual sphere. However, more
significant than that was the argument contained in a semi-official document published
in 1923 which attempted to reject the caliphate and disassociate it with Islam. The
actual authors of this document were not known, but it is believed to have been
prepared by a Turkish committee of a group of religious lawyers set up by the ruling
party.3 The document, under the title The Caliphate and the Sovereignty of the
Nation,' claimed that the institution of the caliphate was originated to meet the political
and administrative needs of the Muslims, but not as a religious obligation. In fact, the
Qur'an and the Prophet traditions, the paper added , contained no details about
government affairs, and that was the reason for the crisis over the caliphate in early
times. The paper held that the legitimate caliphate was the one which was based on
free election by the people, as sovereignty belonged to all the Muslims. That Teal'
caliphate had lasted for a short period, and changed to a"fictitious' one established and
sustained by force. From this analysis, the report reached the conclusion that since the
1 Zia Gokalp, Hilafet ve Hakimiyet (Ankara, 1922), p.58; quoted and translated in Niyazi
Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (London,1959) pp.229-30.
2 Ibid., pp.228-9.
3 Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Itijahat al-Wataniyya fi-al-Adab al-Hadith (Birut,
1970/1389) p.68; Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (London, 1982), p. 55.
caliphate had become an unjust oppressive body the Muslims were free to choose the
form of government which would meet their needs in the present age. Thus, the report
ended, a National Assembly would be far better than a Sultanate.1
On the third of March 1924 the caliphate was abolished and the last Ottoman
Caliph was expelled from the country. The doctrine of unconditional sovereignty of the
nation was affirmed in the constitution of 1924.2 Turkey became the first state in the
Muslim world to be declared as a national secular Republic. Following that, swift
successive blows were struck at the position of Islam to disestablish it. These changes
included the closure of religious schools, the abolition of Sharl'a courts, the
implementation of European civil and penal Law, the change of the alphabet and
calendar, and the enforcement of the Western costumes of dress.
III. The Response of the Islamists
During the long and decisive encounter of the Turks with Western civilization,
the 'ulama' who were supposed to be the intellectual leaders of the Muslims, played on
the whole a negative and a defensive role. The Ottoman State was military in its nature
and it was established at a time when Islamic culture had begun to decline and the
scholars of Islam lacked in general productivity and originality. When the Ottoman
state began to decay and there was a need for reform, the 'ulama! were not only unable
to create improvements but put up a strong resistance to any change. The reformers
had no choice but to turn their face to the West. In the field of political thought, the
'ulama' were very conservative and showed little awareness of the weakness in the
traditional institutions. The caliphate in the shape it took in the late ages formed one of
their firm convictions. Because of their education which for a long time dealt only
with religious knowledge, they were ignorant of the new emerging European ideas. On
the other hand, the reformers developed a hostile attitude to all that was ancient and
1 Husayn, op. cit., 1, pp 68-73; Enayat, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
2 See Kili, op. cit., pp. 19-23.
traditional and were full of admiration for new Western institutions. However, both
parties were of purely imitative nature. The 'ulama' were looking to the past and the
westernizers were blind followers of the West. Both were wanting in creative mentality
which could promote a critical approach and an objective assessment of both the
traditional and Western ideas.
i. Sovereignty of the Ruler
After the failure of the westernizers' reforms of the Tanzimat, a group of
'ulama' began to awake to the reality of the intelectual stagnation of their conservative
class and the futile products of imitation of the West. The leading figure of this trend
was Ahmad Cevdet (1822-1895). Cevdet was educated in Islamic religious schools,
the madrasas, but due to his discontent with his traditional knowledge he went on to
study modern Western culture. His career was shaped further by his close contacts
with top statesmen which enabled him to become experienced in politics and
administration. He served in many important positions including ministerial offices in
education and justice and among his major works were the Ottoman history and the
Mecelle, which for the first time codified the Shari'a laws.1 Cevdet believed, as
Berkes remarked in the Development of Secularism in Turkey, that:
"...All the past reform efforts had been defeated by the
ignorance, superstitious, and corruption of the 'ulama' and the men of
government on one side, and by the blind imitativeness of the admirers
of the West on the other. It is clear from Cevdet's account.... that he
meant to say that success in renovating Turkey lay neither in stubborn
resistance to change, nor in automatic immitation of the West, but in the
intelligent revival of the traditional institutions by the infusion of
Western scientific and technological inventions."2
Cevdet criticised the Tanzimat for resulting only in copying Western
superficialities and for making no serious attempts to master the real methods which
caused European progress.3 The degeneration of the Ottoman system, in his view,
1 For sources on the life of Cevdet see Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 11, pp. 445-
66.
2 Berkes, p. 178.
3 Cevdet, Ma'rudat, quoted in Ahmad al-Shawabka, Harakat al-Jami'a al-lslamiyya
(Zarqa,1984) p.45.
was caused by the departure from Islamic traditions as well as it had not been adapted
to the needs of the time.1 His project of reform was "preparation for the future without
the destruction of the past".2 Therefore, he was concerned to preserve the old
institutions and improve them to meet the modern requirements. So, while he
introduced many new reforms in education and legal system, he opposed borrowing
French codes insisting that, "as our state was based upon the Shri'a, it should
therefore, be the basis of our laws and bye-laws".3 Besides, he supported Abdul
Hamid against the constitutionalists in their attempt to limit the sovereign rights of the
sultan.4
A similar line of thought was adopted in a book written by a Tunisian and an
Ottoman statesman, Khayr al-Dln Pasha (1822-1890),5 who set out in the introduction
his programme of reform of Muslim countries in general and the Ottoman state in
particular.6 Khayr al-DIn did not belong to the class of the 'ulama', but he believed
that reform could only be brought about by collaboration between the 'ulama' and the
politicians. He denounced the lack of involvement of the 'ulama' in politics as one of
the main causes of the weakening of the Muslim states.7 It was important, he
proposed, that the political system of Muslim states be based on justice and liberty, the
sources, in his analysis, of European power. Both justice and liberty, he added, were
well established Islamic principles.8 In order to achieve justice the state ought to be
organized by effective laws which should be supremely binding on both subjects and
rulers.9 As the Muslim community was bound by the Shari'a, Laws were to be drawn
1 Cevdet, Tarikh 1, p.40, quoted in Ahmed Darutoglu,"The Re-emergence of Islamic Thought
in Turkey", in BRISMES Proceedings (Oxford, 1986), p. 232.
2 Ibid.,p.232.
3 Quoted by Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 168..
4 See Ibid., pp.241-6.
5 For his biography see £./.2' s.v.
6 The book is written in Arabic under the title: Aqwam al-Masalik fi-Ma'rifat Ahwal al-
Mamalik (Istanbul, 1284 A.H.) and was translated linto Turkish. The greater part of the book was a
review of the political and econcomic conditions of th European countries of the time.
7 Ibid., p. 5.
8 Ibid.,pp.8-9.
9 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
from it.1 By liberty he meant the participation of the people in political affairs and
consultation with them about the welfare of the state. The sharing of people in
government in Europe was fulfiled by parliaments and in Islam by the counsel of the
notables in the state, ahl al-hall wa-al- 'aqd.2
Khayr al-Din was strongly opposed to despotism and he urged the Muslims to
control the powers of their rulers. Among the most important measures to achieve
that, in his view, were to observe the obligation to take counsel before acting, shura
and the obligation of the enlighted people in the society to supervise public acts.3
Further, he urged that the ministers should be granted a free hand to act, quoting in this
respect the Islamic precedent of unlimited ministerial authorization, tafwid. As to the
means and institutions required to meet the need for control over governmental
policies, he recommended the Muslims to adopt whatever was suitable and appropriate
to circumtances and time such as representative chambers and the press which fulfil
that function in Europe.4 However, he emphasized that political liberty should only be
given to those who had developed to a certain stage to benefit from it. Therefore, he
was against the claims of the Young Ottomans to establish a nationwide representative
chamber in Turkey because the country was not as yet ripe for it.5 To sum up, Khayr
al-Din, using the Islamic concept of shura, was only advocating supervision over the
sovereign rather than locating sovereignty with the people and making the ruler
responsible to them as Namik Kemal did.6 In that respect, he was close to the
traditional Turkish concept of sovereignty of the ruler.
1 Ibid., p.40.
21bid.,pp.14-5.
3 See a short account of his political ideas in Mardin, op. cit., pp.358-95.; Khaldun al-
Husary, Three Reformers (Beirut,1966),pp.33-53.
4 Ibid., pp.11-3.
5 Ibid., p.36.
6 Mardin, op. cit., p. 391.
ii. Sovereignty of the Shari'a
By the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman movement of reform reached
a croossroads. Lines of thinking were no longer confused and mixed but they began
to be clarified and differentiated. During the long controversies on political change and
cultural matters, a new school of thought emerged between the conflicting forces of
conservation and westernization. That school eventually came to be known as
Islamists. In place of the stubborn passive resistance of the traditionalists, the Islamists
fostered a new critical approach and a modem formulation and expression of Islamic
ideas in contrast to Western concepts. The political thought of the Islamist may be
illustrated best by a brief review of the opinions of two leading exponents: Sa'id Halim
and Mustafa Sabri.
The first, Prince Sa'id Halim Pasha (1863-1921), was the grandson of
Muhammad 'All of Eygpt. His ideas were exposed in different essays and probably
the most important one was the article entitled "The Reform of Muslim Society" which
he wrote in French just before his assassination while he was in exile in Rome.1
Confronted by the expansion of the process of secularising the Ottoman state based on
the Western doctrine of popular national sovereignty, Sa'id endeavoured to find out
what should be the Islamic political regime. Perhaps, he was the first to attempt to
express the Muslim belief of the obligation and the supremacy of the Shari'a in
modem terms. He coined the term " sovereignty of the Shari'a" in contrast with the
principle of national souvereignty which the secularists used to disestablish religion
from all state affairs. He wrote:
"The whole social framework of Islam rests upon the
fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the Shari'ah. Muslim
society is that which is subject to that sovereignty. Now, the Shari'ah
is the sum-total of the natural, ethical and social truths which the
Prophet in the name of the Creator revealed to us, and on which human
happiness depends. The principle of the sovereignty of the Shari'a is
the recognition of the fundamental truth that all existence, of whatever
1 The essay was translated into English by Muhammad Marmaduke Picthall and published in
Islamic Culture (Hyderabbad- Deccar, India), I, (Jan. 1927), pp.111-35.
nature it may be, is subject to the natural laws peculiar to it, and,
consequently, that the social existence of men is subject to natural social
laws just as their physical existence is subject to natural physical laws.
Thus Islam succeeded in establishing the principle that man is in no
way bound to submit to his neighbour's law, even though it be the
expression of the will of the most numerous group, because such law
must need to be arbitary to some extent, and owes obdience only to the
will of his Creator manifested in the natural laws."1
But, why was it that man was able to discover scientific laws in the natural
physical sphere by using his faculties of observation and reasoning, and was
incompetent in formulating the laws governing his social life so that he yet had to
depend on their being revealed to him by his Creator? Sa'id raised this question and
proceeded to state that the answer was furnished by the difference between the two
categories of laws. The physical sphere was a ground for objective study where man
possessed mental independence and impartiality which enabled him to reach true
conclusions. The social sphere was of a sentimantal and phychological nature, that is
to say, it was pre-eminently subjective. The study of social disciplines was always
marred by human infirmities and could only furnish uncertainties and defective guides.
That incapacity of man to discover social laws was manifested in the West where social
studies were far behind the high degree of knowledge of other natural sciences. Man
would never have known social laws if they had not been revealed to the Prophet in the
form of the Shari'a,2 Following those arguments, Sa'id concluded:
"In short, the social doctrine of Islam consists in teaching us that
natural human society - that which conforms to the natural ethical laws -
is that society which is built upon the principle of the absolute
sovereignty of the Shari'a. The cardinal point of this teaching is that
authority, the basis of order and stability in society, can only proceed
from an incontestable and uncontested source, the nature of this moral
supremacy of God Himself, since science is impotent to furnish such a
source. Islam teaches us, besides, that the happiest society is that which
best knows and best applies, not only the moral and social laws, but
also the physical laws - in other words, the society which can best obey
the totality of the Creator's will.3
1 Ibid., ppl 12-3.
2 Ibid.p.l 14.
3 Ibid., pp.114- 5.
After stating the meaning and justification for the principle of the sovereignty
of the Shari'ah, Sa'id made a strong criticism of the Western concept of national
sovereignty. He denounced Muslim "intellectuals" who were mislead by the material
power of the West to think that it was a miraculous result of its political ideas such as
the doctrine of national sovereignty. Therefore, that principle was adopted in some
Muslim countries and the Shari'a ceased to be the source of inspiration of its Muslim
rulers. He wrote:
"Now, that concept of omnipotent national sovereignty is as
false as all other concepts of sovereignty which preceded it in the West.
It rests on an imaginary right which the nation adjudges to itself on its
own authority and initiative, imitating thus its former masters, the
church and Royalty, which, each in turn, proclaimed, on their
authority, their own almighty, irresponsible and infallible sovereignty.
At the base of these sovereignties we find always the same principle:
force. The result is a constant struggle for power, in which social
hatred becomes poisonous and national strength is frittered away. Such
sovereignties are, therefore, mere prerogatives imposed by brute force.
They are not principles which of themselves command respect by the
prestige of their intrinsic moral value. They request usurpations - that
is to say, injustice. Moreover, that which people call the national will
is really but the will of the majority of the nation. It may conceivably
be that half of the nation plus one vote;that is to say, the will of a weak
majority in opposition to a very stong minority, a minority almost equal
to the majority. The principle of national sovereignty is therefore merely
the recognition of the right of the majority to impose its will on the
minority, a will which is law in all things, whose decisions are without
appeal; consequently, an absolute will, prevailing only by numerical
strength - supposing that it be not artificial, as it often is. Such a will
is, of all, the most unlikely to be inspired by truth and wisdom. When
we remember that, in past centuries, the same right belonged to a
minority, aristocratic or clerical, which failed not to abuse it at its will
and pleasure, we must agree that the sovereignty of the national will is
merely a revenge of the majority on the minority, a revenge which, in
its turn, will lead on to some new revenge as well deserved.1
Finally, Sa'id set down the outlines of the political system which would best be
suited to the Muslim social order based on the principle of the sovereignty of the
Shari'ah. He did not intend to frame a constitution, since no one constitution would
suit all Muslim peoples despite the many points they had in common. Besides, a
constitution had to take into account the needs, mentality and characteristics of the
1 Ibid.,pp. 115-6.
people for whom it was regulated. His object was to warn the Muslims of the
irreparable error of "adopting immitations of the political constitutions of the West,
and, along with them, the social and political principles of that portion of humanity".1
His political project consisted of establishing three independent, but closely united
institutions: executive power, controlling power and legislative power. Primarily,
authority in Muslim state would reside in one person, the chief of the state who should
be chosen by the nation. His main task was to regulate and harmonize the functions of
the various powers of the state and settle any differences between them. As head of
the executive power, he would delegate sufficient rights to his ministers to govern and
administer effectively.
Though the executive power should be free in its domain, the principle of the
sovereignty of the Sharl'a necessitated that the Muslim community should supervise
that its government was maintaining the supremacy of the Sharia. This could be
fulfilled by an assembly elected by the nation which would control the acts of the
government. But that national parliament would be a controlling, not a legislative
power. Since the right to legislate was simply a matter of competence, it should
belong to that class of specialists who possess deep knowledge of the Sharl'a and high
moral qualities. The legislative assembly, like the controlling Parliament, was to be
elected by the nation. However, the controlling assembly had no authority over the
executive to command it. It had only the right to criticise, urge and warn. In the event
of differences between the two, the chief of the state should intervene and act as an
arbitrator. The chief of the state himself was to be personally responsible both to the
representatives of the Sharia and the representatives of the nation who should provide
for a mechanism and procedure of extreme simplicity to depose him "when his faults,
his vices or shortcomings had rendered him insupportable".2
1 Ibid.,p.\33.
2 Ibid., pp. 128-133.
The second example of the new attitude of the Islamists is Mustafa Sabri (d.
1944) who was the last Shaykh al-Islam of Turkey. He began his political activities
and writings after the reinstatement of the constitution in 1908. But his most
significant contribution was made while he was in exile in Eygpt after Mustafa Kemal
abolished the khilafa and disestablished Islam in Turkey. In two books he launched a
vigorous attack on the Kemalists' basic achievement: secularism, abolition of the
caliphate and nationalism.1
His views were mainly concerned with criticism of secularism manifested in
the principle of separation between politics and religion. He did not involve himself
with a detailed clear exposition of what form the Islamic government should take in
modern times. Yet, it is significant that in his writtings he asserted the principle of the
supremacy of the revealed law, the Shari'a, to which he referred by coining the
expression hakimiyyat al-dln.2 He defined the caliphate simply as the government
maintaining the supremacy of the Shari'a.3 Therefore, religion could never be
separate from politics, unless the government ceased to be Islamic. As the
government was to be supreme over the society, religion was to be supreme over
politics and controlling the government. The relation of religion and politics in the
Ottoman state, he argued, was explained in the Turkish saying: bash Pasha baghli,
Pasha sheri'at baghli, which meant the head was tied down to the Pasha, and the
Pasha was tied down to the Shari'a,4 Moreover, Islam was not only confined to
spiritual affairs like other religions so that it could be separated from politics. Islam, in
fact, was a comprehensive way of life comprising religion, statehood, as well as being
1 His two books were written in Arabic under the following titles. The first is: Al-Naklr
'aid Mu.nk.rl al-Ni'ma min-al- Din wa-al-Khilafa wa-al-Umma (The Rejection of Those who Denied
the Gift of Religion, Caliphate and Community (Bairut,1924), which is reprinted and edited by
Mustafa Hilmi under the title al-Asrar al-Khafiyya wra Ilgha al- Khilafa al-'XJthmaniyya (secrets
behind the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate) (Cairo,1985). The second is Mawqif al-'Aql wa-al-
'Ilm wa-al-'Alam min Rab al-'Alamin wa-'Ibadih al-Mursalin.{The attitude of reasoning, science
and mankind towards the Lord of the Universe and his Prophets.)(Cairo,1950).
2 Sabri, al-Nakir, p.185..
3 Ibid., p.145.
4 Sabri, Mawqif, pp. 290-3..
a supra-nationality uniting different races.1 Sovereignty of law, according to Sabri,
was an important principle to safeguard justice and equality in any society. It was
necessary that no individual, no class, no party and no section of the society should be
above law. Law should be supreme and above all. But that supremacy of law would
not be real if law was man-made because the makers of law would necessarily be
unrestrained by it since they could easily change it. Supremacy of law would only be
true if law was made by God. In such a case God will be the the real sovereign,
hakim, and not any human being. Justice and equality would then be truly dominant
as all men would be on the same footing with regard to the law. On those grounds, S
abri affirmed, the right of legislation, tashrV, in Islam belonged only to God. It could
never be associated to anyone other than Him.2
1 Ibid., p. 295.
2 Sabri, Mawqif, pp. 341 - 5.
Chapter 5
MODERN EGYPTIAN THOUGHT
Owing to a number of factors, Egypt had taken over the leadership of Arabic
thought by the nineteenth century. On the one hand, Cairo had occupied an important
political position since the downfall of Baghdad. This, in particular strenghtened the
role of al-Azhar as a principlal seat of learning of Arabic language and the Islamic
sciences, attracting many scholars and students from Muslim countries. From the
Mamluks era up to the twentieth century, the influence of the 'ulama of al-Azhar in
the promotion of Islamic political ideas had been great in Egypt and other Arab Lands.
On the other hand, the impact of Egypt was also due to the fact that it was exposed to
Western culture much earlier and more intensively than the rest of the Arab World.
The penetration of European influences and their encounter with deep-rooted Islamic
ideas resulted in far reaching intellectual activities. Therefore, it is important to study
the ideological evolution that took place in Egypt and examine in its new structure for
any Islamic Arabic concepts of sovereignty.
I. Making of Modern Egypt
By and large, westernization in Egypt went along similar lines to the
development in Turkey except for the fact that the foreign pressure that stimulated
modernization was much greater on Egypt than on the Ottomans. In fact, Napoleon's
invasion of Egypt in 1798 marked the beginning of the process of westernization. The
Khedives who took power after the French were most of the time under foreign control
which culminated in British occupation of the country in 1882 and which continued to
be dominant even after the declaration of independence in 1922. But the
transformation of Eygpt from virtually a traditional Islamic sultanate into a modern
secular national state was not brought about only by foreign forces. Powerful
autocrats, like Muhammad 'All, Isma'il and Nasir, exerted much effort to drive the
country towards European ideals. As a result of the initiatives of those autocrats,
whether working independently or under foreign influences, the stage was set for the
emergence of an intellectual movement which developed justifications following or
accompanying the reforms of the politicians. However, there can be no question of
giving here a detailed review of the making of modern Eygpt. The purpose of this
study is to explore briefly the importation and application of the European idea of
sovereignty manifested in the notion of secular nation state and the principle of
popular rule.1 The aim of the survey is to set a background to the response of the
Islamic reformers and their endeavour in search of an Islamic theory of sovereignty.
i. The Role of The Rulers
The seeds of Western political thought, particularly secularism and popular
government, were planted by Napoleon in his brief occupation of Eygpt. He opened
the eyes of the Eygptians to the ideas of the French revolution which were secular and
anti-religious in nature. However, Napoleon, in his attitude towards Islam in Eygpt,
prefered to follow a policy "to tame religion not to oppose it".2 "We must lull
fanaticism to sleep before we can uproot it", he wrote to Kleber, his assistant.3 From
the beginning he set out to establish a local native body, the Diwan, composed of
Muslim notables to help him to control the country. Consultative councils were not a
novelty to Muslims, nevertheless, the establishment of the administrative diwan
system introduced to the Eygptians, for the first time the modern methods of
representative popular rule.4 Those early views of Europe might not have had the
effect they had if the subsequent Khedives of Eygpt had not turned their face to France
in their attempts to modernize the country. During the reign of Muhammad 'Alt
(1805-48), the cultural links with France were intensified and there was a massive
1 See for example: Muhammad Qutb, Waqi'una al-Mu'asir (Jeddah,1987) pp. 195-363; Nadar
Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge,196i).
2 J. C. Herold, Bonaparte in Eygpt (London, 1962), p. 182.
3 Correspondence de Napoleon, V, 574, quoted in //bz4.,p.l82.
4 For an account of the Diwan and its functions see for example 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i,
Tarikh al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya ft Misr (Cairo,1948), Volumes 1 and 11.
introduction of Western technology and statecraft and a wide transmission of ideas
through translations and writings.1 Further steps towards secularism and
representative government were taken by Khedive Isma'il.2 In 1866 he established an
elected council of Deputies, majlis shiird al- nuwwab, which was mainly of a
consultative nature to help him combat foreign intervention. However, foreign
pressure forced him in 1878 to delegate the executive power to a responsible cabinet,
majlis al-nuzzar, which was regarded the first modem ministerial council in Eygpt.
In the legal sphere his secular reforms were clearer. His Armenian Minister,
Nubar Pasha, founded in 1867 the mixed courts to adjudicate on disputes involving
foreigners in civil and commercial matters. A modified French law was applied in these
courts. This was a turning point in the judicial system of Eygpt. It marked the
beginning of the replacement of the Shari'a by secular laws which developed further in
one field after another. The year 1883 witnessed the establishment of the national
(ahli) courts which adopted French civil and penal code. Shari'a courts were confined
to disputes of personal status.3 The secularisation of Eygpt's judicial system resulted in
the creation of generations of jurists who took the West as the sole source of legal
ideas.
The developments in the constitutional sphere were more significant for the
further process of secularisation and the introduction of the principle of popular
sovereignty which inspired the later national movements. The first written constitution
was promulgated in 1882. From that time on different constitutional frameworks were
introduced, significantly those of 1913 and 1923. But the basic structure of
government was maintained without important change. At the top of the system was a
personal ruler who held all powers in his hands, namely a khedive during the sultanate
era, a king after independence, and a president when the army took over in 1952.
1 See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Eygpt in the reign ofMuhammad 'All (Cambridge, 1984).
2 For a documented account on Isma'il's reign, see 'Abd al-Rahman al Rafi'i, 'Asr Ismail
(The Age of Isma'il), 2 vols. (Cairo, 1937).
3 P. J . Vatikiotis, The History of Eygpt (London,1985) pp. 119-21, 297.
Legislative organs were elected though in most cases with restricted authority.1
Political parties had emerged at different periods especially before and after
independence, which generally had secular national attitudes. One of the first political
parties, was the National Party, al-hizb al-watani, which was established in 1907 by
Mustafa Kamil, the founder of the nationalist movement. Another important party was
the Wafd which was founded by Sa'ad Zaghlul, one of the most prominent popular
leaders who dominated the Eygptian political life in the first quarter of the twentieth
century. Both leaders, Mustafa and Sa'ad, were close to Western liberalism and
directed their talents to orientate the masses towards it.2 In short, these developments
resulted in the end in the total conversion of Eygpt into a secular nation sovereign state.
ii. The Effect of the Intellectuals
In the field of secular ideology the contribution of the Egyptians was purely
imitative. The Western ideas were borrowed without questioning or criticism. One of
the earliest pioneers who passed on the ideals of the French Revolution to the Egyptian
mind and left a lasting effect on it was Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-71).3 He was an
Azharite scholar who was sent as Imam to accompany the first mission of Egyptians
that went to study in Paris. His great role in the transmission of Western ideas can be
brought home to us by the fact that about two thousand books were translated from
French under his supervision.4 For our present purposes, two of his works are
relevant. The first book, Takhlls al-Ibriz fi-Talkhis Bariz,5 was an account of his
observations on various features of French life during his five-years stay in Paris. In
it, he wrote describing and admiring the political convictions and institutions of
1 Ibid., p. 297.
2 Ibid., pp. 227-8, 255-65.
3 For his biography see Salih Majdi, Hilyat al-Zaman bi-Manaqib Khadim al-Watan
(Cairo,1958). Accounts of his life and thought are found in Khaldun al-Husary, Three Reformers
(Beirut, 1966), pp. 11-32; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge, 1983), pp.
67-83.
4 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'I, 'Asr Muhammad 'All (Cairo,1947), p.414.
5 Reprinted in Muhammad 'Amara ed., al-A'mal al-Kamila Li-Rifa'a Raft al-Tahtawi
(Beirut, 1973)
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France, its constitution and the revolution of 1830. He was the first to acquaint the
Arabs with political ideas of the West including Rousseau's theory of popular
sovereignty and Montesquieu's concept of separation of powers. The book gained
much fame and its impact was stated by a Western historian of Egypt as follows:
"In describing the French constitution and the political
institutions of France generally, Rifa'a was in a way, introducing
Egyptian readers to the notion of secular authority, the concept of law
deriving from other than divine sources. Similarly, he was appraising
them of such ideas as political rights and liberty. He was the first
Egyptian to report fairly systematically and intelligently to his
compatriots on the general outlines of European political institutions,
the ideas of the Enlightment and the French Revolution which
underlined them. To this extent, Rifa'a inaugurated the interest of the
modern Egyptian in the liberal social and political ideas of Europe
which found their widest dissemination in the country during the first
two decades of the tweentieth century."1
In his other work, Manahij al-albab al-Misriyya fi-mabahij al-adab al-
'asriyya,2 Tahtawi stated his views on how Eygpt should develop. With respect to
his political ideas contained in the book, which concern us here, we find a striking
attempt to define political authority and its characteristics and functions which
underlay Western influences. To maintain order in any society, he wrote, there should
exist a central general governing power, quwa hakima, composed of three divisions;
namely the legislative, the judiciary and the executive. These three forces resided in one
person, a monarch, and therefore they composed one single power, that is to say, "the
monarchical power bound by laws". The office of the king was originally elective, but
became in most countries hereditary because elections brought about civil war and
disorder. Only matters of supreme and ultimate nature were to be settled by the king
who had to delegate some of his powers to other bodies like courts or councils. Yet,
his authority was unique and no one would have a share in it. Moreover, the king was
accountable to none but God. But, since kingdoms were established to observe the
1 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 114-5.
2 Reprinted in Muhammad 'Amara ed., al-A'mal al-Kdmila Li-Rifd'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi
(Beirut, 1973)
rights of the subjects and maintain among them equality, liberty and order by means of
stated laws, the king had to govern in accordance with these laws. In other words,
Tahtawi considered his monarch to have absolute power limited only by law. Laws
were to be made by legislative councils subject to the approval of the king.1 However,
Tahtawi did not favour secular laws to replace the Shari'a though he praised Khadive
Isma'il for assembling a legislative council2 and he had himself translated the
Napoleonic Code.3 Apparently, he was advocating the formulation of laws which
would meet the modern needs of the society by making use of foreign codes without
contradicting or undermining the Shari'a. His position was clearly demonstrated in
his attack on the adoption of European laws in the mixed tribunals arguing that the
Shari'a would not fail to meet justice if it had been properly applied.4 However, one
of his students, Qadri, who served as Minister of Justice for sometime, drafted the
secular laws for the Ahli, or National, courts which came into effect in 1883.5
Besides the impact of the French thought on Egypt there came the effect of the
British ideas which came as a direct result of the British occupation. One of the
outstanding intellectuals who was more directly influenced by British liberalism was
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1963).6 Though his writings consisted only of
newspaper articles published during the period from 1907 to 1914 while he was the
editor of al-Jarlda, the organ of the political party founded by him, yet he left a
permanent mark on Egypt's culture so much so that he came to be known by the title
The teacher of a generation', ustadh al-jll.1 During that formative period of modern
Egypt, he was most credited for his great boldness in advocating the imitation of
1 Ibid., pp. 516-22.
2 Ibid., p.497.
3 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 119.
4 Tahtawi, Manahij, pp.3 69-70.
5 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 119.
6 For his life, see Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Qissat Hayati (Cairo, 1962).
7 His articles were later collected and edited by Isma'il Mazhar and published under the titles:
al-Muntakhabat (Cairo,1937,1945); Safahat Matwiyya (Cairo,1946); Ta'ammulat (Cairo,1946).
Europe and its secular views. The following extract shows clearly his enthusiasm for
the importation from European civilisation:
"In our present situation and need to borrow from the civilization
of Europe in order to gain sources of power to be able to compete with
others in life, we must not destroy in ourselves the quality of useful
imitation by viewing it as a disgrace. On the contrary, it is necessary
for us to promote it further so that we will imitate the good examples in
every aspect and increase the number of those who follow them. Let us
imitate, for it may be possible that the copy will be like the original.
There is no reason to fear that copying others will demolish our
identity, simply because complete assimilation is impossible and
because all importations from Europe when they enter into Egypt will
be influenced and adapted to our linguistic, religious and moral ways."1
Paradoxically, the originality of Lutfi al-Sayyid's, contribution lay in
borrowing from the West. Among his most significant borrowed political ideas which
are related to this study are the concepts of nation(wmraa), sovereignty of the nation
(,sultat al-umma), freedom (huriyya) and secularism. The belief in Egyptian
nationalism was at the core of his political thinking. He understood nationalism in the
same way as it was defined in the West. The Egyptians were those who lived in the
land of Egypt and who were identified with many common characteristics like
complexion, language, race and history.2 As a fervent nationalist he believed only in
an Egyptian nation, and rejected the idea of an Islamic community, or of an Ottoman
nation or even of an Arab nation.3 In other words, he abandoned totally the Islamic
sense of umma which comprises all the Muslims. Instead, he used the word umma as
territorial entity giving it a meaning identical with the Western concept of nation.
Moreover, while the ties with outside Communities were denied, he incorporated into
Egyptian nationalism the ancient Pharaohs and the Copts, their descendants. Viewing
Eygptian history as an uninterrupted chain of events he stressed that "we are the
1 Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ta ammulat, pp.79-80.
2 al-Sayyid, Ta ammulat, p.61.
3 Ibid., pp.69-71.
Pharaohs of Egypt, the Arabs of Egypt, the Mamluks and Turks of Egypt - we are the
Egyptians".1
With that sense of nation in his mind he claimed that the nation possessed
natural rights, above them all sovereignty and freedom. In a number of Lutfi's articles
he mentioned the sovereignty of the nation, sultat al-umma, as an accepted rule
without undertaking the task of explaining it fully. In very general terms he meant by
it the right of the community to rule itself and judge what would in its best interests.2
Practically, that should necessitate the formation of a constitutional government
answerable to an elected assembly which would serve as necessary safeguard against
despotism.3 Time and again Lutfl attacked despotic rule and praised representative
government. In particular, he strongly opposed the theory of the benevolent despot, al-
mustabidd al-'adil, advocated by Muhammad 'Abduh, describing it as Utopian.
Intellectual stagnation was but one of the evils of despotism, while modern scientific
progress had only became possible under representative rule.4 Rarely, did Lutfl defend
his ideas by quoting religious arguments. Yet, with respect to sovereignty of the
nation, he claimed that it was decreed by the Prophet and that the Rashidun Caliphs
followed in his footsteps. It was only later, that the legists ifuqaha') justified
despotism for the benefit of the rulers.5
The other important natural right of the nation, according to Lutfl, was
freedom. He admitted that he had borrowed his conception of freedom from the
Liberals (al-Hurriyyun) of the West, particularly those of Britain and America.6
According to the liberal doctrine, from which Lutfl derived his views, the state was
considered to be a necessity and its control should be confined to a very limited area.
1 Ibid., p.61.
2 al-Sayyid, Safahat, p.30, idem., Ta' ammulat, p. 102.
3 al-Sayyid, Ta ammulat, p.96.
4 Ibid., pp.99-102.
5 al-Jarida, 10 Dec. 1912, quoted in Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian
National Image (Berkeley, 1972), p. 226.
6 al-Sayyid, al-Muntakhabat, p.95.
Lutfi mentioned only three functions to be carried out by the government, namely, to
maintain security by the police force, to administer justice and to defend the country
against attack. All spheres other than those should be left to the control of individuals
and independent organizations and the government should not intervene in them.1 In
other words, freedom should prevail in a wide spectrum of social action and
government interference should be an exception. In particular, Lutfi detailed certain
rights with which the authority should never interfere. These included freedom of
belief, education, ownership, expression, association and the like. Besides, he
stressed the importance of freedom of the judiciary meaning by that its independence
from legislative and executive powers.2
Perhaps, Lutfi was aware that the ultimate result of the adoption of Western
concepts of sovereignty of the nation and freedom would be to undermine the concept
of divinely sanctioned Islamic authority. In fact he aimed to liberate the Egyptians
from the so called traditional thought of their ancestors and open their minds to the new
ideas. He wrote:
"Our progress towards realizing our natural share in freedom is
impossible to achieve even if we possessed the greatest instruments of
brutal force and even if our number were many times what it is until
we liberate ourselves first from the curse of worshipping uncritically
thoughts and ideas on authority, and until we shatter with our own
hands the chains which have held our mind in bondage and the fantasies
which have prevented us from benefiting from the new ideals."3
These views revealed his secular attitudes which especially characterized his
political reforms. He believed that it was dangerous to make religion the basis for
political action. He was convinced that politics should be based on nationalism
(wataniyya) and common interest (al-manfa'a) and on nothing more.4 His
arguments provided the intellectual justifications for the constant development of Egypt
1 Ibid., p.65; al-Sayy id,Ta' ammulat p.87.
2 al-Sayyid, al-Muntakhabat, pp.71-90.
3 al-Sayyid, Ta ammulat, p.60, translated in Safran, op. cit., p.95.
4 al-Jarida, 1st. Sep. 1912, 4th May 1913, quoted in Wendell, op. cit., pp. 229-30.




The challenges of imported Western ideas contributed with other factors
towards the awakening of Islamic reform. In particular, much debate was generated
on the question of political authority and its real position in Islam. In general, the
writings that dealt with the problem of Islamic political power fall into two categories.
First, there were those pure academic researches which provided theoretical
investigations without being directly involved with political realities. Second, there
were the essays written by political activists and Islamic reformers whose ideas were
shaped by the changing political circumtances. For example, there was a flood of
political books in the aftermath of the downfall of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924.
That event also marked the beginning of a new phase in Islamic political thought in
Egypt. The Muslim thinkers before the abolition of the Caliphate still continued to pay
homage to their rulers and did not yet give up hope that they might initiate reforms.
Though there was an awareness of the despotic nature of their government, yet it was
argued that a despot could be just. When the evils of despotism were fully appreciated
and it was not possible to justify them any longer, a campaign began against autocratic
rule. By the end of the Caliphate, the focus was still on fighting despotism. The
writings of that period, in their attempt to reconstruct the theory of the Caliphate in the
face of modern challenges, contained clear emphasis on the Islamic principles that
could combat tyranny. To denote those principles, new expressions like sultat al-
umma or siyadat al-umma began to circulate which were direct translations of the
Western term sovereignty of the people. However, before long it was realized that
there was a greater danger than despotism against which Islamic reform should
struggle. It became clear that secularism was the new evil which had actually uprooted
the whole Islamic life including its political and legal authority. The focus now shifted
to stress the ultimate authority of Islam in all spheres involving politics and law. In
these circumtances, the doctrine of sovereignty of God, hakimiyyat Allah, began to
stand out. We shall now turn to look into these developments in greater detail.
i. Before the Fall of the Caliphate
Undoubtly, the two outstanding figures in the Islamic reform in the period
from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the first quarter of the twentieth
century were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) and his disciple Muhammad 'Abduh
(1849-1905). As for al-Afghani, despite his fame, he was a mysterious character and
his actions and opinions were surrounded by controversy. Apparently, his political
objectives were dominated by one major factor, that is to say, the expansion of
European powers into the Islamic world. He strove all his life to unite the Muslims to
defend themselves and was regarded as a leader of Pan-Islamism. Yet, his plan of how
to achieve unity or how to liberate the Muslim countries was vague. At one time, he
believed in bringing the Muslims under the strongest ruler of the time, the Ottoman
Caliph.1 His centre of attention being this, he spent his life in search for a Muslim
ruler to cooperate with, and, therefore, he never questioned the ideal form of Islamic
government. He contented himself to work with any monarch, though sometimes he
made indefinite calls to curb the despotic powers of the Muslim rulers.2
Muhammad 'Abduh collaborated with his master for a short period in pursuit
of his political objectives. Later, when he returned from exile which had been brought
about for alleged links with 'Urabi revolution, he became discontented with political
struggle and confined his reforms to educational and judicial matters. Even, his
writings in his early political career contains general observations about constitutional
issues and did not mount to a systematic structure.3 He spoke of shura and approved
1 See details of his project of unity which he had presented to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid in
Muhammad al-Makhdumi, Khtatrat Jamal al-Dln al-Afghani (Beirut,1933) pp.237-9.
2 See al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, 3rd.ed. (Beirut,1933).
3 Cf. Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform (Cambridge,1966), pp.146-52.
of establishing consultative councils on the Western model.1 However, his inclinations
for limiting the powers of the ruler seemed to have changed since he advocated the idea
of the benevolent dictator which won wide fame. He wrote an article under the title
'innama yanhad bi-al-sharq mustabidd 'add! (only a just despot will develop the
East) in which he pleaded for a benevolent autocracy that could in fifteen years lead
the country to a level of advancement that could not be reached in fifteen centuries.
However, he also suggested that his dictator introduce gradually representative
councils and freedom whenever the people reached a certain level of civilization.2
It is suprising, presumably, that 'Abduh with his Azherite beckground did not
say anything in protest against the replacement of the Sharl'a by French secular codes
in national courts. He wrote articles objecting to the use of any language other than
Arabic in these courts,3 but nothing more. It is not only true that he did not deplore
secular legal changes, but many of his fatwas paved the way for the Muslims to live in
compliance with them. See for example his fatwa concerning allowing working as a
judge in secular courts.4 It is also necessary to mention that 'Abduh was regarded as a
pioneer of modernism in Arabic thought. Albert Hourani described him as follows:
"He carried farther a process of identifying certain traditional
concepts of Islamic thought with the dominant ideas ofmodem Europe.
In this line of thought, maslaha gradually turns into utility, shura into
parlimentary democracy, ijma' into public opinion; Islam itself become
identical with civilization and activity, the norms of nineteenth century
social thought. It was, of course, easy in this way to distort if not
destroy the precise meaning of Islamic concepts, to lose that which
distinguished Islam from other religions and even from non-religious
humanism."5
In that way, 'Abduh's essential theme was to bridge the gulf between Islam
and modern life and he ended in modernizing the forms of education of al-Azhar and
the procedures of the Sharl'a courts. In short, he did not address the question of the
1 See Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tdrikh al-Ustadh al-Imam (Cairo,1344 A.H.) pp.197-200.
2 Ibid., pp. 390-1.
3 Ibid.,pp. 365- 9.
4 Cf. al-Manar, IV, No.17,pp. 262-5.
5 Hourani, op. cit., p. 144.
source of political authority in Islamic society. However, there was a significant
attempt to examine the nature of Islamic political power which happened in the
academic field. It was a doctoral thesis prepared in Paris in 1917 by Ahmed Sakka.1
In it, he claimed that there was a distinction in Islamic law between sovereignty and
power. For sovereignty he used the Arabic word rububiyya and for power the term
wildya. Sovereignty or supreme unlimited power was attributed to God the Master of
all people and things. One aspect of His sovereignty was the right to declare what was
lawful and what was not. The Qur'an and its complement the Sunna were the
expression of God's sovereign will and by them men should be governed. However
for the enforcement of these divine laws God had instituted "general wildya'. In other
words, pure sovereignty, Sakka explained, in its full sense was made up of two
elements: a will and an implementation of what was willed. It was the latter element
which constituted the essence of general wildya. It was wrong to understand genaral
wildya as implying absolute power and consequently make it coincide with the notion
of sovereignty. If legitimately exercised, it was undoubtedly limited by its own
function which was essentially to maintain social order in the way prescribed by the
sovereign will of God. In this way, Islamic political power or general wildya was of a
complex character. It was both divine and temporal. Divine because of its origin and
temporal for its social function. In conclusion he stressed that within the sphere of
human relations, it was therefore not a matter of sovereignty in the absolute sense.
The proper legal term was wildya. It was possible to use in a loose way the word
sovereignty, but it should be taken to mean wildya.2 By those words, Sakka attempted
to summarize the uses and misuses of the word sovereignty in an Islamic context
before it became a matter of debate in Egypt.
1 Ahmed Sakka, De La Souverainete dans Le Droit Puplic Musulman Sunnite
(Paris,1917).
2 Ibid., pp. 19-21.
ii. Crisis Over the Caliphate
The attitude of the Muslims in the Arab world towards the Ottoman Caliphate
before the fall was one of recognition and reverence for an office which, in their eyes,
was regarded as sacred. However, there were occasions when opposition was spelled
out. Such antagonistic trend was fully expounded in two books by a known Syrian,
'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi( 1849-1903).1 The first book was a strong attack on
despotism as the origin of many evils and an obstacle to progress. The second book
contained the ideas of an imaginary secret society, which would work to transfer the
caliphate to a descendant of Quraysh based in Mecca.2 But the caliphate in his scheme
was to be of a pure spiritual authority similar to the government of the Church.3
Considering Western influence on his thought, it was not suprising to find his ideas
close to those of a contemporary Christian Syrian.4
Nonetheless, the events which took place in Turkey and led to the abolition of
the Caliphate caused quite a stir in Egypt. Under their impact a wave of intellectual
activity was created and a number of essays appeared arguing for or against the
caliphate. The drift of support for abolition culminated in the appearance in 1925 of a
book entitled al-Isldm wa-Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Origins of Government)
advocating the complete divorce of Islam and politics. The author was 'All 'Abd al-
Raziq, an Azharite who was at that time a judge at a SharVa court. Being one of the
'ulama', 'All used Islamic sources and history to defend his views. He, unlike other
secularists, did not draw his arguments from Western thought in which the idea of
separation of religion and politics was deep rooted. His attempt was the first to defend
secularism on religious grounds.
1 For his life and thought, see Khaldun al-Husary, Three Reformers (Beirut,1966), pp.55-
112; Muhammad 'Amara (ed.), al-A'amal al-Kamila li-'Abd al-Rahmdn al-Kawakibi (Cairo, 1970),
introduction.
2 The titles of the books, respectively, are Tabai' al-Istibdad (Features of Despotism) and
Umm al-Qura . Anonymous prints of them appeared in Cairo in 1900. New edition are found in
'Amara, al-A'mal al- Kamila.
3 al-Kawakibi, Umm al-Qura , pp. 364-5.
4 Najib 'Azur similarly advocated an Arab Caliphate with pure spiritual authority.Cf. Enayat,
op. cit., p. 57.
The book was received with severe opposition and it aroused considerable
agitation. One of its consequences was that it transferred the debate on the Caliphate
from Turkey to Egypt. Firstly, 'All claimed that the caliphate as a special form of
government had nothing to do with Islam and there was no religious obligation to
establish it. Any form of government and any kind of authority could serve its
purpose whether it was individual, autocratic, democratic or socialistic. He wrote:
"We have no need for this caliphate, neither in the affairs of our
religious life, nor in those of our civil life. For the caliphate has always
been, and continues to be, a misfortune to Islam and Muslims and the
source of evil and corruption."1
'All did not only reject the caliphate but had gone further than that. The core of
his thesis was a basic assumption that Islam was purely spiritual religion which had no
relation with political authority, functions of government and all other worldly affairs.
He wrote:
"The truth is that this abusive conception of a caliphate imbued
with ambition, fear, spleandour and force is quite alien to Islam. The
caliphate has nothing to do with the divine project, and for that matter
neither does the administration of justice and the other functions of
government and the state. These are specific political projects with
which religion has no concern. Islam has neither recognized,
condemned nor forbidden them, leaving us to make up our minds on
the bases of reason, the experience of nations and the rules of politics.
Similarly religion has nothing to do with the administration of the
Muslim armies, civic amenities, or other municipal projects. These are
all matters of common sense and experimentation drawing on
established ground rules and expert opinion. There is nothing in
religion which forbids Muslims to compete with other nations in the
social and political sciences. Nothing debars them from overthrowing
the decrepit form of organization which has so humiliated them ever
since they adopted it. Muslims are free to establish rules of kingship
and government fully in keeping with the most recent achievements of
the human spirit, and with that which the experience of nations has
shown to be the most advantageous in terms of the principles of sound
government."2
1 'All 'Abd al-Raziq, al-Islam wa-usul al-Hukm (Cairo,1925), p.38.
2 'Alf, op. cit., pp.100-3. Extracts translated by Michael Pallis in Anauar Abdel- Malik,
Contemporary Arab Political Thought (London, 1983) p.43.
His attempts to furnish proofs for the disassociation of religion from politics led
him to conclusions which his critics found extremely unsatisfactory.1 Starting from the
Prophet he claimed that his apostolic function was purely religious and his leadership
was entirely spiritual. He possessed neither kingly rule nor government and he was
not charged with the task of founding a kingdom in the political sense.2 But what
about the Prophet's activities such as judicial, administrative and military actions which
could only be described as political? The author simply denied such activities on the
ground that the traditions did not reveal to us a clear picture of the judicial system of
the Prophet if there was any. In his view, his administrative acts were reported on few
occasions and were meant for temporary purposes. Even jihad was not part of his
mission but he was forced to wage war.3 His critics found such statements clearly
contrary to the facts of history and easily refuted them by quoting the numerous
recorded actions of the Prophet which could only be interpreted as political activities.4
When he discussed the beginning of the establishment of the caliphate by Abu
Bakr, he maintained that it was but a monarchy founded to keep order by the power of
the sword. Abu Bakr was thought of as the successor of the Prophet only to save the
unity of the Arabs in the face of the revolt against his political authority. This lead to
the false conception that the caliphate was a religious institution which was emphasized
by later kings to make their subjects obey them.5 These arguments were strongly
opposed. For example, al-Rayyis believed that the proofs provided by the jurists to
support the setting up of the caliphate were overlooked by 'All. Political theorists had
clearly based the caliphate on the evidence of consensus, ijmd'. The inconsistency of
1 Among his early critics was the Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Bakhit in his book Haqlqat
al-Islam wa-Usul al-Hukm (Cairo, 1925). One of the latest books was Muhammad Diya' al-Din al-
Rayyis, al-Islam wa-al-Khilafa fi-al-'Asr al-Hadith (Cairo, 1973).
2 'All, op. cit., p. 64; C. C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London. 1933), p.
264.
3 'Ali, op. cit., pp. 56, 80.
4 See al-Rayyis, al-Islam wa al-Khilafa, pp.230-50; Muhammad Fathi 'Uthman, Min Usui
al-Filcr al-Siyasi al-Islami (Beirut, 1979) pp. 52-3.
5 'All, op. cit.,pp. 92-102.
'All, said al- Rayyis, was amazing as he himself had written a book on the authenticity
of consensus as a source of jurisprudence and stated in it that the caliphate was based
on that origin. Though the consensus was sufficient as an evidence, continued al-
Rayyis, the support of the obligation of the caliphate was found in the Qur'an and the
traditions.1
As for the advocacy of the caliphate and its revival in the modern age it is
sufficient for our purposes to consider an important treatise which had appeared
shortly after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and was written in response to it. The
author of the book was Muhammad Rashid Rida, a leading disciple of 'Abduh,2 and
its title was al-Khilafa, aw al-Imama al-'Uzma (The Caliphate, or the Supreme
Imamate).3 The book furnished a vivid example of the stress laid on the role of the
community in relation to its ruler which was reflected upon the vigorous attack on
despotism prompted by all religious and secular schools of thought at that time. The
central position attached to the community was denoted in the book by the expression
sultat al-umma which meant sovereignty of the community. It is our aim here to
examine Rida's usage of this expression as an illustration of the connotations assigned
to it by the Islamists and draw a comparison between it and the Western concept of
sovereignty of the nation.4
Rida had indicated clearly that he was using the term sultat al-umma,
sovereignty of the community, in the sense applied to it in modern politics.5 Then he
set out to verify that the Islamic employment of the principle of sovereignty of the
1 al-Rayyis, al-Islam wa-al-Khilafa, pp.208-10, 214-6.
2 Accounts of his life and thought are found in numerous works. See for example Shakib
Arslan, al-Sayyid Rashid Rida. aw Ikha Arba'in Sana (Damascus, 1937) and Kerr, op. cit., pp. 153-
208.
3 Cairo, 1923. The book was a collection of a series of articles published in the periodical al-
Manar volumes XXIII and XXIV. A new print was published in Cairo, 1988. The following page
references are to the new print.
4 For attempts to emphasize the rights of the community in Islam expressed in the principle
sultat al-umma see also 'Abd al-Razaq al-Sanhoury, le Califat (Paris,1926) and 'Abd al-Wahab
Khallaf, al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya (Cairo,1350 A.H., reprinted 1987), . Sanhoury claimed in his thesis
that Islam had known the doctrine of sovereignty of the people before Rousseau had formulated it in
his Social Contract.
5 Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Qur'dn (Cairo,1328),V,p.183.
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community surpassed its modern application in the West. His views are best
summarised in the following extract from his introduction to his book al-Kh.ila.fa:
"Islam is a spiritual guidance as well as a social and a civil
system. As for the latter, Islam has founded its basis and fundamentals
and entitled the Muslim community to make its own judgements and
ijtihad concerning its detail since these change with times and places
and develop with advancements in civilization and in scientific
disciplines. Among these fundamentals is that the community
possesses sovereignty, its affairs are decided through consultation
shura, its government is like a republic and its ruler, who is in place of
its Prophet, is only an executive enforcing the Shari'a laws and the
community opinion without himself being above the law but equal to
any other subject. Moreover the government is administering religious
affairs and temporal interests, combining moral virtues and material
benefits and pursuing the universalization of human brotherhood by
uniting the different nations inwardly and outwardly. But, when the
Muslims became weak they failed to attain these fundamentals and to
practice these ideals. Had they established them they would have set up
applications of them suitable for the requirements of any age."1
His arguments for the sovereignty of the community were drawn heavily from
Islamic sources and history. He based his conviction on three grounds, the idea of
shura (consultation), the doctrine of ijma' (consensus) and the the concept of iilu al-
amr (possessors of the right of command) concluding that these Islamic principles
clearly indicated that sovereignty belonged to the community. As for shura he stressed
its importance as a base of Islamic government. The Qur'an directed the Prophet, in
place of him the ruler, to consult the community in general affairs. More significant
the community itself was described as taking heed of shura in their decision making
process. As such the shura became a foundation of rule and Rida showed how it was
exercised during the era of the Prophet and the Rashidun by quoting numerous
historical incidents. When the Ummayads took over power they abolished shurd and
established their dominion over the community by force. Since then the Muslim rulers
assigned to themselves autocratic power so much so that Islam was mistakenly
considered to approve of despotism. The truth of the matter was that the corruption of
the caliphate was essentially a result of its deviation from Islamic principles such as
1 Rida, al-Khilafa, p.9.
shura.1 The other mark of the authority of the community, Rida maintained, was the
binding nature of a decision reached through consensus. He quoted in this respect the
assertion of the Prophet that all the members of the community would not be
completely unanimous in an error of judgement. Following al-Tabari, he defined the
term jama 'a (community) as to be identical to a body politic. If the people reached an
agreement to choose a ruler and be under his single government, they would thereupon
forma jama 'a whose decision would be enforced on all. Such obligatory nature of a
political resolution was a vivid aspect of the sovereignty of the community.2
As for the concept of ulu al-amr (holders of the right of command) he payed
more attention to it and dwelt on it in demonstrating his idea of sovereignty. The
Qur'an had evidently stated that obedience should be rendered to God, his Messenger
and ulu al-amr? In answer to the question who were ulu al-amr, Rida, accepted al-
Razi's view that they were ahl al-'aqd wa-al-hall (the people who bind and loose) to
whom was attributed the power of election and deposition of the ruler, consultation in
governmental decisions, and definition of the law. He further supported this view by
quoting another occurance of ulu. al-amr in the Qur'an which reads: "when they hear
any rumour about safety or fear they at once spread it; whereas if they reported it to the
Messenger and to ulu al-amr they would properly investigate it.4 To him, this was a
clear indication that ulu al-amr were those whose authority included the determination
of strategic issues of war and peace. Besides, Rida once more referred to al-Razi who
explicitly mentioned that sovereignty or right of leadership haqq al-ri'asa belonged to
the community (umma) represented by ahl al- 'aqd wa-al-hall.5 An important mark
of the authority of ahl al-'aqd wa-al-hall in Rida's view was their competence to
derive the law. He denoted this ability to deduce or make the law by the term ishtra
1 Ibid., pp.21, 39-41, 51-5; Idem., Tafsir, IV, pp. 198-205, V, pp. 195-8.
2 Rida, al-Khilqfa, pp. 21-2.
3 The Qur'an 4:58.
4 The Qur'an 4:83.
5 Ibid., p. 22; Rida,Tafsir,V, pp. 180-6.
meaning by it legislation in its modern sense which he saw as identical to the traditional
words ijtihad and istinbat (inference). Legislation in Islam, he argued, was not only
based on Qur'anic and Prophetic text (.nass) but also on public interest (maslaha); and
was not only confined to religious aspects ('ibadat) but also comprised civil, criminal,
administrative and army rules (mu'amaldt). As the Qur'anic and Prophetic text was
limited there was a wide area of permissibility for man made laws based on utility
which were changeable and adaptable to the times. This legislative authority, he
concluded, belonged to the community (umma) represented in ahl al- 'aqd wa-al-hall.1
The assumption of legislative power by the community, he maintained, was not in
contradiction to the principle that God was the sole legislator to whom alone judgement
belonged which formed a cardinal constituent part of the belief in the oneness of
godship (tawhld al-rububiyya). The right of the community to legislate was
legitimate because God himself had permitted it.2
There remained an important question, namely who specificly were ahl al- 'aqd
wa-al-hall. Rida, in his attempt to answer, cited first the early definition that they
were composed of the 'ulamd', the chiefs and the notables who, by virtue of their
rank, were influential, and could easily affect the rest of the community to follow
them. Then he embarked on a historical review to identify them in the early period of
Islam. During the time of the Prophet and the Rashidun they were easily distinguished
for their prominence and association with the Prophet and were normally situated in
Medina. The Ummayads depended on tribal solidarity ('sabiyya) and made the
consultation of ahl al-'aqd wa-al-hall, inoperative. Thus, the shurd system was not
given the chance to develop and institutionalize. As for the identification of ahl al- 'aqd
wa-al-hall in the modern age it would be possible, according to him, to adopt the
present day method of election. But he insisted that election should be free so as to be
1 Rida, al-Khilafa, pp. 101-8
2 Rida, Tafsir, V,pp.87-8.
Islamically accepted.1 The elected body would have the powers of election and
deposition of the executive, supervision over its action, and legislation. In many ways
it would be identical to a modem legislative assembly.2 Though there were similarities
between the Islamic and European applications of the principle of sovereignty of the
community, there were also vital distinctions. In the first place, the Muslim
community was not above the Sharl'a law and therefore it was not free to legislate
anything not in accordance with it.3 Rida laid the blame for the Muslim's loss of
unity, independence, and cultural identity on their adoption of foreign laws without
any modifications. As the rules of grammar of any language would not be used to
govern the structure of another language, foreign laws would not be suitable to rule
any society unless they were adapted to its beliefs and needs.4 On the other hand, the
sovereignty of the Muslim community was not based on nationalism. Rida argued
strongly against Ibn Khaldun's idea that the caliphate was founded on national group
feeling ('asbiyya) since Islam was against racism.5 Pursuing the same point, he
attacked the national trend in Turkey towards Turkeyism. The Turks had associated
their concept of popular sovereignty (al-hakimiyya al-milliyya) with nationalism and
secularism, and for this reason he was totally opposed to it. From this it may appear
that Rida conceived sovereignty of the community to be different from its European
formula adopted in Turkey.6
iii. The Muslims Brotherhood
The next phase in the history of the idea of sovereignty in Egypt was
dominated by the contribution of the movement of the Muslim Brothers,
1 Ibid.,pp. 195-201.
2 Ibid., p. 187.
3 Ibid., p. 189.
4 Rida, al-Khilafa, pp. 1-2.
5 Ibid., p. 149.
6 Ibid., pp. 152-4.
al- Ikhwan al-Muslimun, founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in 1928.1 The
emergence of the movement came about under the impact of a combination of
circumstances. Among these, as stated by al-Banna, were the liberal trends in cultural
life with orientations towards apostacy and materialism and attacks on tradition, the
forceful voices of westernized feminist movement, the forces favouring secularism
which culminated in the support to the abolition of the Caliphate and the corruption and
disunity of political parties and their failure to confront the Western powers and bring
about real independence and reform.2 The battle-cry of Rashid Rida to establish a
moderate party to achieve Islamic reform3 was embodied by al-Banna in his tight
organized movement which spread quickly into other Arab countries and beyond.
Since the Muslim brothers understood Islam as a comprehensive way of life
and aimed to bring about its supervision over all individual and collective affairs, the
establishment of an Islamic state was at the top of their objectives. As was hinted
before, secularism was now clearly conceived as a grave threat engulfing the whole
Muslim life and the struggle against it moved into the centre. The appeal for an Islamic
state required a discussion of political principles including the question of sovereignty
and the Muslim Brothers made a considerable contribution in this regard. To begin
with, Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the movement, asserted a similar version of the
ideas of Rashid Rida about the sovereignty of the community sultat al-umma. In a
number of his pamphlets he stated that Islam acknowledged the modem constitutional
principle known as sultat al-umma. At one place he wrote:
"Islam has established sovereignty of the community and
emphasized it. It directed every Muslim to supervise fully the actions
of his government by providing it with counsel and assistance and by
bringing it to account. While it has instructed the ruler to fulfil the
interests of the ruled by means of instituting good and eradicating evil,
1 Accounts of the history and ideas of the movement are found in Ishaq Musa al-Husayni,
The Muslim Brethren (Beirut,1956), Ra'uf Shalabi, al-Shaykh Hasan al-Banna wa-madrasatuh al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo, 1978), Richerd P. Mitchell, The Soceity of Muslim Brothers (London,
1969).
2 Enayat, op. cit, p.84; Shalabi, op. cit.,pp.133-9.
3 Rida, al-Khilafa, pp.69-77.
it has also ordered the ruled to render obedience to the ruler as long as
he carries out that function. If he becomes corrupt it is their duty to put
him right, ensure that he abides by the law and bring him back to
follow the course of justice."1
Speaking generally about constitutional principles in another place he stated:
"The principles of constitutional rule, which could be
summarized in maintaining individual freedoms, consultation and
locating sovereignty with the community, responsibility of the rulers to
the people and their accountability to the public for their actions and
definition of the prerogatives of state powers - these principles, if
thoroughly studied, will be found to be identical with teachings of
Islam and its basis and regulations of its ruling system.2
In a separate book under the title Nizam al-Hukm (System of Government)
he clarified in more detail what he conceived to be the basis of an Islamic state. The
whole framework of government, in Islam, he explained, was founded on a set of
established rules. These essentially include the responsibility of the ruler to the people,
unity of the community and respect for its will. As for the responsibility of the ruler,
Islam had surpassed the theory of social contract by stating that the origin of the
authority of the ruler was a contract between him and the community. According to
this contract, the community hired the ruler to work for its interests and therefore he
was responsible and accountable to them.3 In applying this principle to the
constitutional system of Egypt at that time, he observed that it was full of obscurities in
this regard. He demanded the formation of a responsible cabinet with clear-cut limits
of powers and responsibility either attached directly to the head of state, the King, or a
prime minister.4 Pursuing the second rule, the unity of the nation, he required the
dissolution of all political parties in Egypt which he claimed produced nothing but
antagonism and corruption.5 In application of the third rule, the superiority of the will
of the community, he approved the adoption of parliamentary system in general but
asked for basic reforms. As an alternative to political parties, independent candidates
1 Hasan al-Banna, Fl Mu'tamar Talabat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimln , in Majmu'at al-Rasa il
(Beirut,1981), pp.160-1.
2 al-Banna, Risalat al-Mu'tamar al-Khamis, in Majmu'at al-Rasa il, p. 138.
3 al-Banna, Nizam al-Hukm, in Majmu'at al-Rasa'il, pp.318.
4 Ibid., pp. 322-4.
5 Ibid.,pp.325-7.
should only be allowed to compete in the elections. These candidates should possess
high qualities well-defined by law and have clear programmes. A strict code of
conduct should be prescribed to govern election campaign and propaganda, prohibit
bribing voters and lay severe punishment for counterfeiting.1 If these and similar
reforms were brought about, the election system would yield a real representation of
the will of the community.
However, after Hasan al-Banna there was a gradual shift in the views of the
Muslim Brothers. Undoubtedly, al-Banna himself in demanding an Islamic state had
vigorously opposed the adoption of secular laws in place of the Shari'a. He regarded
them as contrary to Islam and to the Egyptian constitution which stated that Islam was
the state established religion. Their infliction upon the Muslims was creating a serious
conflict as they were torn between obeying them or obeying God.2 But, he did not
denote the obligation to derive all laws from the Shari'a by any specific expression
such as hakimiyya which later came to be invariably used by his followers, nor did he
mention that sovereignty belonged to God.
The change in the ideas of the Muslim Brothers took place in stages. The
mixed ideas expressed at one stage were examplified in a book of one of the leading
members of the movement. 'Abd al-Gadir 'Awda in his booklet al-Islam wa-
dwdd'una al-Siyasiyya (Islam and the Political Conditions)3 was in agreement with
Rashid Rida's belief in sovereignty of the community and had cited his agruments in
full.4 Also he supported this view by a chapter on shura in which he claimed that it
was one of the fundamentals of Islam and that it was obligatory on the Muslims to
depose any ruler who did not apply it.5 Besides he placed great emphasis on the
necessity to implement the Islamic laws of the Shari'a and reject any legislation in
1 Ibid., pp. 328-30.
2 Banna, Risalat al- Mu'tamar al-Khdmis, in Majmu'at al-Rasd'il, pp. 139-40.
3 The following page reference are to the 7th.ed. (Bairut,1986).
4 Cf. 'Awda, op. cit., pp. 211-3.
5 Ibid.± pp. 193-5.
174
contradiction with it. The demand for the enforcement of the Shari'a laws and the
abolishment of man-made laws was not new. But, 'Awda took a different approach to
the problem. He raised the question who possessed hukm (authority to judge)?
Within the context of arguing for the adoption of the Shari'a laws his natural answer
was that hukm (authority to judge ) belonged to God and man was made his vicegerent
(khalifa) on earth to follow and enforce His judgements. He said in his answer to the
above question:
"The answer to this question is not difficult since we have
known that God is the Creator of the universe and the Owner of it. He
caused mankind to thrive on earth, made them his vicegerents and
instructed them to follow his guidance and defer to the will of none
beside him. In the light of this fact, anyone with reasonable thinking
can only say that authority to judge belonged to God and that he was
ruler {hakim) over the universe since he was its creator and owner.
Mankind has to subject itself to His revealed judgements and govern in
accordance to them. This is because they were made vicegerents on
earth. Therefore, on the one hand their vicegerency was conditional on
following God's guidance, and on the other hand being a vicegerent
necessitates that one should not violate the order of the one who
appoints him. In fact, God has already made what was revealed to his
Prophet a compulsory legal code and prescribed that we should follow
and abide by its rules. He has forbidden us to subject ourselves to
man-made laws."1
Now, apparently 'Awda was contradicting himself by stating that authority to
judge belonged to God and at the same time holding that the community was the source
of sovereignty. He offered two propositions in order to remove any ambiguities.
First, he claimed that all mankind were vested with general vicegerency to God which
could only be exercised in full when a community was formed and a government
above the community was established to enforce the laws of God. This government
was a delegation of the community since it was chosen, supervised and directed by the
consultation (shura) of the members of the community. Though the Islamic
government was named a caliphate which indicated vigerency, its vigerency was not
direct from God. The caliph was a deputy of the community which God vested with
1 Ibid.,pp.67-9.
direct vicegerency while God himself held real authority.1 Second, he drew a
comparison between Islam and democracy to show how the principle of sovereignty of
the community operated in a Muslim context. The similarities between the two
systems comprised many aspects such as election of rulers by representatives of the
community, foundation of government on justice and equality, and permission of
freedoms. However, the big difference between them lay in the fact that Islam had
limited the authority of both the ruled and the rulers. Definitions and standards of
justice, equality and freedom were prescribed by Islam and were not left to men to
determine. While in democracy men possessed absolute right to make their own
norms and values.2
'Awda's analysis of the relation between man and God and his stress that
hukm was only God's, was later given a greater force and became the dominant
current thought within the Muslim Brothers since the sixties. In this stage two
important developments took place. First, the word hakimiyya, an Arabic word
derived from hukm which was rich and powerful in connotations deeply rooted in the
Muslim mind, began to be used and equated with the modern sense of sovereignty.
Second, it was argued that sovereignty, hakimiyya, was exclusively an attribute of the
Divinity and that whoever rejected this divine quality or rendered it ineffectual in reality
would negate his claim to be a Muslim. This shift, which was indeed a culmination of
the vigorous refutation of secularism, was mainly brought about by the avidly and
massively read writings of Sayyid Qutb whose career as an Islamic ideologue began
when he joined the Muslim Brothers in 1952. He wrote almost all of his important
works in prison due to Nasir's suppression of the movement and eventually he was
sentenced to death in 1966.3 The Shock of his death, viewed as martyrdom, inspired
more vigour and spirit in his words and ideas.
11bid.,pp.97-9.
2 Ibid.,pp. 103-4.
3 The life, works and ideas of Qutb are accounted in Mahdi Fadl al-Allah, Ma'a-Sayyid Qutb
fi-fikrih al-Siyasi wa-al-Dlni (Beirut,1987); Yusuf al-'Azm, Raid al-Fikr al-Islami al-Mu'asir al-
Qutb made an intensive explanation of his concept of hakimiyya especially in
his later works. The following extract from his voluminous commentary on the
Qur'an may briefly introduce his views. He said:
"Hukm, authority to judge, belongs to no other than God. It is
only his by virtue of his godship since hakimiyya (judgeship or
sovereignty) is a characteristic of the Divinity. Therefore, whoever
claims to possess it will in fact be denying God one of his fundamental
divine rights. This is true whether the possession of this right is
claimed to belong to an individual, a class, a party, an assembly, a
nation or even all mankind represented in one international
organization. Now, the truth of the matter is that denying God this
fundamental right and claiming its possession is clear apostacy beyond
any doubt. The undue assumption of this right, which will result in
giving up faith in the true religion and the denial of a fundamental
divine quality, does not necessarily take one form. It must not
necessarily be by saying, as Pharoah openly said, syou have no other
god that I know except myself or "I am your supreme Lord'. The claim
to this right and its dissociation from God can merely be by dislodging
divine law from sovereignty (hakimiyya) and deriving law from other
source. It can merely be by declaring that the seat of sovereignty
(hakimiyya), that is the source of powers, is any other than God
whether it be the whole nation or all mankind."1
Apparently, Qutb used the word hakimiyya, as in the above quotation, to
mean the source of legislation, that is to say, the supreme power that possessed the
right to make laws which would determine the various systems of the society and its
form of government.2 But Qutb did not confine the concept of sovereignty,
hakimiyya, to the narrow legal sense. He explained it in a wider sense as the source
of beliefs, concepts, morals, values, culture and knowledge beside laws and
governmental rules.3 It is to be recalled that the word hakimiyya was already in use,
especially in Turkish, to mean sovereignty and some reference to it in the same sense
was to be found in some modem Arabic sources.4 But there is no evidence to show
Shahid Sayyid Qutb (Damascus,1980); Salah al-Khaldi, Sayyid Qutb al-Shahld al-Hayy
(Amman,1981)
1 Sayyid Qutb, Fi Zilal al-Qur'an, 7th.ed. (Beirut, 1971), VII, p.725 (comments on verse
12:40)
2 Cf. Sayyid Qutb, Muqawimat al-Tasawwur al-lslaml (Cairo, 1986), p.133.
3 Cf. Sayyid Qutb, Ma'alim fi-al-Tarlq (Cairo, nd), pp. 123-4.
4 Cf.Rashid Rida, al-Khilafa, p. 153.
that Qutb was borrowing the usage of the word from these origins. In fact, when he
was asked, during his trial to explain the meaning of the word hakimiyya and its
origin, he replied that he meant by it the source of legislation and claimed that he
coined the word from his studies of Islam.1 However it was evident, as he also
admitted, that his concept of hakimiyya was influenced if not directly adopted from,
the ideas of the contemporary Pakistani thinker al-Mawdudi which we shall review
later.2
Qutb asserted that hakimiyya was a divine quality which should be associated
with none but God. This was not, he affirmed, his own subjective opinion or the
suggestion of any other. It was what the Qur'anic text had literally said. There were
clear statements, in the Qur'an that God was not only sovereign over the universe and
heaven but also over human affairs and their system of life.3 To support his argument
he depended on many citations from the Qur'an. We shall suffice ourselves with the
following quotations as examples.
(1) "His is the creation, His the command."4
(2) "The authority to judge is for none but God, He ordered that you worship
none but Him."5
(3) "Have they partners who have made lawful to them in the system of life
what God has not allowed."6
(4) "They take their rabbis and monks as Lords beside God."7
1 Sami Jawhar, al-Mawta yatakallmun (Cairo,1977), p.135 quoted in Salah al-Khalidl, Fi
Zilal al-Qur'an fi-al-Mizan (Jeddah, 1986), p. 185.
2 Ibid., p.135.
3 Qutb, Muqawimat, p. 147.
4 The Qur'an 7:54; cf. Qutb, Fi Zilal al- Qur'an, III, pp.524-6.
5 The Qur'an 9:40; cf.Ibid,IV, pp.725-7.
6 The Qur'an 42:21; cf. Ibid.y 11, p.281.
7 The Qur'an 9:31. This was a reference to the Jews and Christians who followed their leaders
in legislating what was contrary to the laws of God. Cf. Ibid., IV, pp.202-5.
(5) "Have you not considered those who though claiming that they believe in
the revelations that have come to you and to others before you, yet they seek the
judgement of a false god despite having been ordered to reject him."1
(6) "Those who do not judge in accordance with God's revelations are
'unbelievers', 'transgnessors' and 'wrong-doers'."2
We can now attempt to summarise briefly his arguments drawn from the above
verses. As God was the creator of the universe and there was no partner beside him in
its creation, He ought to be the only one entitled to possess the command in
determining its affairs including the way of life of man which was but a part of the
universal system. Since there was no one who partnered God in the creation, there
should be no partnership with Him in legislation for mankind, that is to say, in
sovereignty. In fact, no one possessed the knowledge and qualification to make laws
except God. Therefore, it was not only a great mischief to associate sovereignty to a
human being, but also a form of polytheism. The Qur'an was very clear with respect
to this point. Anyone who submitted to man-made laws was described as a polythesist
even though he believed in God and rendered Him other religious forms of worship.
The Jews and Christians took their rabbis and priests as Lords in the religious and
political sense of the word "lord". By following their legislation which was not in
accordance with God's laws, they were actually worshiping them though they never
attributed to them godship over the universe. Likewise, if Muslims enforced man-
made laws or accepted their implementation they ceased to be Muslims. Having said
all this, it will not be difficult to undestand the following far-reaching conclusions
which probably were the main cause for him being put to death.
"Whenever the supreme sovereignty in any society is associated
with God alone as depicted in the supremacy of His divine Shari'a, this
will be the only state in which man gains real and complete freedom
from servitude to human whims and slavery to other men. This will be
the only form of Islamic civilization in God's judgement. Since the
1 The Qur'an 4:59; cf. Ibid., 11, pp.421-2.
2 The Qur'an 5:44,45,47; cf. Ibid., pp.724-53.
civilization which God designed for a mankind is founded on respect
and liberty of every individual, as a basic rule, respect and liberty is
never attained when there is servitude of a man to man. There is no
liberty and respect in a society in which some men become lords
entitled to legislate and hold the right of supreme sovereignty and the
others became slaves submissive and obedient to these lords.
Legislation is not only confined to legal judgements since values,
standard, morals and customs are all parts of legislations to which men
are subjected with or without awareness. If the previous conditions
prevail in any society it is to be considered as reactionary and
backward, or, in Islamic terminology, as polytheistic and part of
jdhiliyya.1
Jdhiliyya is a state and a condition and not a temporal historical
period. Today, it is prevailing all over the world among the people of all
creeds, ideologies, systems and practices. It is based primarily on the
principles of sovereignty of human beings over each other and the
rejection of the absolute sovereignty of God over men. In it human
inclinations in all shapes essentially made an arbitrary god and God's
revealed code is denied legal application. It may take different forms
and appearances, show different signs and features, have different
names and qualities or establish different sects and systems. Yet, it
always stems from its distinctive principle which defines its nature and
reality.
Mankind is divided into various jdhiliyya socities.
There is the atheistic society which originally denies the
existence of God. The case of these atheists may be self-evident and
needs no further explanation.
There is the pagan society which recognizes the existence of
God but partnered with him many false gods and lords as is the case in
India, Central Africa and various other parts of the world.
Also, as a jahili society there is the ahl al-kitab, the Jews and
the Christians. In the past these people attributed associates to God by
relating a son to him and by taking their rabbis and monks as lords
beside God since they accepted their claim for sovereign rights and
followed their canons even though they did not make prayers to them.
At present they have driven completely the sovereignty of God out of
their life and established for themselves systems such as the so-called
capitalism and socialism and forms of government such as democracy
and dictatorship. In that way they departed from the principle laid in
God's religion and adopted a jdhiliyya similar to that of the Greeks and
the Romans by manufacturing systems and ways of life according to
their opinion.
Likewise, the society that claims itself to be Muslim is in fact a
jdhiliyya one. It adopts the above method of the ahl al-kitab and
follows in the footsteps of them by deserting God's religion for a man-
man religion."2
There remains an important question to be sorted out before we conclude our
discussion of Qutb's ideas. What is the role of the community in a scheme over which
divine sovereignty is dominant? It seemed that Qutb was fully aware of the question.
1 Jdhiliyya, derived from jahl (ignorance) is originally the name of the pre-Islamic period.
2 Qutb, Fi Zilal al Qur'dn, 111, pp.461-3 (comments on verse 7:2.).
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However, he did not appear to have attempted an elaborate answer to it. There is no
doubt that he recognized the function of the community in the Islamic political system
and asserted its rights of consultation (shura) and legislation within the limits of the
revealed law.1 In one of his early books he insisted that the ruler in Islam received his
authority from one source: "the will of the ruled".2 To reconcile the role of the
community with divine sovereignty he offered the following brief interpretation:
"The community in the Islamic system chooses the ruler and by
that it ascribes him the legitimacy to exercise the authority of enforcing
the laws of God. But it is not the source of sovereignty which lends
legitimacy to the law. The source of sovereignty is God only. Many,
even Muslim reseachers, seem to confuse the exercise of authority with
the source of it. Mankind in its totality does not possess the right of
sovereignty. It is God who is entitled to it. But men exercise the
authority of application of what God legislated by virtue of his
sovereignty."3
iv. Criticisms
The ideas of Qutb aroused much controvesy especially after the appearance in
the seventies of a group of extremists who in many ways resembled the thought of the
early Kharijites and who claimed to be influenced by Qutb. One of the main doctrines
of the Kharijites was that the authority to judge belonged to God alone and anyone
who did not act according to God's command should be excommunicated. A similar
ideology nourished among some Muslim Brothers in prison under the pressures of the
tortures which they suffered. Qutb's concept of hakimmiyya became their basic
dogma leading them to excommunicate all Muslims who were not members of their
society.4 One of the earliest books which attempted to refute these new tendencies was
written in prison by the leader of the Muslim Brothers at that time, Hasan al-Hudaybi,
under the title Du'ah, La Qudah (Preachers, not Judges) and published in 1969. Its
1 For shurd see his comments on verses 3:159 and 42:38 in al-Zilal, 11, pp.118-22, Vll,
pp.299-300. For legislation see for examples his remarks on verse 42:21 in al-Zilal, VII, p.281.
2 Sayyid Qutb, Ma'rakat al-Islam wa-al-Ra simaliyya, 4th ed.(Jeddah,1969), p. 73.
3 Qutb, Fi Zilal al Qur'an, IV, pp. 725-6 (remarks on verse 9:40.
4 A good discussion of these tendencies is found in Salim 'All Bahnasawi, al-Hukm wa
qadiyyat takfir al-Muslim (Cairo, 1977). See also Gillies Kepal, The Prophet and Pharaoh:
Muslim Extremism in Egypt. Trans, by Jon Rothschild (London, 1985).
main theme was to show the conditions under which it could be permitted to
excommunicate a Muslim and to clarify the ambiguities surrounded the concept of the
hakimiyya (sovereignty) of God. He was not in favour of the use of the word
hakimiyya, let alone attributing it to God, on the ground that it was not found in the
Qur'an and the traditions. Though he admitted that it could be possible for Muslims
thinkers to coin a word to express a certain Qur'anic or prophetic concept, yet he
warned against the misunderstandings that could arise if the original meanings in the
Qur'an and the traditions for which the term was derived were forgotten. He wrote:
"There are some who establish their belief on a term which is not
found in any text of the Book of God or the traditions of the Prophet, a
word which is invented by fallible human being who are bound to fall
into error and delusion. Moreover, their judgement of what has been
said may be premature and distorted."1
To dissolve the ambiguities attached to the term hakimiyya Hudaybi made an
analysis of the term endeavouring to limit its ruinous consequences which were the
causes for the appearance of extremism. From his discussion it was clear that he was
in agreement with Qutb's main thesis that sovereignty belonged to God. Only, he
rejected its misinterpretations.2 Such a line of thought was nearly followed in most
criticisms and defences of Qutb which were written afterwards. His ideas were
generally accepted though it was admitted that they contained some ambiguities which
could lead to disasterous misunderstandings.3
Of greater importance than criticisms of Qutb were the objections made against
the introduction of the concept of sovereignty into Islamic thought. Such objections
were first raised by a constitutional lawyer, 'Abd al-Hamid Mutawali, in his book on
the system of government in Islam. He was convinced that the early Muslim scholars
did not attempt to formulate any theory of sovereignty. It had only been recently that
some Muslim thinkers had raised the question of sovereignty in Islam under direct
1 Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, Du'ah, La Qudah (Kuwait, 1985), pp.83-4.
2 Ibid.., pp.89-106.
3 See Bahnasawi, op. cit., pp.245-77; al-'Azam, op. cit., pp.229-85; Kahaldl, op. cit.,
pp. 172-85.
influence from the West and claimed that it belonged to God or to the community. In
his view, the introduction of such a problem into the sphere of Islam was wrong for
two reasons. First, Western theories of sovereignty had appeared under certain
circumtances which did not apply to Islam such as the fight between religious and
temporal authorities or the struggle against monarchical absolutism. Second, Western
theories of sovereignty proved to be not only artificial and invalid but also dangerous
as they paved the way for despotism.1
These opinions of Mutawali were developed in a separate monograph
concerned with the study of authority in an Islamic state compared with Western
theories of sovereignty.2 The author, like Mutawali, followed in the footsteps of the
French thought of the early twentieth century which rejected the theories of
sovereignty on the grounds that they were outdated. Since sovereignty, as a term and
a concept, was anchored to the historical circumtances in which it appeared, it was not
proper to use it to express Islamic ideas. The Islamic concept of public authority, he
claimed, was unique and distinctive. To show its distinction he made a detailed
contrast between it and modern theories of sovereignty. He arrived at the conclusion
that Islam had succeeded in resolving the problem of authority while the West had
failed. Theories of sovereignty did not provide any sound interpretation of why one
human will should be entitled to supremacy over other human wills. Moreover, such
supremacy was demanded by these theories to be absolute and in no way bound by
restrictions. As there were no effective means of limiting sovereignty, it mostly lead to
despotic rule by an individual or a minority over the majority. Islamic public authority
was different. It derived its legitimacy from the will of God and that was the basis for
why it should be obeyed. In its nature it was limited since it should operate within the
1 'Abd al-Hamid Mutawali, Mabadi' Nizam al-Hukm fi-aL-Islam (Cairo, 19666), pp. 551 -
88.
2 The book is Fathi 'Abd al-Karim, al-Dawla wa-al-Siyyada fi-al- Fiqh al-Isladml (State
and Sovereignty in Islamic Law), 2nd. ed.(Cairo, 1984).
boundaries of the laws of God. There were also practical ways to check the power of
the government such as public supervision over it and shura.
It should be clear that such objections against the introduction of sovereignty
into Islamic thinking were dependent on the controversial assumption of its invalidity.
They did not take into account the recent history of the theory and the attempts to
restate it. Moreover, they used the term public authority to denote Islamic rulership
while they admitted that sovereignty was defined to mean public authority. In the light
of this, they appear to be playing with words when they rejected the usage of
sovereignty to express Islamic ideas.
Chapter 6
IDEAS IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
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I. Modern Developments
i. Early Attitudes to Western Rule
When the British came to India in the seventeenth century and began to gain a
footing, the dominant type of Muslim rule was the sultanate. The Mughul
government, to all intents and purposes, was a traditional monarchy with absolute
powers limited only by the supremacy of the Shari'a laws.1 However, political ideas
were reconstructed by the writings of Shah Wali al-Allah of Delhi, an eminent reformer
of the late Mughul era who had a great impact on all subsequent developments of
Muslim thought in the subcontinent.2 In his view one of the main factors of the
decline of the Muslims was the corruption of their political power as a result of the
transformation of the caliphate system into kingship. He made a masterly analysis of
the effects of the adoption of monarchical rule and outlined the basic principles of the
system of the caliphate as the best type of Islamic government.3 The aim of his reform
was essentially to initiate a movement among the Muslims of India to establish a
refurbished state power. Thus he laid the intellectual foundation of the struggle for an
Islamic state which became a dominant feature of the subcontinent up to the present
time. Also, we shall see that this struggle was a major factor in shaping ideas about
sovereignty.
As for Western ideas, India came into contact with them as early as the
establishment of the dominion of the East India Company. The British were a powerful
1 See Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Administration of the Sultanate ofDelhi (Lahore, 1942);
idem, "India under the Mughuls", in P. M. Holt, ed., The Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge,
1970), 11, pp. 35-62.
2 For his life see Rizvi Saiyid Athar Abbas, Shah Wall al- Allah and his times (Canberra,
1980).
His political thought is exposed mainly in two works in Arabic; Izalat al-Khafa 'an
Khilafat al-Khulafa (Luknow,n.d.); Hujjat Allah al-Baligha (Lahore,n.d.).
representative of Western culture and their growing influence in the country was a
great challenge to the Muslims. When the Mughul ruler fell under the control of the
British in 1803, Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz, a son of Shah Wall al-Allah who inherited his
ideals and mission, declared that India had become an un-Islamic territory, dar harbd
Thcfatwa described the situation as follows:
"...In this city the Imam al-Muslimin wields no authority,
while the decrees of the Christian leaders are obeyed... Promulgation of
the commands of ku.fr means that in the matter of administration and the
control of the people, the levy of land taxes, tribute tolls, and customs,
in the settlement of disputes, in the punishment of offences, the kafirs
act according to their discretion. There are, indeed, certain Islamic
rituals - as, eg., Friday and id prayers, adhan, and cow slaughter -
with which they do not interfere. But that is of no account."2
The implication of this fatwa from the point of view of sovereignty was
significant. It was a legal judgement that a territory would not be regarded as Islamic if
political power over it was exercised according to non-Muslim ways and laws.
Therefore, it was obligatory for the Muslims to wage war, jihad, to overthrow it and
establish Islamic rule. Consequently, a wide movement of jihad was organized by the
followers of Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz chiefly under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad
Barelwi. The great development of the movement was its success in forming an
Islamic state in north west India in accordance with the system of the caliphate as
outlined by Shah Wali al-Allah and its leader assumed the title of Imam in 1826. Soon
after, the movement was crushed as its leaders were killed in the battlefield;3 yet it
became a vivid example that provided inspiration for all future struggle for an Islamic
rule.
Meanwhile in eastern Bengal a similar activity of jihad was in operation
during the first half of the nineteenth century which came to be known as the Fara'idi
1 S. A. A. Rizvi, "The Breakdown of Traditional Society", in Holt, ed., The Cambridge
History of Islam, II, p.73.
2 Quoted in Mujeeb ashraf, Muslim attitudes towards British rule and Western Culture in
India (Delhi,1982), p.122.
3 Ibid., pp. 73-5. The history of the movement is recorded in many books in English , Urdu
and Arabic. See for example Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi, Iza Habat Rlh al-fmdn (Kuwait, 1974). The
British view is best represented in W.W. Hunter, The Indian Mussalmans (London, 1871).
movement.1 Succesive uprisings were organized but all ended in failure.2 However,
the resistance to British rule culminated in the revolt of 1857 in which the Muslims
took an active role with the aim of restoring Islamic government.3 Again, the uprising
was quickly suppressed and India came under direct British Crown control for almost
a century. By the ascendancy of the British over India Western ideas, laws, and
institutions became deeply rooted. The British Parliament in London acquired real
sovereignty over the country and Islamic political doctrines were driven into the realm
of theory.
ii. Islamic Modernism
By the failure of the uprising of 1857 a new chapter was opened in the
development of Indian Muslim thought. A new tendency appeared which sought to
strike a compromise not only between the Muslim and their new foreign rulers but also
between Islam and Western culture. The origins of such a tendency could be traced
back to an early period since there had always been a group among the Muslims who
favoured the British rule and "looked forward to the birth of a new culture, a cross¬
breed of the Western with the Eastern".4 But this trend found a forceful expression in
the ideas of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) who was regarded as the pioneer of
Islamic modernism in India. In the field of religious thought he re-interpreted Islam
and the Quran "in order to bring them in line with the scientific knowledge and the
mental and cultural ideals of the later half of the nineteenth century".5 In the political
field, which is our concern here, he did not content himself with advocating passive
obedience to British rule but went to the extent of demanding loyalty to it. His
opinion was not advanced as a practical policy fit for the circumtances but he argued
1 This was on account on their emphasis on the observance of fara id meaning obligatory
duties on Muslims.
2 See Ashraf, op.cit. , pp. 144-54.
3 A brief survey of events and a comparative review of sources is provided by Ashraf, op.cit.,
pp. 155-84.
4 Ashraf, op.d/.,pp.187. For these tendencies see Ibid. pp. 187-263.
5 Abu al-Hasan al-NadwI, Western Civilazation - Islam and Muslims. Eng. trans, by M.
A. Kidwai (Lucknow,1978), p.67.
for it on religious grounds. He claimed that Islam taught that "if through the Will of
God we are subdued by a nation which gives religious freedom, rules with justice,
maintains peace in the country and respects our individuality and property, as it is done
by the British rule in India, we should be loyal to it".1 He supported his claim with the
example of Joseph who served the Pharaoh of Egypt very obediently and loyally,
although the latter was not a Muslim ruler.2
Sayyid Khan's doctrine of loyalty was also advocated on another occasion.
It was used against the ideology of Pan-Islamism which urged the Indian Muslims to
support the Ottoman Caliphate and express indignation against its European enemies
including Britain. He argued that the Muslims of India were legally bound to obey the
will of the Indian British government and not of an external Muslim ruler. He regarded
direct relations of the Ottoman agents with the Muslims to be illegal because the
Indians were loyal subjects of the British government. They were not subjects of
Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid who wielded no authority or spiritual suzerainty over them. His
title of Caliph was effective only in his own land.3
Sayyid Khan did not develop a complete political theory, nor did he discuss
fully the system of government in Islam. All his concern was to prove that "loyalty to
the powers that be was ordained by God". As his interest was to save the Muslims
from persecution by the British and combat any revolutionary tendencies, his concept
of sovereignty appeared to be very close to that of the early Christians. He believed
that power was God's and that Muslims had to submit to it whether it be evil or good.
Viewed from this angle, his opinion appears to be a special interpretation of the
concept of Divine sovereignty. However, Sayyid Khan's modernism was splendidly
expounded by his devoted disciple Ameer Ali (1849-1928) in his famous book The
1 From a letter of his cited in J. M. S. Baljon, The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Leiden,1949), p.14.
2 Ibid., p. 14.
3 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan (London, 1967), p. 125.
Spirit of Islam} In one of the chapters of the book, the author attempted to interpret
the Islamic political system in terms of modem Western concepts. He wrote:
"Islam gave to the people a code which, however archaic in its
simplicity, was capable of the greatest development in accordance with
the progress of material civilization. It conferred on the State a flexible
constitution, based on a just appreciation of human rights and human
duty. It limited taxation, it made men equal in the eye of the law, it
consecrated the principles of self-government. It established a control
over the sovereign power by rendering the executive authority
subordinate to the law - a law based upon religious sanction and moral
obligation."2
According to Ameer Ali the Islamic state was a kind of republic based on a
definite code which was supreme over both the ruler and ruled. The head of the state,
who was elected by the suffrage of the people, assumed sovereign rights but his
powers were limited and not absolute. Beside the Islamic fundamental law his
authority was checked by the advisory councils which assisted him. Moreover, the
judiciary was independent and even the head of state could not intervene in its
judgements. The following quotation sums up his views:
"An examination of the political conditions of the Muslims under
the early Caliphs brings into view a popular government administered
by an elective chief with limited powers. The prerogatives of the head
of the state were confined to administrative and executive matters, such
as the regulation of the police, control of the army, transaction of
foreign affairs, disbursement of the finance, etc. But he could never act
in contravention of the recognised law. The tribunals were not
dependent on the government. Their decisions were supreme; and the
early Caliphs could not assume the power of pardoning those whom the
regular tribunals had condemned. The law was the same for the poor
as for the rich, for the man in power as for the Labourer in the field.
As time advances the stringency of the system is relaxed but the form is
always maintained. Even the usurpers, who, without right, by
treachery and murder seized the reins of government, and who in their
persons represented the pagan oligarchy which had been displaced by
the teachings of Islam, observed more or less the outward semblance of
law-abiding executive heads of a representative government. And the
rulers of the later dynasties, of arbitrary power, were restrained by the
1 The book was first published in London in 1890 and was edited and revised several times up
to 1922. Since then there have been numerous reprints of the book and parts of it have been translated
into Arabic and Turkish. The book have been met with vigorous criticism and was even described as
heretical. See Maryam Jameelah, Islam and Modernism (Lahore, 1977), pp. 69-76.
2 Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam. (London, 1974), p. 277.
sentence of general body of jurisconsults, which in all Muslim states
serves as a constitutional check on the sovereign."1
Another modernist view of sovereignty was expressed by Salahuddin Khuda
Bukhsh, a liberal thinker from Bengal. He discussed the problem of sovereignty in
one of his books in an essay under the title "The Islamic Conception of Sovereignty".2
His study of the features of sovereignty was made in the light of the history of the
Caliphate. Khuda Burksh possessed some acquaintance with the Western theory of
sovereignty and the writings ofWesterners on Islam like Van Kremer, Wellhausen and
Goldziher as he had translated some of their works. His survey of the history of the
Caliphate and his discussion of the Islamic theory of sovereignty contained many
quotations ofWestern writings which apparently had exerted a great influence on his
thought. Unlike Ameer Ali who emphasized the binding nature of the Divine law as a
constitutional check on the sovereign, Khuda Burksh took an opposite view.3 He
claimed that the Muslims sovereignty was defective as far as it possessed no power to
alter the divine law. He believed that the divine law was not fixed and that it was not
against Islam to make changes in it and adapt it to modem conditions. Therefore, he
assumed that politics should be separated from religion and human legislation should
be freed from religious interference in order to bring the laws in line with progress.
The following quotation may best show his standpoint:
"But modern jurisprudence understands by sovereign authority
the person or body to whose directions the law attributes force, the
person in whom resides, as of right, the ultimate power either of laying
down general rules, or of issuing isolated rules or commands whose
authority is that of law itself. Judged from this point of view the
Muslim sovereignty was undoubtedly defective, the sovereign
possessing no right or power to interfere with or alter or modify the
Muslim law. Nor could the Muslim jurists take such a comprehensive
view of sovereignty as is taken by European jurists, accustomed as they
are to limited monarchy or democracy. The Muslim sovereignty was
unlimited in one way and absolutely fettered in another, inasmuch as
interference with Muslim law would have been equivalent to a defiance
1 Ibid.,p. 278.
2 S. Khuda Burksh, Essays Indian and Islamic (London, 1912), pp. 25-55.
3 This is only an apparent difference between the two modernist thinkers as they agree in
their final findings. Ameer Ali has also demanded alteration in the Divine law to meet the changing
conditions. See his book The Spirit of Islam, pp. 182-7.
of the law of God. But if it was narrow and confined in this respect it
was far too wide and extensive in other ways. The power of the
Muslim sovereign ranged over not merely temporal affairs of the State,
but also matters religious and social. He had to protect religion from
heresies and innovations just as much as he had to defend the frontiers
from foreign inroads and incursions. Here lay the strength as well as
the weakness of the Muslim sovereignty. It was religion which
prolonged the existence of the Caliphate till 1258, and it was religion
again which hopelessly placed limitations and reservations on the
powers which a beneficient monarchy might have exercised over the
people by assisting the current of progress unimpeded by the fetters
forged by religion and modifying and harmonizing the laws with
advancing civilization."1
iii. The Khilafat Movement
Beside modernism there was no significant development in Muslim political
thought in India after the failure of the Jihad, movement. However, by the first decade
of the twentieth century a new turning point was reached. This development was a
result of the confrontation between the Ottoman Caliphate and Western powers
especially during World War 1 when Turkey joined the war against the Allies. The
Muslims of India felt a religious obligation to show loyalty to Turkey due to the fact
that it was the seat of the Caliphate, the only remaining symbol of Muslim power and
unity. Emotions of pan-Islamism had already been aroused before the war by Western
expansionism over Muslim territories and by the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who
visited India. It became an established practice to recognize the Ottoman Caliph in
Friday sermons. When the war came to an end and Turkey was defeated, feelings
were electrified in India since it was felt that with the British occupation of
Constantinople the very existence of the caliphate was in danger. In these
circumtances the Khilafat movement was founded which fought vigorously for the
preservation of the caliphate and a just peace settlement. The significance of the
movement was its great impact on the revival of political ideas. The abstract concepts
of the caliphate began to be discussed particularly in the face of the Western
propaganda which attempted to humiliate the Islamic doctrines. The question of
1 Ibid, pp. 51-2. For his views concerning the need for change in the Divine law to adapt
itself to progress see his "Thoughts on the Present Situation" in Ibid, pp.284-95.
loyalty was also raised as the Indian Muslims were forced to fight with Britain against
Turkey.
One of the leaders of the Khilafat movement was Muhammad Ali Jauhar who
headed a delegation to London to explain the claims of the Indian Muslims.
Muhammad Ali did not expose his ideas in a systematic treatise but his speeches and
writings revealed for the first time a clear concept of the sovereignty of God which
became the dominant belief of Indian Muslims ever since. His ideas reflected in the
interview with the British Prime Minister were widely echoed. He argued as follows:
"In this regard we wish to show the connection between the
Musulmans of India and the Caliphate. Islam as we understand it is not
just a body of doctrines and dogmas; it is, a total way of life, it is a
moral code and a social constitution. It does not distinguish between
the church and the state. It considers life as an indivisible entity, and its
goal is to provide divine guidance in all the affairs of humanity. The
Muslims consider themselves as the servants of God whom they obey
and recognize as the supreme authority. Islam does not admit any
political, geographical or ethnic barriers."1
His concept of the caliphate was expanded further in his reply to those who
equated the Caliph with the Pope and suggested the establishment of a spiritual
caliphate. It also contained an explicit mention of the sovereignty of God. He said in
one of his talks in London:
"But the Khalifa... was not the Pope, and the moment he would
consent to be "Vaticanised", he would cease to be the Khalifa. He was
the Commander of the Faithful, the President of our Theocratic
Commonwealth, the leader of all Muslims in peace and war though he
could neither claim to be infallible like the Pope, nor could he in all
circumtances exercise unquestionable authority, for Allah was the only
Sovereign, and in the case of dispute Muslims were bound to refer back
to the Holy Qur'an and to the Traditions of the Prophet whose
successor the Khalifa is."2
The other outstanding figure in the Khilafat movement and its principal
theoretician was Abu al-Kalam Azad (1888 - 1958).3 His major contribution to the
1 Quoted in Manzooruddin Ahmed, Pakistantan the Emerging Islamic State (Karachi, 1966),
p.75.
2 Afzal Iqbal ed., Selected Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamad Ali (Lahore,
1969), 11 ,p.37.
3
movement was an exposition of its ideology and a discussion of the doctrine of the
Caliphate published in 1920 as Mas'ala-i-Khilafat.1 His views revealed an influence
of Shah Wali al-Allah and showed no originality except with regard to the modern
question of the Ottoman Caliphate and its future. Azad defended the obligatory nature
of the caliphate as a universal institution to establish divine justice on earth. The
caliph, he argued, possessed real sovereignty different from the spiritual authority
possessed by the Pope. Since Islam did not assign legislative authority to other than
God and His Messenger, the caliph should be subjected to Divine laws and he had no
right to legislate. However, in all other spheres the caliph possessed the ultimate right
of command, amr, and the Muslims all over the world should render loyalty to him. In
its early history the caliphate was an ideal example of the Islamic political system. It
was a kind of a republic based on election and shura. Though the Umayyads, the
Abbasids and the Ottomans represented a despotic monarchical government different
from what Islam demanded, yet they were still the legitimate leadership of the
Muslims. As for the Indian Muslims, it was a legal duty on them to show loyalty to
the Ottoman Caliph and therefore they should not co-operate with the British who were
at war against him.2
However, the Indian Muslims did not realize that the disintegration of the
Ottoman Caliphate was not solely an outcome of external pressures. Forces of
nationalism and secularism within Turkey itself were steadily gaining momentum and
eventually the caliphate for which the Indians vigorously fought was abolished.
Consequently, the Khilafat movement was doomed to failure from the start. After it
was brought to an end, one of its leaders, Abu al-Kalam Azad, was even driven by the
drift of the Indian nationalism and secularism. Nonetheless, the impact of the Khilafat
movement on the development of the political thinking of the Indian Muslims was
1 Arabic translation by 'Abd al-Razaq AbadI as Kitab al-Khilafa al-Islamiyya and published
in a series in al-Manar periodical, XXIII, 1922.
2 Ibid, pp. 48-9, 104-6, 196-7, 201
great. It revived the struggle for an Islamic state which had been launched by the
Jihad Movement and crystalized the basic Islamic political doctrines.
iv. Pakistan Movement
The establishment of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was the first step
towards the political regeneration of India. The attitude of the Muslims towards it was
exemplified in the position of Sayyid Khan who urged them to disassociate themselves
with it on the ground that they were a weak minority and if they were united with the
Hindu majority in one body the Muslims would be permanently submerged. His fears
that "the larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller
community" drove him also to oppose the introduction of representative and
democratic system and the formation of a local self-government. He held a firm
conviction that it was not possible that two nations - the Mohammedans and the
Hindus - could sit on the sama throne and remain equal in power".1 These ideas
dominated the Muslim political thinking for so long after Sayyid Khan. Under their
impact and in the face of the increasing Hindu hostile attitudes, the Muslims formed a
separate political organization, the All-India Muslim League, in 1909 with the main
objective "to protect and advance the political rights and interests of Mussalmans of
India".2 One of the first reforms proposed by the Muslim League was to demand a
separate electorate to ensure the adequate representation of the Muslims in the newly
introduced elective councils.3 However, a series of national and international
developments after the First World War brought the League and the Congress into
alliance and they mutually organized opposition against the British and struggled
together for the common goal of independence. Such cooperation lasted for a short
time. Distrust and polarity between the two political parties returned and continued to
dominate Indian politics from 1924 onwards. Gradually, the concern of the Muslims
1 For documents of Sayyid Khan views see C. H. Philips, The Evolution of India and
Pakistan 1858 to 1947 (London, 1962), pp. 185-9.
2 Resolution of 30 December 1906 at Dacca in Ibid., p. 194.
3 Ibid., p. 195.
to safeguard their community began to crystalize in a definite demand to secure a
Muslim political power over the territories in which the Muslims were a majority.
Eventually, the concept of a separate Muslim state emerged marking the birth of the
movement which lead to the establishment of Pakistan in 1947.1
We shall now turn to examine briefly the political ideas of the period before the
formation of Pakistan. One of the most outstanding thinkers of that period was
Muhammad Iqbal (1876 - 1938) who made the first clear statement of the demand for a
separate homeland for the Muslims in his address to the All-India Muslim League
Conference in 1930.2 Iqbal was strongly against the Western concept of nationalism.
He described it as a sickness which tended to impoverish human culture by narrowing
down thoughts and emotions. Nationalism could not "cure the ills of a despairing
humanity" and as such the Modern Muslim was mislead to seek to create new loyalties
based on patriotism and nationalism.3 Iqbal asserted that Islam did not approve of the
national notion which recognized territory as the only principle of political solidarity.
He wrote:
"You know that Islam is something more than a creed, it is also
a community, a nation. The membership of Islam is not determined by
birth, locality or naturalisation; it consists in the identity of belief. The
expression, "Indian Muhammmadans", however convenient it may be,
is a contradiction in terms, since Islam in its essence is above all
conditions of Time and Space. Nationality with us is a pure idea; it has
no geographical basis.4
Beside nationalism, Iqbal critized secularism which began to change the
outlook of the present generation ofMuslims who were inspired by Western ideas and
were anxious to adopt them in their own countries "without any critical appreciation of
the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe".5 In Europe, Christianity
1 See Aziz Ahmad, "India and Pakistan", in P. M. Holt, ed., The Cambridge History of
Islam (Cambridge, 1970), 11, pp. 97-119.
2 Philips, op.cit., pp. 239-40.
3 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore, 1954), pp.
188-9.
4 Muhammad Iqbal, Islam as an Ethical and a Political Ideal (Lahore, 1977), p. 101.
5 Iqbal's address to the Muslim League in 1930 reproduced in C. M. Nairn, ed., Iqbal, Jlnah
and Pakistan (New York, 1979), p. 192.
developed as a pure spiritual order having nothing to do with political and civil affairs
and practically obeying the Roman authority in these spheres. When the state became
Christian, the State and the Church were separate bodies and eventually conflict
evolved between them. The reformation of Luther was directed against the
organization of the church and in the peculiar conditions of Europe his movement lead
to the displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by national systems. Europe
was consequently driven to the conclusion that religion was a private affair of the
individual and had nothing to do with what was called man's temporal life. As for
Islam, it was different, for it was a civil society from the start. Therefore, secularism
could not be adopted by Muslims as it assumed a dualism which never existed in Islam.
In Islam, spirit and matter, church and state are organic to each other.1 He went on to
warn the Muslims against the dangers of separating religion from politics because it
would eventually mean the complete rejection of Islam even as a religious ideal. In his
address to the Muslim League in 1930, he said:
"The proposition that religion is a private individual experience
is not suprising on the lips of an European. In Europe the conception
of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and
fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit led by a logical process of
thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the
Holy Prophet's religiuos experience, as disclosed in the Qur'an,
however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a
purely biological event, happening inside the experient and
necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual
experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the
fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic
significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is
revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically
related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one
will eventually involve the rejection of the other."2
When we proceed to examine the Islamic political system as conceived by Iqbal
we find in it an implicit recognition of the concept of sovereignty of God.3 According
1 Ibid., 191-4; Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 155-6.
2 Nairn, op.cit., pp. 193- 4.
3 Manzooruddin Ahmed, Pakistan: The Emerging Islamic State (Karachi, 1966), p.88.
to him, the Islamic form of government was founded on the principle of Tawhid,
oneness of God. This basic doctrine of Islam comprised a number of working political
ideals such as equality, freedom and unity. Moreover, an important result of it was
that loyalty of the Muslim community was to be rendered to God, not rulers. In his
own words:
"The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the
principle of vTawhId'. Islam, as polity, is only a practical means of
making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life
of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God
is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts
to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature. ...The essence of "Tawhid' as
a working idea is equality, solidarity and freedom. The State, from the
Islamic stand point, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles
into space-time forces, an inspiration to realize them in a definite human
organization. It is in this sense alone that the State in Islam is a
theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God
on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed
infallibility."1
Another important consequence of Tawhid in the political sphere, in Iqbal's
view, was the absolute supremacy of the law of God. "The law of God", he wrote,
"is absolutely supreme. Authority, except as an interpreter of the law, has no place in
the social structure of Islam." However, this was the only limit on freedom which
otherwise was regarded as sacred in Islam. Hence, Iqbal maintained that Islam had
based its government on democracy in order to develop individual freedom. In
explaining the democratic elements of Islam he referred to the elective aspect of the
caliph's office and equality of all Muslim before the law.
"The best government for such a community would be
democracy, the ideal of which is to let a man develop all the
possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as
practicable. The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being; like other
Muslims, he is subject to the same law; he is elected by the people and
is deposed by them if he goes contrary to the law."2
1 Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought, pp. 146, 154.
2 Iqbal, Islam as a Political Ideal, p.103.
Though Iqbal believed that democracy was the most important aspect of Islam
as a political ideal, yet he was critical of the Western type of democracy. The will of
the majority was the source of law and norms in the democracy of the West. But in
Islam God was the real source of religion, philosophy and law, and bestower of
power, strength, and authority.1
H. The Idea of Sovereignty in Pakistan
i. Constitutional Developments
The demand of the Muslims of India to have a separate homeland attained
fulfilment by the establishment of the state of Pakistan in 1947. The new state was
governed by an interim constitution, the Government of India Act of 1935 with
modifications made by the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Under the latter Act a
Constituent Assembly came into existence whose first task was to frame a permanent
constitution for Pakistan. However, the process of constitution-making faced many
problems and became the subject of much controvesy. Since independence Pakistan
has been offered a great number of constitutional drafts and it had three constitutions
enacted in the years 1956, 1962 and 1973 and amended now and again.
No doubt Islam was at the base of the demand for Pakistan. The founders of
the country proclaimed that the objective of the new state was to enable the Muslims to
fashion their lives according to Islamic teachings. Pakistan was envisaged to be an
Islamic state although the nature of such a state and its conformity with modernity was
not well defined in the minds of the people and their leaders. Nonetheless, Islam
became one of the major factors which determined the shape of the new state and its
constitution. There was a strong movement to adopt an Islamic constitution though the
elements of such a constitution were given different interpretations. Sovereignty,
which was a chief question in modern Western constitution making, was at the core of
1 M. Aziz Ahmad, "Iqbal's Political Theory", in Iqbal as a Thinker : essays by eminent
scholars (Lahore, 1944), pp. 251, 262.
the constitutional debate in Pakistan. There were different attempts to define it
Islamically. It is our purpose here to examine those views on sovereignty as reflected
in the contitutional developments in Pakistan and how they were embodied in its
constitution.
Objectives Resolution
The first step in making the constitution of Pakistan was taken when the
Constituent Assembly passed a resolution in 1949 containing basic guidelines for the
future constitution which came to be known as the Objectives Resolution. Under the
pressure exerted by the movement to incorporate Islam in the constitution, the
Objective Resolution had a distintive Islamic feature. The resolution clearly recognized
the sovereignty of God and viewed state authority as a trust delegated by God which
was to be exercised within the limits laid by Islam. Standards of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance and social justice which were to direct the state policy should be
followed and interpreted according to Islamic concepts. The function of the state,
according to the resolution, was to enable the Muslims to lead an individual and
collective Islamic way of life in conformity with the teachings of the Qur'an and the
Sunna and at the same time to make provisions to safeguard the rights of the other
religious minorities. The first clauses of the Objectives Resolution were as follows:
"Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God
Almighty alone and the authority, which He had delegated to the State of
Pakistan through its people to be exercised within limit prescribed by
Him, is a sacred trust;
This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan
resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of
Pakistan;
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality,
tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully
observed;
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna;
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities
freely to profess and practice their religion and develope their culture."1
1 G.W. Choudhury, Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan (Dacca,
1967), pp. 23-4.
Perhaps there was an apparent inconsistence in the Objectives Resolution with
respect to the usage of the word sovereignty. The first clause admitted that sovereignty
belonged to God, yet immediately in the second clause the term "the sovereign
independent state of Pakistan" was used and, in additon to that, an other clause
contained the phrase "its sovereign rights over land, sea and air".1 Seemingly, the
framers of the resolution had confused the two concepts of God's sovereignty and
state sovereignty. This was a clear indication that the formulation of the resolution was
a result of a compromise between the different forces inside and outside the Constituent
Assembly. Moreover, a close examination of the contents and meanings of the
resolution would reveal a more serious confusion. In a remark about the resolution, it
was observed that:
"The Objectives Resolution, acknowledged the sovereignty of
God, recognized the authority of the people derived from their Creator,
and vested the authority delegated by the people in the Constituent
Assembly for the purpose of making a constitution for the sovereign
state of Pakistan. Thus is God sovereign, the people sovereign,
parliament sovereign, and the state sovereign in Pakistan. It would
indeed be a narrow-minded person who was not satisfied with such a
compromise."2
Indeed, the ambiguity of the resolution was self-evident if the word
sovereignty was used in its original Western sense to mean a supreme absolute power.
However, it would be safer to assume that the makers of the constitution attached to
the word sovereignty a loose meaning. As a result of that, as we shall see in the
analysis of the constitutional debate, contradictory interpretations were given to what
came to be known as the "sovereignty clause" in the constitution of Pakistan.
Islamic Provissions
All the constitutions of Pakistan contained Islamic provisions.3
1 Ibid.., p.24.
2 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley, 1963), p. 149.
3 Cf. Muhammad Shafiq, "System of Government in the Constitution of Pakistan", Islamic
Culture, LX, No.4 (1986), pp. 1-29; Manzoordin Ahmed, "Islamic Aspects of the New Constitution
of 1962", Islamic Studies, II, No.2 (June 1963), pp. 249-86; Fazulur Rahman, "Islam and the New
Constitution of Pakistan of 1973", Journal of Asian and African Studies, VIII (1973), pp. 190-204.
These include:
1. the clause on the sovereignty of God,
2. the head of State should be a Muslim,
3. the directive principles of state policy,
4. the repugnancy clause : no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the
Qur'an and the Sunna.
Since the Objectives Resolution formed the preamble of all the constitutions
of Pakistan, the clause on the sovereignty of God reserved its place there. However,
the ambiguity that surrounded this clause continued as the term sovereignty was still
used to refer to God's sovereignty and to the state sovereignty in the same preamble.
Moreover, it was apparent that the makers of the constitution interprated sovereignty of
God to mean a higher moral and ethical values. Therefore, the sovereignty of God was
never given a legal sanction. It was incorporated only in the preamble of the
constitution. Though the preamble to the constitution was the guiding principle on
which the several provisions of the constitution were based, yet the preamble was not
considered to be part of the constitution and therefore it had no substantive authority to
make it legally enforceable.1 Therefore, it may be concluded that the provision of the
Sovereignty of God was of no real significance and it produced no actual effect.
All the constitutions of Pakistan provided that one of the qualifaications for
the office of the Head of State, the President, was that a person should be a Muslim.2
The Prime Minister, according to the constitution of 1973, should also be a Muslim.3
However, such a qualification was also of no effective importance though it had been
surrounded by much controversy in the constitutional debate. Though there was a
non-Muslim minority in the country, the fact of the matter was that the overwhelming
1 Muhammad Shafiq, Islamic Concept of a Modern State (Gujarat, 1987), pp.77-9; See also
idem., "System of Government in the Constitution of Pakistan", pp.27-9.
2 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, article 32 paragraph 2;
Constitution of 1962, article 10; Constitution of 1973 article ? .
3 Chapt.3, article 91, paragraph 2.
majority were Muslims. It would be only natural then that the President or Prime
Minister should be Muslims. Such a qualification could not be paralleled by the
qualities laid by the jurists for a caliph. A caliph was required to be pious and
knowledgeable about Islam. The makers of the constitution of Pakistan, by providing
Islam as a qualification for the President, did not seem to be necessitating that he
should be a practising Muslim. The provision was a product of the historical
background and special circumtances of Pakistan, rather than an effect of Islamic
political theory.
Other Islamic provisions were also found in the "Directive Principles of State
Policy" in every constitution. The most important of these was the provision called
"the enabling clause" which stated the following:
"Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan
individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the
Holy Qur'an and the Sunna."1
In order that the Muslims of Pakistan could be enabled to lead an Islamic way
of life, the constitution listed a number of steps. Among them were the provision of
facilities to promote the understanding of Islamic concepts and standards, proper
organization of zakat, wakfs and mosques, elimination of riba , prevention of
prostitution, gambling, drug-taking and consumption of alcohol.2 However, these
clauses were in reality inoperative since they were not enforceable by law. It was
clearly stated in every constitution in more or less similar words that the principles of
State policy were only guiding and no court action could be brought against the State,
any organ or authority of the State or any person on the ground that an action or a law
was not in accordance with the principles of policy.3
1 Article 25, paragraph 1, the Constitution of 1956. Similar provisions were also in the
other constitutions.
2 Cf. The Principles of State Policy in the different constitution.
3 See A. K. Brahi, Fundamental Law of Pakistan (Karachi, 1958), pp.55, 740-69.
There was one single Islamic provision in Pakistan's constitutions which was
sanctioned to be legally binding. It was the repugnancy clause which stated in the
Article 198 of the Constitution of 1956, the following:
"(1) No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the
injunctions of Islam as laid down in Holy Qur'an and Sunna,
hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam, and existing law shall be
brought into conformity with such injunctions.
(2) Effect shall be given to the provisions of clause (1) only in
the manner provided in clause (3).
(3) Within one year of the Constitution Day, the President
shall appoint a commission -
(a) to make recommendations-
(i) as to the measures for bringing existing law into
conformity with the Injunctions of Islam, and
(ii) as to the stages by which such measures should be
brought into effect; and
(b) to compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of the
National and Provisional Assemblies, such injunctions of Islam as can
be given legislative effect.
The commission shall submit its final report within five years
of its appointment, and may submit any interim report earlier. The
report, whether interim or final, shall be laid before the National
Assembly within six months of its receipt, and the Assembly after
considering the report shall enact laws in respect thereof.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall effect the personal laws of
non-Muslim citizens, or their status as citizens, or any provision of the
Constitution.
Explanation:- In the application of this Article to the personal law
of any Muslim sect, the expression Qur'an and Sunna shall mean the
Qur'an and Sunna as interprated by the sect."1
It may be clear that the aim of this clause was to bring about a legal system
reform which would necessarily involve the Islamization of all laws in order to
materialize the concepts of the sovereignty of God and the supremacy of the Shari'a.
However, nothing or very little had been done in this direction ever since Pakistan
came into existence. The constitutions of Pakistan were inoperative during most
periods and were abrogated from time to time. Some ineffective attempts were taken
towards Islamization under the military regime of Ziaul Haq during the years 1977-89.2
The thrust of the reform was the Islamization of laws. A Shari'a Court was
1 Chaoudhury, op.cit.,p. 450.
2 Cf. C. Bouma, "Pakistan's Islamization: 1977-89", Al Mushir, 31 (1989), pp. 9-27; Riaz
Hassan, "IslamizaUon: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan", Middle
Eastern Studies, 21 No.3 (July 1985), pp. 263-84.
empowered to abolish any law contrary to Islam and replace it by Islamic laws. As a
result of that various ordinances imposed some laws such as hudiid, qisas, zakat and
'ushur. However, the scope of this Islamic legislative process was limited to certain
spheres. Besides, the implementation of Islamic reforms depended on state
bureaucracy which was primarily secularly oriented.1 The reasons for the failure of
the Islamization of the constitution and laws of Pakistan were analysed by a Pakistani
Islamist as follows:
"... the reins of power have been in the hands of those persons
who not only did not have even an elementary understanding of Islamic
law and constitution, but had all their education and training for the
running of Godless secular states. Therefore, they are in a bad
predicament because they are incapable of thinking except in terms of
the nature and pattern of the Western secular type. They are not in a
position to wriggle themselves out of the Western modes of thinking
and practice. The position of the Muslim masses is not very dissimilar
in certain respects. No doubt they are extremely eager to reestablish the
Islamic way of life and this urge of theirs is very real and sincere. But
they too are not clear about the nature and form of the state whose
establishment they so sincerely urge. They also do not know as to
what should they do to establish the state of their dreams. Furthermore,
Western thinkers and policy-makers whose opinions have begun to
command immense importance in our times, who are influencing most
the decisions of the Muslim countries, and to whose opinions we too
give due weight, harbour many a prejudice and suspicion about the
nature and prospect of the Islamic state."2
In the light of such claims it may be convenient to turn now to examine the
Islamist's programme and how they conceived the structure of an Islamic modern state.
II. The Islamists' Views
A close examination of the history of the constitutional developments in
Pakistan reveals that the Islamists had played a major role in constitution-making
despite the fact that Pakistan was brought into existence and continued to be governed
by westernized secular politicians. The Islamists, with their background of Islamic
1 Hassan, op.cit., pp. 268-70.
2 Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudl, The Islamic Law and Constitution. Trans. Khurshid Ahmad, 7th
ed. (Lahore, 1980), pp. v, vi.
learning, attempted to formulate the basic concepts which characterize an Islamic state
and created public pressure by mobilizing the masses to support their demands for an
Islamic constitution. In the final analysis, the Islamists' campaign to embody Islam in
the constitution did not bear fruits, but their other task of defining Islamic
governmental principles was a remarkable contribution to the ideological controvesy
which surrounded constitution-making. The term Islamists is used here to cover
basically the 'ulama' and the Jama'at-i-Islami, an Islamic organization founded by Abu
al-ATa al-Mawdudi. It is our intention to review here their ideas regarding the concept
of an Islamic state and the definition and place of sovereignty in it.
i. Mawdudfs Thought
The Jama'at-i-Islami was a leading Islamic movement in Pakistan. The party
and its founder, Mawlana Mawdudi (1903 - 1979), wielded a lot of influence both in
the intellectual sphere and on the political platform,1 which was felt not only inside
Pakistan but also extended outside it. Mawdudfs thought, and in particular his concept
of divine sovereignty which is our present concern, had greatly impressed the minds of
the modern Muslims throughout the world. Shortly after the establishment of
Pakistan, Mawdudi launched a powerful campaign for an Islamic constitution. He
mobilized the masses to support a public demand for the Islamization of the state which
he composed in a formula of four points as follows:
"Whereas the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Pakistan
firmly believes in the principles of Islam; and whereas the entire
struggle and all the sacrifices in the freedom movement for Pakistan
were for the sole purpose of establishing these very Islamic principles
in all fields of our life:
Therefore now, after the establishment of Pakistan, we the
Muslims of Pakistan demand that the Constituent Assembly should
unequivocally declare:
1 For sources on the history of the Jama'at-i-Islami and the life and thought of Mawdudi, see
Asaf Hussain, Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran (London, 1983), pp. 47-83; Khurshid
Ahmad and Zafar Ansari, eds., Islamic Precpectives (Leicester, 1980), pp. 3-14.
(1) That the sovereignty of the State of Pakistan rests in God
Almighty and that the Government of Pakistan shall be only an agent to
execute the Sovereign's will:
(2) That the Islamic Shari'a shall form the invoilable basic code
for all legislation in Pakistan;
(3) That all existing or future legislation which may contravene,
whether in letter or in spirit, the Islamic Shari'a shall be null and void
and be considered ultra vires of the Constitution; and
(4) That the powers of the Government of Pakistan shall be
derived from, circumscribed by and exercised within the limits of
Islamic Sharia alone."1
Mawdudi, therefore, had clearly proclaimed his firm belief in Divine
sovereignty and the corollary of it the supremacy of the Shari'a laws. In order to
understand his concept of sovereignty it is essential to examine the Islamic political
theory as conceived and expounded by him.2 Political theory of Islam, he argued, like
all other aspects of Islamic ideology, was derived from and rested on a definite set of
fundamental principles. All the prophets asked mankind to acknowledge the concept
of Tawhid (the Unity of the Godhead) and to render unalloyed obedience to Him. To
explore the full significance and the logical and practical implications of these
postulates it was necessary to look to the real meaning of the terms ilah and rabb. The
word ilah in Arabic stood for ma'bud, by which was meant the object of worship, and
which in itself was a derivative of the word 'abd, that is, slave or servant. This implied
that man had to live like an 'abd to God and offer him 'ibada (worship). 'Ibada,
worship of God, was not confined to spiritual rituals and prayers, it meant "a life of
continous service and unremitting obedience like the life of a slave in relation to his
Lord." Similarly, in Arabic the word rabb literally meant "one who nourishes,
sustains, regulates and perfects."3 In the light of the meanings of ilah and rab it could
easily be discovered who possessed the qualities to rightfully claim to be ilah and rabb
and therefore deserved to be served, obeyed and worshipped. But man, instead of
1 al-Mawdudl, The Islamic Law and Constitution, pp.26-7.
2 Cf. Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudl, Political Theory of Islam, in Khurshid Ahmad ed., The
Islamic Law and Constitutio, pp. 124-52.
3 Mawdudi elaborated fully the meanings of the terms ilah, rabb, 'ibada and din in a separate
book under the title: Four Basic Quranic Terms . English tr. serialized in the Criterion from XI, No.
I (Jan., 1976) to XII, No. 2 (Feb., 1977).
recognizing God Almighty as his sole master and Lord {ilah and rabb), had enchained
himself in the slavery to other men who had made false claims to godhood. The
consequences of this man's over lordship and domination over his fellow beings
(.uluhiyya and rububiyya) was despotism, tyranny, unlawful exploitation, inequality
and injustice. This was the root-cause of all miseries and mischiefs in the world. The
real mission of the Prophets was to free man from this slavery of man over man and
this domination of man over man. The message of all the Prophets was: "O my people,
worship Allah. There is no ilah whatever for you except He.1 As God was the Creator
of the universe, its real Sustainer and Ruler and His will prevailed in the cosmos all
around, His command should also be dominant and obeyed in man's society. He
should be recognized as real Sovereign and His will should rule supreme as the law.2
Hence, Mawdudi concludes that:
"The belief in the Unity and the Sovereignty of Allah is the
foundation of the social and moral system propounded by the Prophets.
It is the very starting point of the Islamic political philosophy. The
basic principle of Islam is that human beings must, individually and
collectively, surrender all rights on overlordship, legislation and
exercising of authority over others. No one should be allowed to pass
orders or make commands in his own right and no one ought to accept
the obligation to carry out such commands and obey such orders. None
is entitled to make laws on his own authority and none is obliged to
abide by them. This right rests in Allah alone.3 According to this
theory, sovereignty belongs to Allah. He alone is the Law-giver. No
man, even he be a prophet has the right to order others in his own right
to do or not to do certain things. The Prophet himself is subject to
God's commands. Other people are required to obey the Prophet
because he enunicates not his own but God's commands.4
Thus the main characteristics of an Islamic state that can be
deduced from the express statements of the Holy Qur'an are as follows;
(1) No person, class or group, not even the entire population of
the state as a whole, can lay claim to sovereignty. God alone is the real
sovreign, all others are merely His subjects;
(2) God is the real Law-giver and the authority of absolute
legislation rests in Him. The believers cannot resort to totally
independent legislation nor can they modify any law which God has laid
down, even if the desire to effect such legislation or change in divine
laws is unanimous; and
1 The Qur'an 17:59.
2 Mawdudi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, pp. 125-36, 166.
3 Mawdudi quoted the Qur'an verses 12:40, 3:154, 16:116 and 5:44.
4 The following verses of the Qur'an are quoted 4:64, 6:50, 6:90 and 3:97.
(3) An Islamic state must, in all respects, be founded upon the
law laid down by God through His Prophet. The government which
runs such a state will be entitled to obedience in its capacity as a political
agency set to enforce the laws of God and only in so far as it acts in that
capacity. If it disregards the law revealed by God, its command will
not be binding on the believers."1
At this point a question may be posed. What was the meaning which Mawdudi
attached to the word sovereignty and made him equate it with uluhiyya and rubiibiyya.
Mawdudi himself explained the sense in which he used the term sovereignty as
follows.
"In the terminology of Modern Political Science, this word is
used in the sense of absolute overlordship or complete suzerainty. If a
person or a group of persons or an institution is to be Sovereign, it
would mean that the word of that person, group or institution is law. A
sovereign has the undisputed right to impose orders on all subjects of
the State and the subjects are under an absolute obligation to obey them,
be it willingly or unwillingly. No outside agency, excepting his own
will, impose any limitations or restrictions on his power to rule. No
subject has any absolute right against him or in contravention of his
orders. Whatever rights anybody enjoys emanate from him and
whatever rights he withdraws become extinct forthwith. It is a
universal legal axiom that every right in law comes into existence only
because the law-giver desires it to be so. If, therefore, the law-giver
withdraws it, its very existence is obliterated and it cannot be demanded
thereafter. Laws come into existence by dint of the will of the sovereign
and place all subjects of the state under an obligation to obey them; but
no law binds the Sovereign himself. In other words, he is the absolute
authority, which means that, in relation to his orders, questions of good
and evil and right and wrong cannot and should not arise at all.
Whatever he does, is just and nobody can question his conduct or his
orders and their enforcement, His behaviour is the criterion of right
and wrong and none can question it. It is thus inescapable that the
sovereign should be accepted as being absolutely above all aberrations
and errors, even though he may not actually be so.
Such is the nature and meaning of the concept of sovereignty as
enunicated by modern lawyers and jurist'. Nothing short of this can be
termed sovereignty. This sovereignty, however, remains a mere legal
supposition so long as some active parmount body capable of enforcing
it is not available. In the language of Political Science, therefore, legal
sovereignty without political sovereignty has no practical existence.
Political sovereignty thus naturally means ownership of the authority of
enforcing legal sovereignty."2
Applying this modern Western original sense of sovereignty, with its attributes
of absoluteness, unity and illimitability, it was natural that Mawdudi arrived, like some
1 Mawdudi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, pp. 136- 8.
2 Mawdudi, First Principles of Islamic State, in Khurshid Ahmad ed., The Islamic Law
and Constitutio, pp. 212-4.
Western thinkers, to the conclusion that such sovereignty did not and had not existed
within the bounds of humanity. Neither any monarchy nor the people nor any
institution possessed these attributes of sovereignty. The myth of investing anything
with it whether an individual or an institution or a people was not justifiable on any
grounds. It was a superhuman right reserved for God alone and was inherent in Him
by reason of His being the Creator. The Qur'an explained this point by saying:
"Verily, His is the Creation and His is the Law".1 Moreover, the association of this
superhuman quality with any human agency had invariably resulted in despotism and
injustice. For these reasons Islam had definitely placed de jure sovereignty with God
whose de facto sovereignty was clearly working over all the creation.2 But it was
important to notice that this God's sovereignty as stated in the Qur'an was not merely
of the metaphysical type but it also comprised both legal and political aspects.3
Since sovereignty belonged to God alone, the Muslims, according to Mawdudi,
adopted the word khilafa (vicegerency) for the political organisation. Khilafa, he
explained, referred to one who enjoyed 'certain rights and powers not in his own right
but as a representative and viceroy of his Lord'. This concept of vicegerency should
not be confused with Western doctrines of the divine right of kings or papal authority.
Mawdudi argued that the vicegerency of God was not the exclusive birthright of any
person or body of persons. It was the collective right of all those who recognized the
absolute sovereignty of God over themselves and adopted the divine code as their
supreme law. In other words, this vicegerency belonged to the whole community of
believers, the Muslims. Quoting the Qur'an,4 Mawdudi assumed that every Muslim
was a caliph of God in his individual capacity. For this principle he coined the term
'popular vicegerency' and presumed that it was the basis of democracy in Islam. While
1 The Qur'an 7:54.
2 Mawdudi, First Principles of the Islamic State, pp. 214 - 6.
3 Mawdudi, Fundamentals of Islamic Constitution, in Khurshid Ahmad ed., The Islamic Law
and Constitution, pp. 255- 6.
4 The Qur'an 24: 55.
Western secular democracy was formed on the foundation of popular sovereignty,
Islam totally repudiated this philosophy and established its polity on the sovereignty of
God and the popular vicegerency of man. These two principles demanded that claims
to absolute sovereignty in an Islamic state were to be forsaken and that authority was to
be vested in the whole Muslim society as a delegation by God and to be exercised
within the limits set by him. The Qur'an described the method of application of the
doctrine of 'popular sovereignty' in the following statement: "They manage their affairs
by mutual consultation"1 This verse made it clear that no collective matter of the
Muslims should be conducted without counsel with the people concerned. Such rule
applied in the first place to the appointment of the Head of the Muslim State and to the
mangement of governmental affairs. Islam had not prescribed a definite mode of
consultation and it was left to the Muslims to decide it in terms of time and place.
Problems of whether to consult the people directly or indirectly through their
representatives, whether to form one consultative body or two, whether to hold general
elections or have electoral colleges and the like were to be solved according to the needs
of the time.2
A fundamental feature of the Islamic state, which emerged from the priciples of
sovereignty of God and vicegerency of man and which distinguished it from a non-
Islamic state, was that it adopted divine law as set in the Qur'an and theSunna of the
Prophet as the final authority. If this charcteristic was lacking, the state would not be
Islamic. The Qur'an and Sunna consisted of definite principles and certain injunctions
in different spheres of life and activity which laid down the broad framework within
which man was given the freedom to make decisions, legislate and set subsidery laws
to regulate his life affairs. These limits which man was not permitted to override were
termed 'Divine Limits' (Hudiid Allah ) in the Islamic phraseology. The Qur'an warned
those who did not govern their affairs in accordance with God's revealed law and did
1 The Qur'an, 42: 38.
2 Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, pp. 148-52,172-3, 218-9, 258- 61.
not enforce it that they were (a) disbelievers (b) unjust and (c) transgressors.1 Whoever
did not follow the law of God was guilty of the three crimes kufr, zulm and fisq but
the extent of his guilt would, of course, depend on the extent of the deviation and
disobedience which in certain cases might take him outside the fold of Islam. It
logically followed from these injunctions that it was beyond the purview of any
legislature of an Islamic state to lay any laws in contravention of the directives of the
Qur'an and the Sunna and all such laws, even though passed by the legislature, would
be considered null and void. In spite of these limitations, Mawdudi assumed that, the
legislature in an Islamic state, had a number of functions. The legislature, according to
him, was known in the old terminology of Fiqh as 'the body which resolves and
prescribes' (Ahl al-hall wa-al-'Aqd). Wherever there were explicit directives of God
and his Prophet, the legislature alone was competent "to enact them in the shape of
sections, devise relevant definitions and details and make rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing them". If these directives were capable of more than one
interpretation, the legislature had the authority to decide which of these interpretations
should be preferred and enacted into law. Where the provisions of the Qur'an and
thtSunna were not explicit the legislature had to enact laws taking into account the
general spirit of Islam and the opinions found in the books of Fiqh. If even basic
guidance was not available the legislature was left free to make laws according to his
best lights provided that they were not in contravention in any way to the letter or the
spirit of the Divine law.2
In his discussions Mawdudi drew a comparison between the Islamic and
Western concepts of sovereignty. Islam, in his view, was extremely antithetical to
secular Western democracy. Western democracy was founded on the doctrine of
popular sovereignty which placed absolute powers of legislation and determination of
values and norms of conduct in the hands of the people. Laws were drived according
1 The Qur'an, 5: 44, 45, 47.
2 Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, pp. 140-5, 174-5, 182-3, 221-3.
to the attitudes and moods of the masses. If they desired any specific piece of
legislation it had to be enacted however unacceptable it might be from religious and
moral standpoint; and if they disapproved of any law it had to be abrogated however
just and good it might be. In contrast to that, Islam had established its state on the
sovereignty of God and the khildfa (vicegerency) of man. The Islamic government
was bound to administer its affairs and laws within the limits set by the divine law.
Viewed from this angle the Islamic state might be confused with Western theocracy of
which Europe had had a bitter experience. In such kind of theocracy a class of
priesthood, which clearly distinguished itself from the rest of the society, enjoyed
absolute domination to enforce its own man-made laws in the name of God. In other
words, it was imposing its own godhood over laypersons. This was not the case in
Islam wherin rulership was not in the hands of any particular religious class but the
entire Muslim society had the right to run the state and the government was established
or changed by the will of the people. Since in that way Islam was a unique system
which bore certain similarities and differences in relation to other systems, Mawdudi
coined the term 'theo-democracy' to describe it. More important than that, however,
was that his analysis along these lines of thought lead him to use the phrase limited
popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God' to signify the authority of the people
instead of the word khildfa (vicegerency). In the light of this usage it may be assumed
that Mawdudi most probably used the two terms, khildfa (vicegerency) and limited
popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God' to mean the same thing.1 To verifiy
this point further it is proposed to examine the following statements of Mawdudi who
said:
"If I were permited to coin a new term, I would describe this
system of government as a 'theo-democracy', that is to say a divine
democratic government, because under this the Muslims have been
given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The
executive under this system of government is constituted by the general
will of the Muslims who have also the right to depose it. All
1 Ibid., pp. 138 - 52, 218-9,
administrative matters and all questions about which no explicit
injunction is to be found in the Shari'a are settled by the consensus of
opinion among the Muslims. Every Muslim who is capable and
qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law, is entitled to
interpret the law of God when such interpretation becomes necessary.
In this sense the Islamic polity is a democracy. But it is a theocracy in
the sense that where an explicit command of God or His Prophet already
exists, no Muslim leader or legislature, or any religious scholar can
form an independent judgement, not even all the Muslims of the world
put together, have any right to make the least alteration in it."1
ii. The 'Ulama'
Mawdudi was the principal reprsentative of the Islamic revivalist movement in
Pakistan. The significant charcteristic of his approach was an attempt to reconstruct the
Islamic thought in order to meet the intellectual challange of the West and to fulfil the
needs of the modem times. He differed in this respect from the traditional 'ulama' who
adopted in general a conservative approach. For many reasons the 'ulamd' were
unable to understand the modern political or constitutional problems or speak the
language of today. This created an ideological gap between them and the westernized
politicians who held the reigns of power in their hands. In spite of all their
shortcomings, the 'ulamd' continued to form a powerful religious leadership which
exerted a great influence in the development of events. In the course of time, they
adjusted themselves to the new situations and were able to provide interesting views on
constitutional and political matters. A brief account of these views shall follow below.
One of the outstanding 'ulama' of Pakistan was Mawlana Shabir Ahmad
'Uthmani who was the head of Jama't-al-'Ulama'-i-Islam which was the only
organization of ulamd' at the time when Pakistan came into existence. He had also
close links with the ruling class and was appointed as a Muslim League member of the
first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. This unique position enabled him to bring
about public pressure on the government and to voice the opinions of the 'ulama in
the official circles. 'Uthmani was the only 'alim in the first Constituent Assembly.
After his death the voice of the 'ulama' was weak in the Assembly though they were
1 Ibid., pp. 139 - 40.
strong outside it. Later on, a number of 'ulama entered the Assembly especially
during Bhutto's era.1 However, in the speeches of 'Uthmani one could hear an echo of
Mawdudi's thought. In the debates of the Constituent Assembly over the Objectives
Resolution, Mawlana 'Uthmani spoke about Divine sovereignty and said:
"An Islamic state is not a state in its own right, with authority
inherent in it. It is a state to which authority has been delegated. The
real sovereignty belongs to God. Man is his vicegerent on earth and
discharges his obligations along with other religious duties within the
limits prescribed by God, thus exercising his authority within a more
comprehensive Divine sovereignty."2
Beside the Constituent Assembly the voice of the 'ulama.' was officilly
expressed in the Board of TaTimat-i-Islamia (Islamic Teachings) which was an
advisory body formed in 1949 by the Basic Principles Committee to counsel on matters
related to the Islamic aspects of the constitution. The membership of the Board
consisted of prominent 'ulama' including Mawlana 'Uthmani who was its first
chairman.3 The Board had no real power and its authority was only to advise on
matters referred to it. Yet, its opinions were kept secert by the government and were
not made available even to the members of the Constituent Assembly. Mufti Shafi,
who succeeded 'Uthmani in its chairmanship, published a pamphlet under the title "The
Basic Principles of the Quranic Constitution of the State" which was believed to
have summed up the views of the Board.4 In it he asserted, in the same way as
Mawdudi, the principle of divine sovereignty. Sovereignty rested with God alone.
" The government of the earth," he wrote, "is entrusted to mankind only as a trust and a
delegated function."5 In addition to Shafi's book there were some released reports of
1 See Shafiq, System of Government, p. 13.
2 Constituent Assembly Debates, V, No. 3 (March 1949), p. 45, quoted with changes in the
translation in Manzooruddin, op. cit., p. 90. For the views of 'Uthmani see Shafiq, Islamic Concept
of Modern State, pp. 67-9.
3 Among the members of the Board was Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari as secretary, Mufti
Muhammad Shafi, Mawlana Sulayman al-Nadawi, Dr. Muahammad Hamidullah and Mufti Ja'far
Hussain , a Shi'a scholar. For a more detailed account of the Boad and its views see Leonard Binder,
Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley, 1963), pp. 155- 82.
4 See Mawlana Mufti Muhammad Shafi, The Basic Principles of the Qur'anic
Constitution of the State (Karachi, 1955). For a summary of his ideas see J. Windrow Sweetman,
"Viewpoints in Pakistan", The Muslim World, XLVII, No. 2 (April, 1957), pp. 117- 21.
5 Sweetman, op. cit., p. 120.
the Board which need close examination. In them the Board offered a definition of an
Islamic state as follows:
"Islamic state means a state ruled in accordance with the tenets of
Islam or, more correctly, a state where the divine order, as contained in
the Holy Qur'an and Sunna , reigns supreme and the entire Government
business in its various spheres is conducted with a view to executing the
will of Allah as laid down in the Shari'a. The next significant
implication of an Islamic and, for the matter of that, of any ideological
state is that all the places wherefrom the policies of the Government
emanate must necessarily be in the charge of such persons who not
only believe in the fundamental principles underlying that particular
ideology but also conform to the minimum code promulgated under that
paritcular ideology."1
Such a state, maintained the Board, was required to work for the consolidation
of Islam, implementation of its scheme of life, ensuring dispensation of justice and
provision of necessaries of life to all subjects, preservation of good morals, spread of
knowledge and learning, and maintenance of peace and order inside its territory and in
the world. The performance of these functions of the state was, in the first place, the
responsibility of the whole people of the state who had to elect a Head of State to
discharge these duties on their behalf and in consultation with thier representatives.
From this analysis three constituent elements of the Islamic state were brought out,
namely, the people, the councillors and the head of state. Each of these had its own
powers, riglhts and obligations. The Board elaborated these powers as follows:
"The people are responsible for electing their head and giving
him full allegiance, co-operation and support and keeping an eye over
his activities, the councillors for giving wise and sincere advice and
such assistance in the discharge of the head's duties as may be required
of them, and the head for the functioning of the entire machinery of
government within the framework of the Shari'a and with a view to
accomplishing the aforementioned objectives.
The head of state may have a single advisory council for the
performance of his multifarious fuctions -legislative, propagative,
executive and judicial - or, if exigencies of times and climes so require,
a number of councils with well-defined scopes. He is the trustee of the
interests of the Milla, the symbol and manifestation of its power and
authority and its executive organ in all walks of the state. But Islamic
Government being essentially a consultative government, he is bound to
take counsel from men of wisdom and righteousness and to ascertain the
1 Report of the Board dated 10-4-50 reproduced in appedix A in Binder, op. cit., p. 385.
desires and wishes of the people in matters left out by the Shari 'a as
discretionary."1
The Board suggested having a number of councils in a big territory like
Pakistan which included legislative council, executive council, propagative or cultural
council and judicial council. The details of functions of each of these councils and their
relation with the head of state were drawn up by the Board.2 As for the legislation,
with which we are more concerned here, it was stated that its activity was limited due to
the fact that the Islamic state was based on the idea of the sovereignty of Allah and its
function, therfore, was mainly to execute His commands and will. In matters which
were expressly laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunna or determined by consensus of
opinion of knowledgeable persons there was little room for legislation. However,
there was still a wide range of affairs outside these two catogeries which called for a
legislative machinery to fulfil the day-to-day needs in condition that the laws made
thereby should be in the light of the broad and basic principles of Islam and its spirit
and should not conflict with them.3 In view of this, the Board mentioned that there
was a fundmental difference between democracy and Islam. In an Islamic state
supremacy is to the commands of Allah and the will of the people was compratively
subservient to them; while, on the contrary, the will of the people was to be
unconditionally dominant in an absolute democratic state. It was essential, therefore,
that the future constitution of Pakistan should not be a copy of the constitution of any
contemporary Western or Eastern democratic states. The Board, in particular, attacked
the tendency to imitate the British or the Indian constitution and called for different
courses which would be in closer resemblance with the traditions of Pakistan. The
Board also observed that the legislatures in various countries were made the most
powerful bodies and were vested with administrive and judicial functions in addition to
legislation such as consideration of the budget, ratification of treaties and hearing of
1 Ibid., p. 395.
2 Ibid., pp. 395-400.
3 Ibid., p. 396.
cases against the head of state. Hence, it was suggested that pure legislation be
allocatedto the legislative council and the other functions such as the election and
deposition of the head of state and the budget be entrusted to a larger representative
body which may be called the Supreme House (Majlis al-Hall wa-al-'Aqd).1 As for the
question of whether non-Muslims were legible to become members in the legislature or
the Supreme House, the Board was of the view that considerations of many factors lead
it to allow them the right of membership provided that it should be ensured that the
injunctions of Islam should not be affected in any manner.2 It was also the opinion of
the Board that it would be preferable not to bring women into the representative
assemblies on the ground that Islam assigned to them a social role inside the home and
they were not encouraged to bear activities outside except in conditions of urgent
necessity. However, if the membership of women was deemed indispensible, the
Board suggested that it should only be granted to women of fifty years of age and who
observed the rules of the Islamic dress.3 In the main the Board was in favour of
universal suffrage, but it laid down certain qualifications for the candidates. Muslim
candidates should be observant of the tenets of Islam and non-Muslims should not
object openly to the principle of the sovereignty of God which was the foundation of
the constitution of Pakistan.4
The 'ulama', as it was pointed above, were very active outside the official
spheres. Facing allegations that there was a severe conflict of opinions among them
about the version of Islamic constitution demanded for Pakistan, a convention of
scholars of all schools of thought was held in Krachi in January 1951. The conference
formulated unanimously in twenty two points the "Basic Principles of the Islamic
State".5 The first principle stated that "ultimate sovereignty over all nature and all law
1 Ibid., pp. 406-9.
2 Ibid., pp. 409-10.
3 Ibid., pp. 410-2.
4 Ibid., pp. 412-3.
5 See Mawdudi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, the introduction pp.28-9 and appendix 1,
pp. 331-6 for the text of the resolutins and the names of the participants.
vests in Allah, the Lord of the universe, alone." Hence, the law of the country should
be based on the Qur'an and the Sunna and no law or administrative order should be
issued in conflict with them.1 The Head of the State was entrusted with the full
administrative authority of the state although he could delegate part of his powers to any
person or body. However, he should discharge his duties in a consultative manner
with the advice of the officials of the state and the elected representatives of the people.
He had no right to run the government without consultation (shura) or to suspend the
constitution wholly or partly. With respect to civil rights, he should be equal to other
Muslims and should not be above the law. The body empowered to elect him should
also have the power to depose him by a majority of votes.2
Beside the convention of the 'ulama' there were some other conferences
organised by academic persons in which the problem of sovereignty from the Islamic
point of view was dealt with.3 Moreover, sovereignty became the subject of interesting
research carried out by scholars who were generally familiar with Western concepts.4
In the main, the doctrine of the sovereignty of God was accepted, defended and
explained in most of the studies. Nonetheless, it is significant to notice a tendency to
discover more than one sovereignty in the Islamic state. Mazheruddin Siddiqi, for
instance, in All Pakistan Political Science Conference of 1962 concluded his paper on
"The Concept of Sovereignty in Islam" with the following remarks:
"It is, therefore, clear that there is no one sovereign in Muslim
polity. Sovereignty is not concentrated either in the person of the caliph
or the people, both of whom are subject to the laws of Islam which they
1 Ibid,, p. 332.
2 Ibid„ p.334.
3 Cf. Amir Hassan Siddiqi, "Concept of Sovereingty in the Islamic State', in S. Moinul Haq,
ed., The Proceedings of the Pakistan History Conference (2nd. session, Karachi, 1952), pp. 60- 8;
Yusuf Abbas Hashmi, "Sovereignty in Islam in Theory and Practice", ibid,, pp. 87-97; Mazheruddin
Siddiqi, "The Concept of Sovereignty in Islam", in Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, ed., The Proceedings of
the Third All Pakistan Political Science Conference, 1962, pp. 87- 96.
4 There is only one book which is exlusively written about the Islmaic concept of
sovereignty, that is, Ilyas Ahmad, Sovereignty: Islamic and Modern (Karachi, 1965). But, it is very
unsystematic and polemical. Periodicals contain various mateiral. See for example S. A. Q. Husaini,
"The Sovereign in a Muslim State", The Islamic Literature, II, No. 7 (July, 1950), pp. 595-604;
Haroon Khan Sherwani, Sovereignty in the Islamic State, ibid., II, No. 8 (August, 1950), pp. 843- 51.
can not change or modify according to their will. But the people enjoy
the right of choosing the ruler and removing him. They can criticise him
and see that he does not follow wrong policies, but so long as he keeps
to the observance and enforcement of Islamic law or does not do
anything in flagrant disregard of the interests of religion or the Islamic
polity, they are required to obey him. The ruler, on the other hand,
enjoys wide powers of administration and the enforcement of the laws
and punishments of Islam. He can legislate outside the sphere covered
by the Islamic law. He has to conduct the foreign policy of the state and
is charged with its defence. These are wide powers and in their exercise
he enjoys unquestionable sovereignty. Yet, above both the people and
the ruler stands the fabric of Islamic law whose observance is binding
on both. This presuposes a completely free judiciary and history shows
that the system of qada' in Islamic Countries was to a very great extent
independent of the ruler and free from his interference. Thus the
Shari'a or the law of Islam is a far more real sovereign than either the
people or the ruler, though, within their sphere, these two also enjoy a
limited measure of sovereignty."1
1 Mazheruddin Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 96.
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I. Validity of the Western Concept of Sovereignty
The question of the validity of the Western concept of sovereignty, its
existence or non-existence in ancient or modern communities, and where it can be
located is basically a problem of terminology. The controversy over them appears to
originate essentially from the ambiguity of meaning of the word sovereignty as there are
a great variety of senses attached to it. With respect to the more general meaning of
sovereignty, however, there appears to be no real difference in opinions. The necessity
of the existence of a superior power wihin any community to maintain law and order
has been expressed in ancient and modern thought. In particular, the Greek, Roman,
Christian and Muslim political thinkers have made intense studies about the proper
qualities of the holder of the "supreme power" and his primary functions. It is only in
the circumstances that prevailed in Europe at the beginning of the early modern period
that the concept of sovereignty took on a definite formula there. Two specific factors
had a great impact on the shape of the modern theory of sovereignty in its formative
period in France, that is, the emegence of the secular territorial nation state and the
acceptance of the postive conception of law. The definition, therefore, of the French
jurisit Jean Bodin of the sixteenth century, which is regarded as being the first modem
expression of sovereignty, embodied implicitly and explicitly the claims of national
monarchy. As a product of peculiar historical conditions, sovereignty meant an
absolute, indivisible, inalienable, and unlimited right of command placed in the national
king's hands. The commands of the king established the law while he himself was
regarded as above the law. These attributes of sovereignty, as a recent thinker
observed, were analogous to the qualities of God. Theologians, in speaking of the
sovereignty of God, ascribed to him absolute supremacy and plenteous power with
the implication of the complete subjection of man to God. In applying the same sense to
the political context, he concluded, it appeared that "the theological concept of
sovereignty has been secularised."1
Nonetheless, these attributes were confirmed further by later theorists who were
reasoning under a similar historical environment. Perhaps the most important of these
were Thorns Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Austin. In the main they were
in agreement on the attributes and nature of sovereignty. They differed only on the
person or body of persons who possessed or ought to possess sovereignty. While
Hobbes continued to vest it in a personal ruler, Rousseau shifted it to the ruled, that is
to say, the whole people and Austin placed it in the hands of their representatives.
As long as the circumstances that led to the formulation of the theory of
sovereignty, namely the establishment of the national state and its right of law-making,
still survive, many still hold it to be valid. Yet, there are some voices which have
claimed that the 'classical' doctrine of sovereignty is inadequte to account for a number
of new developments such as federalism, international law and modern democracy.
Moreover, in the light of a new understanding of the nature and character of the state
and law the traditional ideas of sovereignty have been given new interpretations. It is
very difficult, according to the critics of the theory, to decide accurately the location of
an absolute sovereignty in a federal state since authority is shared between the central
and local governments. Sovereignty with its despotic connotations appears as anti-
democtatic. In the international sphere where states are regarded as equals it is not
practical to grant any one of them an absolute freedom and total independence. Leon
Duguit, a French lawyer, dwelt on the concept of a welfare state whose main function
was to provide public services to reject the absolute notion of sovereignty. Among the
critics of sovereignty was the English Political Scientist Harold Laski who viewed the
state as one organisation among others in the society and, therefore, denied its
1 George Schwarzenberger," The Forms of Sovereignty" in W. J. Stankiewicz, In Defence of
Sovereignty (New York, 1969), p. 165.
monopoly of power under the name of sovereignty. The historical origins of the
concept of sovereignty, maintained Laski, represented "not an absolute but a historical
logic".1 On the other hand, on the basis of the assumption that there exist a number of
kinds of power in any society which operate at the same time, many types of
sovereignty have been claimed to be discovered. These include poltical, legal,
coercive, influential, de jure, de facto, internal, external, positive, negative, absolute
and relative. In other words, it is maintained that there exists a number of bodies in
which sovereignty is located, each of which is found to be fully supreme, but only
within its proper sphere. But this tendency is also faced with objections not least
because it shows sovereignty as a 'protean' word which has no fixed meaning.2 One
of the advocates of this tendency admits that:
"The dilemma with which we are faced, therefore, if we wish to
retain the concept of sovereignty, is very great. If we preserve the
traditional simplicity of the concept, it is too ambiguous to be of service,
but if we draw the distinctions necessary to avoid these ambiguities, the
analysis of the concept becomes so complicated that its use is no longer
helpful. "3
This dilemma concerning the nature of sovereignty has its effect on the question
of who bears or ought to bear the sovereign rights and how to justify the claim to hold
them.Similarly, this enquiry seems to be a puzzle. The entities in which, according to
various Western theories, sovereignty does reside or should reside comprise the
monarchy, the people, the state, the parliament, the electorate, the constitution, coercive
institutions such as the army or the police and influential bodies like pressure groups.
Perhaps, the most objectionable attribute of sovereignty when determining its location
1 Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925), p. 48.
2 See Stanley Benn, "The Uses of Sovereignty", Political Studies, III, No. 2 (June, 1955)
pp. 109-22. Reprinted in Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of Sovereignty, pp. 67-85.
2 W. J. Rees, "The Theory of Sovereignty Restated", in Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of
Sovereignty, p. 221.
within the human boundaries is its absoluteness since all human authority is necessarily
relative and conditional. Here we are faced with the basic defect in the original
Western theory of sovereignty. When Bodin conceived the sovereign prince as an
image of God,1 he actually embodied this notion in his attributes of the sovereign.
However, the complexities of the problem are reduced if claims to absolute, illimitable
and indivisible power were excluded. If sovereignty is understood to mean the highest,
greatest, final and most general human power in the society it is possible to find a germ
of truth in it. Since the unique function of any political power is to maintain the legal
order it is not possible to fulfil such a function if these qualities are not possessed. The
criterion which determines where the highest, greatest and final power can be located
is the phenomenon of obedience. It seems to be commonly believed that obedience is a
fundamental constituent of sovereignty and from its existence power is established.
Sovereignty which is not rendered de jure or de facto obedience does not exist.
Whoever is obeyed as a highest and a final authority is a sovereign in the sphere in
which he is obeyed. The fact that it is possible to attribute obedience to diffrent entities
by obeying each body in its proper sphere allow for the existence of more than one
relative sovereign in the society. By a consideration of the historical conditions it can be
decided who is obeyed in a particular case. As for the question who ought to be
soverign it is to be remembered that any system of rule embody an ideology and the
answer to that question is to be sought within that ideology. Apparently, each ideology
costructs its own theory of sovereignty.
1 See Jacques Maritain, "The Concept of Sovereignty", in Stankiewicz (ed.), In Defence of
Sovereignty, p. 47.
2. The Muslim Viewpoint
i. The Early Muslims
The early Muslim thinkers, especially Ibn Khaldun, made outstanding
endeavours to analyse the nature of political power in human civilization to which they
applied the term mulk. It is stated that mulk was essential for human associtaion
(,ijtimd'). Its essence was its competence, than which there should be no one stronger
and higher , to effect real subjection of the people in order to enable it to carry out the
various functions of rule. According to Ibn Khaldun, it was possible to classify mulk
into three kinds owing to the type of laws (qawanln) enforced. Firstly, there was
arbitrary mulk which had no established set of rules except the bigoted desires of the
ruler. Secondly, the secular type of mulk which was based on laws established solely
by human reason. The third kind of mulk was the one founded on divine laws revealed
by God to a prophet. God in this system was considered the only law-giver and mulk,
whose basic function was the enforcement of the divine laws, belonged originally to the
prophets who recieved God's revelation. Afer them it was passed to successors who
were called caliphs (khulafa') in the Islamic phraseology.
The above analysis explains why the Muslim rulership was given the term
caliphate (khilafa) beside other names like imamate (imama) and imarate (imara). In
most standard definitions, the caliphate was viewed as a succession to the Prophet in
the office of the enforcement of the divine laws and the maintenance of order and
material welfare. Most of the Muslim scholars did not accept the idea that the caliph is
God's vicegerent, but he was descibed as a shadow of God. Ibn Taymiyya's
statements of the reasons why the caliph was an image of God on earth stands out as a
remarkable explanation. He said:
"Definitely the sultan is a servant of God, created by Him,
always in need of Him, and cannot dispense with Him, But there are
some qualities possessed by the sultan like ability, authority, protection,
support and other attributes of mastery (su'dud) and lordship
(samadiyya) on which rests the control and welfare of the people. That
is the reason why he resembles the shadow of God on earth; besides he
is the most effective cause to put the affairs of the people in order. If the
one who is possessed with power is good, then the affairs of the people
will be set in a right state. If he is corrupt there exist pandemonium and
injustice in accordance with the extent of his corruptiont though the
people will not be in a state of complete disorder in every aspect. There
must exist some benefit as long as the sultan exists, because he is the
shadow of God. But shadow may sometimes be completely dark and
sheltering from any kind of harm, and sometimes it protects only
partially. However, if there is no shadow there will be complete
disorder. That is a case similar to the situation if God does not exist,
because God is the one who sustains all mankind."1
The various thinkers attached to the caliphate a number of attributes such as
describing it as most superior ('uzma), most general ('dmma) and independent. It was
also conceived as an authority assigned to a determinate definite person by which it was
meant that it did not belong to all the people though it was in their power to elect or
depose the caliph and supervise his acts. Being an elective office was also one of the
charcters of the caliphate according to the Sunni view. They held that it should be
based on consulation (shard) in its formation and in its administraion of governmental
affairs. However, the political realtities compelled the Sunnis to legitimize the rule taht
had gained competence (shawka) by force and not by consent provided that it
maintained the supremacy of the Sharia laws.
In the final analysis, there appears to be certain similarites beween the concept
of mulk as understood by the early Muslim thinkers and the Western notion of
sovereginty and there are significant distinctions. If sovereignty is taken to mean
simply a highest, greatest, final and most general political power it becomes very close
to mulk. The Muslims associated to mulk supremacy, generality, and competence, but
they never thought of it as absolute or illimitable. But the distinction between mulk and
sovereignty is not only in the attributes attached to them but it is basicaly in thier
nature. Owing to the peculiar conditions which shaped the Western concepts,
sovereingty has become essentially national and secular. One of the important marks of
sovereignty is its legal aspect, that is to say, it creates laws beside its other function of
subjecting the people to obey it. Without being the source of law-making sovereignty in
1 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa (al-Ribat, n.d.), p. 46.
the Western conception does not exist. Sovereignty will only be found if law is
positively made and not given. Mulk, on the other hand, is possible to exist regardless
of wheather it possesses the authority to make laws or not. The basic function ofmulk
is the enforcement of law and not law-making. Laws can be made either by the wilful
wishes of the ruler, the decisions of the political elite of the state, or they could be given
by God. Mulk will only be Islamic if law in it is given by God and not made by men.
This forms a basic difference which distinguishes sovereignty from mulk.
ii. Modern Muslims
By the year 1924 the last form of the Muslim caliphate was abolished and in its
place the secular nation state sytstem of the West was adopted. That was the
culmination of a long process of secularization in Turkey which was developing in a
similar way in the other parts of the Muslim world. By reason of many historical and
geographical factors westernization was very forceful in Turkey, Egypt and India and
they bcame a scene of the encounter betwen Islam and Western ideas. The political
thought of the secular intellectuals which accompanied the development of secularism in
the Muslim countries was generally a mere imitation of the West. The Western cncepts
of sovereignty were echoed and in most cases enacted in constitutions without any
critical evaluation. Under the impact of the French revolution and other influences
democratic ideas especially the concept of sovereignty of the people spread widely.
The words hakimiyyat millat in Turkish and sultt al-umma or siyyadat al-umma in
Arabic, which mean sovereignty of the people, became the motto of the secular
movement in Turkey and Egypt which portrayed itself as a freedom crusade against
despotism.
In the course of the decisive struggle between Islam and secularism, the
traditional intellectual leaders of the Muslims, the 'ulamd', remained stagnant and over
protective towards the old order of the past. They failed to adapt their thought to the
new changes and initate solutions to the new problems. In particular, they were unable
to grasp the modern political and legal concepts or express the Islamic principles in the
language of today. Consequently, the secular politicians won the battle and captured
power even in Pakistan which was established as a seperate state chiefly to enable the
Muslims to maintain their Islamic identity. Not only was the political and legal
authority of Islam disestablished in the Muslim countries but most of the Islamic way
of life was uprooted. Those successive blows to the position of Islam brought about a
new movement of Islamic reform. Amongst the tasks of this reform was to define the
Islamic principles and express them in modern terms. Therefore , it addressed itself to
the problem of sovereignty as an important political and legal concept.
With respect to the problem of sovereignty two tendencies dominated the
thought of the Islamic reformists. The first laid emphasis on the Islamic ideas which
combat despotism which was seen as a chief cause of the degeneration of the Islamic
life. The second focused on the campaign against secualrism, which completely got rid
of Islam, and involved itself in stressing the ultimate supremacy of the Islamic scheme
of life including the political and legal system. Both trends borrowed the Western
concepts of sovereignty and attempted to interpret them from an Islamic point of view.
The former attitude used the notion of popular sovereignty to denote the participation of
the Muslim populace in governmental affairs. The latter denied that sovereignty can be
attached to any human being and reserved it only to God or to His divine laws, the
Shari'a.
An outstanding advocate of the stress laid on the role of the Muslim community
in relation to its ruler is Muhammad Rashid Rida who explicity admitted that he used
the term sovereignty of the nation (sultat al-umma) in its modern political sense to
express his ideas. Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the movement of the Muslim
Brothers (al-lkhwan al-Muslimun), and 'Abd al-Qadir 'Uda, a leading thinker of the
movement, were in agreement with Rida in his usage of the concept sultat al-umma and
its applications and reproduced his thesis in their writings. These thinkers argued that
one of the fundamentals of Islam was that the Muslim community possessed
sovereignty. Islam attributed to the community through its representatives ahl al- 'aqd
wa-al-hall (the people who bind and loose) the power of election and deposition of the
ruler, consultation (shard) in governmental decisions, and definiton of the law.
However, it must be rmarked that they never accepted the full connotations of the
Western concept of sovereignty of the nation. The Muslim community was not based
on nationalism and it was not free to legislate anything which was not in conformity
with the Shari'a laws. Assigning sovereignty to the community, it was asserted, was
not in contradiction with the doctrine of oneness of godship (tawhid al-rububiyya)
which implied that God was the real legislator and His laws enjoyed ultimate
supremacy. It is clear, therefore, that though these thinkers have borrowed the modem
Western concept of popular sovereignty to express their ideas, yet they were compelled
to give it new interpretations and make vital amendments to it in order to make it
suitable to convey the Islamic ideas.
On the other hand, the other group of Islamists who emphasized the supremacy
of God's laws, the Shari'a, preferred to assign sovereignty directly to it or to God.
Perhaps, the most important of those thinkers are the Turkish Prince Sa'Id Halim
Pasha, Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudl of Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt. Sa'id
appears to be the first to use the phrase 'sovereignty of the Shari'a' to express the
belief of the Muslims in the obligation and the supremacy of the divine laws, the
Shari'a, in contrast to the concept of national sovereignty which was employed by the
secularists to disestablish Islam. He was convinced that "the whole social framework
of Islam rests upon the fundmental principle of the Shari'a."1 He also furnished new
arguments to justify the truth of the Shari'a's sovereignty and the falsehood of the
national sovereignty. Man was not competent to discover social laws to govern his life
as he was able to find scientific laws in the physical and natural sphere. Therefore,
1 Sa'id Halim Pasha, "The Reform of Muslim Society". Ednglish tran. Muhammad
Marmaduke Pickthal, Islamic Culture, I, No. 1 (January, 1927), p. 101.
law, which was the basis of order in the society, could only be derived from the
incontestable source, God. By reason of this fact, he maintained that the principle of
national sovereignty was a false imaginary right which produced only injustice.
Al-Mawdudi, who was writting after Sa'id, followed a similar line of thought
but in place of the Shari'a he vested sovereignty in God himself. Sayyid Qutb's
contribution, on the oter hand, was mainly an elaboration and explanation of the ideas
of al-Mawdudi. Al-Mawdudi has expressedly acknowledged, like Rida and al-Banna,
that he borrowed the word sovereignty (hakimiyya) from the terminology of modern
Political Science. He understood to it to mean 'absolute overlordship or complete
suzerainty' which entitled its holder to unquestionalble right to impose his orders on all
the subjects of the state without himself being subjected to any limitatiions or
restrictions on his power to rule except his own will. Laws were enacted by the means
of his absolute will which was the only criterion of right and wrong and good and evil
and all the subjects were under obligation to obey them. It is clear, therefore, that his
concept of sovereignty was identical with the original notion developed by the early
Western theorizers up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Assuming this sense
of sovereignty, he argued that no human being could possess it or be justified in
holding it. Like Sa'id, he stated that the myth of invesing anything with it would only
produce injustice. As he equated sovereignty with the Arabic terms uliihiyya and
rububiyya (godship), he reserved it to God alone. Similarly, Qutb detailed further
those ideas and associated absolute sovereignty (hakimiyya) with God only as depicted
in the supremacy of the divine law, the Shari'a.
With regard to the question of the role of the community in a system in which
God is the only sovereign, al-Mawdudi and Qutb offered slightly different answers.
Generally, Qutb seems to have paid more attention to the question of sovereignty of
God than its relationship to the community. No doubt he spoke about the function of
the Muslim community in the political system and its right of consultation (shura) and
legislation within the limits of the Shari'a. But it is not possible to find an elaborate
explanation of the place of the community in relation to God's sovereignty except his
reference to the position of man as a vicegerent (khalifa) of God. In only one place he
hinted that there was a difference between the source of authority and the exercise of it.
Since God was entitled to sovereignty, "men exercise the authority of application of
what God legislated by virtue of his sovereignty."1 On the other hand al-Mawdudi
dwelt on his concept of vicegerency for God to define the role of the Muslim
community in relation to God's sovereignty. Every Muslim was a vicegerent of God
and all the Muslims possessed what he called 'popular vicegerency'. This popular
vicegerency entitled the Muslim community to conduct all collective affairs by mutual
consultation (shura) like the appointment of the head of state, the management of all
governmental matters and the function of legislation in conformity with the explicit and
implicit directives of the Qur'an and the Sunna and the general spirit of Islam. He
uncommonly denoted this authority of the people by the phrase 'limited popular
sovereignty under the suzerainty of God'. This fact, in itself, reveals that al-Mawdudi
found that his doctrine of divine sovereignty was inadequate to account for the Muslim
political phenomenon unless it was aided by a doctrine of "popular vicgerency" or
"limited popular sovereignty". Apparently, Qutb faced the same difficulty when he
attempted to make a distinction between the source of sovereignty and the exercise of it.
However, both attempts to resolve the difficulty appear to be unsatisfactory. On the
one hand, how can an entity exercise a right which it does not hold. On the other hand,
al-Mawdudi's concept of popular vicegerecny which assumed that every Muslim is a
caliph of God could hardly be defended in the light of the usage of the word khalifa in
the Qur'an and the Sunna2
1 Sayyid Qutb, Fi-Zilal al-Qur'an, comments on verse 9:40.
2 See below pp. 81-5.
iii. A Restatement
Taking into account the difficulties that faced the modern Muslim attempts to
borrow the Western concept of sovereignty to express the Islamic ideas of rulership, it
may be clear that they were inadequate. The basic reason for this may be the
impropriety of the term sovereignty in its Western usage to accurately convey the
Islamic principles. In the West, sovereignty is understood to mean an authority to
make laws and to enforce them.Those who have believed in a monistic sovereignty
hold these two constituents of it to be inseparable. The modern Muslim thinkers also
believed in a monistic sovereignty but it was difficult to associate its two elements of
making and enforcing the law with one entity. It is difficult to vest the authority of
enacting and implementing the law in the Muslim community since the real law-giver in
the belief of the Muslims is God. It is equally difficult to assign to God a coercive
power which compells men to obey the law. There is no doubt that the necessary
coercion to impose the law is left to be exerted by a human power. Therefore,
sovereignty in its Western sense is neither applicable to God nor to the Muslim
community. The modern Muslims who have used the word sovereignty to express the
Islamic ideas heve found themselves compelled to adapt its senses to suit their
purposes. Tlhey were no longer using it in its original Western sense. Hence,
Mawdudi, for instance, equated sovereignty with uluhiyya and reserved it to God.
Even though he adjusted its proper sense which denotes a human power working
within the human society, he was additionally forced to recognize a human 'limited
popular' sovereignty. Qutb mainly used the word sovereignty (hakimiyya) to mean
law-giving (tashri'). Apparently, those who placed sovereignty within the Muslim
community have modified its sense by excluding from it the aspect of law-making.
In the light of the above discussion, and if it is insisted to use the term
sovereignty to describe Islamic rulership, it may be appropriate to consider the recent
tendency in Western thought which splits sovereignty into distinctive types each fully
sovereign in its proper sphere. In that case, what is termed legal sovereignty and which
deals with law-giving can be assigned to God or to his divine laws, the Sharl'a, as
they are definitely binding upon the Muslim community. Political sovereignty, which
chiefly means the power to enforce the law, can be vested in the Muslim ruler who
enjoys wide powers of administration in Islam. The people, who posses the right to
elect the ruler and depose him and to participate in making collecitve decisions, can be
considered to be holding the ultimate political sovereignty and the ruler the immediate
one. Besides, the influential sovereignty undoubltedly can reside with the people.
Perhaps, this may sound less helpful since the word sovereignty will take many
meanings. However, it is to be remembered that there is no real difference of opinions
as regards the basic outlines of the Islamic political system. Muslim scholars generally
are in agreement concerning the supremacy of the Sharl'a, the rights of the ruler and
the powers of the Muslim community in relation to its government. Therfore, it is only
a problem of terminology which made some scholars assign sovereignty to God and
others associate it with the community. In the final analysis, there is a common
consent regarding the original Islamic principles. In that case, it may be more proper
to use the early Islamic phraseology and reject the word sovereignty, which have
proved to be rather confusing than useful, or equate its meaning with them. Firstly,
there is the term Uluhiyya (godship), which certainly implies the right of command
over the creation and legislation for mankind, and it clearly belongs excluesively to
God. No doubt, the term uluhiyya comprises all the meanings which those who
assigned sovereignty to God wanted to attribute to Him. The term mulk suffices to
denote human political power. It is advantageous also as it can account, as Ibn
Khaldun attempted, for the nature of political power in different civilizations. Mulk can
equally exist in Muslim and non-Muslim societies. But the Islamic mulk, which can
also be termed khilafa, must meet at least two conditions. It must in the first place
recognize the supremacy of the Sharl'a laws and abide by them in accordance with the
doctrine of uluhiyya. Its power and competence (shawka) must originally be derived
from the consent of the governed people, that is to say, they must be consulted in all
collective decisions including the formation of the government and the definition of
law. Ifmulk is established by force instead of consent of the people it is stil possible to
describe it as Islamic as long as it abides by the Sharl'a laws. But it certainly suffers a
serious defectiveness according to the Islamic norms of the khilafa system. Only,
mulk becomes un-Islamic if the Sharl'a laws are not maintained even if it is in the
hands of Muslims. A Muslim would cease to be a Muslim if he rejects the belief in the
supremacy of the Sharl'a laws as that would imply a rejection of the doctrine of
uluhiyya.
To sum up, the terms uluhiyya and mulk are very useful in describing the
nature and location of legal and political authority in Islam. Therfore, if it is required to
use the word sovereignty to signify those authorities it may be more consistent to give it
two senses: one equivalent to uluhiyya and the other to mulk. Uluhiyya implies an
absolute sovereignty and mulk implies a limited relative sovereignty. In other words,
there will be more than one sovereign in Islam, namely, God and the human political
power, mulk, which comprises both the ruler and the people. This fact can be verified
further if we apply the criterion of obedience which detects the existence of sovereignty
in any society. It is evident that the Muslim community ought to render obedience to
God, his Prophet and ulu al-amr as it is stated in the Qur'an. The Qur'an said : "O you
believe, obey Allah and obey His Messenger and those from among you who hold
authority {ulu al-amrj."1 Two objects of obedience stand out from this verse: God or
his divine law as contained in the Qur'an and the Sunna and the human authority
denoted by the term ulu al-amr which indicates both the ruler and the persons who are
qualified to decide the collective affairs of the Muslim community.
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